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BACKGROUND: The Care Act 2014 introduced the most significant change in social care law 
in England for sixty years, fundamentally overhauling the entire care and support system for 
adults, older people and their carers. Given the complexity of the changes, the Department 
of Health and Social Care (known as the Department of Health at the time of the passage of 
the Care Act) and its key partners decided that a comprehensive programme of 
implementation support should be put in place to ensure legislative readiness and increase 
the likelihood of smooth implementation.  There were three interlinking principles that 
underpinned the support programme established by the Department of Health and Social 
Care: 
 Clarity of expectations and requirements: this was to cover the new legislative 
framework, financial issues and the outcomes to be achieved, all of which were to be 
effectively communicated to meet the needs of different audiences. 
 Flexible products: these were to be accessible and drawn upon in a way that met local 
needs. These included for example, information, toolkits to assess readiness, good 
practice guidance, guidance for service users and a model contract.  
 Collaborative infrastructure: one that supports collaboration at local, regional and 
national levels through an ongoing two-way supportive dialogue. Underpinning this 
infrastructure was the relationship between the three key partners – the Department 
of Health and Social Care, the Local Government Association (LGA) and Association of 
Directors of Adult Social Services (ADASS).  
 
These arrangements involved the establishment of three key organisational innovations: a 
Programme Board; a Delivery Board and Programme Management Office; and a regional 




Prevention charging regulations (to be delivered alongside wider 
Charging for Care regulations); Statutory Guidance on prevention and 
housing 
Quality and safety Publish, consult and implement regulations on fundamental 






Delivery of information and advice services to meet needs of 
population; Legal duty on local authorities to provide a universal 
information and advice service 
Paying for care Support for those planning costs associated with care; Design of 
deferred payment scheme 




Statutory guidance for care planning (including care planning process, 
reviews, and personal budgets/resource allocation 
Assessment and 
eligibility 
Assessment regulations; Statutory guidance on assessment 
Care markets Regulations for the market oversight regime (definition of business 
failure, entry criteria, obtaining information from group companies 
including organisations that are not registered providers) and local 
authority duty when providers fail 
Law reform Oversight across the suite of regulations and guidance to ensure 
policy coherence, quality and a single voice. Includes coordination, 
challenge and review 
 
This intervention was felt to be innovative and was underpinned by a close and structured 
relationship between the responsible government department (the Department of Health 
and Social Care), the representative body for the key implementation agencies (the Local 
Government Association) and the representative body for the key professional body (the 
Association of Directors of Adult Social Services).  The Department of Health and Social Care 
wished to better understand the effectiveness of this approach and accordingly invited bids 
to evaluate the programme. As well as a greater understanding of the Care Act programme 
itself, it was expected that the commissioned research would lead to greater insight into how 
government may support the redesign of local services and systems more widely.  A successful 
bid was submitted by a research team from Kent and Durham (latterly Newcastle) Universities 
to conduct a 2-year (2016-2018) research study. This report is the outcome of the 
commissioned research. 
 
METHODS: Our research proposal identified three levels of inter-dependent activity that 
shape outcomes – the macro (national support structures), meso (regional and 
senior/strategic local authority level) and micro (service management/service delivery level). 
Data were explored in three key areas; analysis of relevant theoretical and conceptual 
literature, a review of the support programmes (if any) for a number of previous and current 
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national policy programmes, and an empirical study of the Care Act implementation support 
programme itself. For the latter we undertook fieldwork at national, regional and local levels. 
At the national level interviews with Programme Board members and representatives from 
key stakeholders were conducted. At the regional level we undertook interviews with five 
regional leads. At the locality level we sampled six local authority case study areas where we 
undertook interviews with senior managers, operational staff and focus groups of users and 
carers. Drawing on the policy implementation literature, we identified four broad reasons for 
hindering policy implementation: overly optimistic expectations; implementation in 
dispersed governance; inadequate collaborative policymaking; and the vagaries of the 
political cycle. These can be regarded as the implementation challenges that would have to 
be met by a policy support programme. Building on McConnell’s work on policy failure, we 
then developed an overarching framework to structure our analysis as shown below. 
 
        A Framework for the Assessment of Implementation Support Programmes 




Few challenges to the 
legitimacy of the policy 
from implementing bodies 
Contested legitimacy 
with potential for long-
term damage 
Policy process deemed to be 






All key stakeholders 
support the policy and 
participate in support 
programmes 
Patchy and uneven 
engagement amongst 
stakeholders; some key 
groups missing 





Aims of the implementation 
support process are agreed 
and understood  
Some of the aims and 
activities of the support 
programme are unclear 
and/or contested 
Little understanding or 





A reputation for 
understanding the 
complexity of ‘real-world’ 
implementation 





Perceived and as a remote 
agency with little 






Support programme has 
clear and sustained backing 
at the highest political 
levels 
Uncertainty as to 
whether political 
support is being 
sustained over the 
implementation period 
Support programme is 
undermined by waning 





Evidence that the support 
programme has 
contributed to the 
achievement of policy 
objectives 
Some evidence of policy 
success but uncertainty 
around the contribution 
of the support process 
Both the policy itself and the 
implementation support 





Other Policy Domains: Before undertaking fieldwork, we conducted a mapping exercise of 
other English policies with aims not dissimilar to those of the care Act in order to 
understand what – if any – policy support had been made available. The aims of this 
exercise were to:  
 
 Identify a range of examples of policy implementation support and determine the role 
of government in the implementation 
 Develop understanding of the mechanisms that appear to have contributed to 
successful policy implementation support and how they play out in different contexts. 
 
Fifteen policies were initially identified and reviewed but using sampling criteria we then 
focused on five of these – the Community Care Support Force, Sure Start, Health and 
Wellbeing Boards, the Troubled Families Programme and the NHS Vanguards. Although many 
of the policies had been subject to an evaluation, few of the studies detail the approaches of 
implementation support (if any at all) that had been provided. Our review suggests that 
implementation support has tended to be regarded as somewhat marginal to successful 
policy implementation.  In this context the Care Act programme was seen to be distinctive. 
By the same token our research field could be viewed as relatively unchartered territory. 
 
EFFECTIVENESS of the CARE ACT SUPPORT PROGRAMME 
We structure our findings from data collection at the macro, meso and micro levels within 
the six domains of our assessment framework: 
 
1. Helping to secure policy legitimacy:  to understand how far, and in what ways, the 
creation of the implementation support programme had itself helped to shape the 
legitimacy of the policy, namely, the Care Act 2014. In some important respects the quest 
for policy legitimacy around the Care Act was facilitated by the general view that parts of 
the legislation consisted of legal ‘tidying’, bringing together separate requirements that 
had accreted since the 1948 National Assistance Act. Other parts of the Act were more 
challenging requiring, for example, a new focus on wellbeing, prevention, self-care and 
market-shaping.  However, these concepts already had widespread support within many 
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local authorities and to that extent the Care Act could be regarded as going with, rather 
than against, the grain of organisational and professional thinking. To some extent this 
limits what can be learned from this particular case study about the value of 
implementation support programmes; different challenges would be faced in more 
controversial policy domains within which policy legitimacy is questioned.  
 
However, the existence of a policy consensus should not be equated with a ‘simple’ 
implementation path. The Care Act represented a formidable challenge to established 
ways of working and this complexity constituted the justification for creating the 
implementation support programme. Our fieldwork suggests that the support 
arrangements were successful in helping to secure legitimacy for both the Care Act and 
for the support programme itself. Although there were some concerns about detail and 
practicality, there was little or no suggestion that the support programme was 
unnecessary, unwanted or in any way lacking in legitimacy.  
 
2. Developing stakeholder support: the nature and extent of stakeholder engagement; 
whether all key partners had been involved and the terms of their engagement in the 
implementation support programme. Our fieldwork suggests that the relationship 
between the three key national stakeholders was highly successful. This is not an 
achievement that should be taken lightly - the national, local and professional voices in 
social care have often been in disagreement over the general direction of social and 
economic policies. A key aspect of this relationship was the decision to engage the key 
stakeholders in the policy design process as well as the policy implementation 
arrangements.  
 
Securing a workable balance between the legislative authority and the implementing 
agencies is a complex area. It was clear to all involved that ultimate authority lay with the 
Department of Health and Social Care and that compliance with law, regulation and 
guidance was the bottom line, yet this ‘primus inter pares’ status was rarely raised as a 
problem by other stakeholders. There was little or no reservation expressed about how 
this model had worked out in practice and we were not able to identify any comparable 
achievement in other policy domains. The incorporation of a regional support mechanism 
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generally served to strengthen these achievements, especially by drawing upon networks 
of local stakeholders.  
 
3. Clarity of Programme Contribution: to understand more about two things: whether 
effective use was made of the implementation ‘products’ commissioned by the 
programme; and whether there was clarity over the aims of the support programme. A 
battery of products – guidance, events, factsheets and more – was rapidly commissioned 
by the programme and offered, or distributed to, the implementing agencies. These flows 
of information were widely seen as helpful in averting the need for implementing localities 
to create their own products for local consumption.  However, there are bound to be 
limits over the extent to which centrally commissioned support products and other 
arrangements can meet all of the eventualities encountered at local level. Concerns were 
raised about timeliness, customisation to local contexts and the extent to which the 
products filtered down to operational staff. 
 
In the case of clarity over the aims of the support programme, the key tension was 
between a perception of the programme as helping localities to solve problems and build 
implementation capacity on the one hand, and managing performance on the other. 
These two elements – carrot and stick - do not sit easily together. They conflicted most 
prominently in relation to the ‘stocktaking’ exercises where local authorities were 
required to self-assess their preparedness for Care Act implementation on a wide range 
of dimensions. From the perspective of the centre – and perhaps especially at political 
level – the stocktake findings could be viewed as necessary indicators of progress that 
could justify investment in the implementation support programme. On the other hand, 
localities could – and often did – view them as a means of unwanted attention that could 
result in some form of ‘naming and shaming’ exercise. This led to some element of 
‘gaming’ whereby local authorities assessed themselves as neither doing well or badly in 
order to avoid attracting attention. Implementation support programmes will arguably 
struggle to achieve their aims if the agencies they are designed to support feel uncertain 




4. Comprehension of Complexity: extent to which the support programme was felt able to 
get to grips with the realities of implementing a complex policy. It is well known that 
successful change is at least as much (if not more) about bottom-up behaviour than top-
down prescription; that local contexts (history, tradition, culture, personalities) can filter 
out standardised expectations and requirements; and that most policies – and certainly 
this one – are characterised by complexity rather than simplicity. In short, there is an issue 
around the ways in which an implementation support programme understands and 
responds to the complexity of the implementation environment. 
 
It is unrealistic to expect a national government department to be in touch with, and have 
a detailed understanding of, around 150 local implementation agencies each with their 
own history, culture and democratic governance. Indeed, when national representatives 
were despatched to speak to localities there were some concerns expressed about a lack 
of credibility. It was for this reason that a decision was taken at national level to insert a 
regional dimension into the national support programme. Some modest funding was 
found to establish this level of support and by and large the regional leads were left free 
to determine their own ways of working.  
 
Our fieldwork suggests that in some localities the regional tier ended up having a 
significance that far exceeded expectations. Where they worked well, the regional leads 
were very highly regarded with expressions such as ‘the driving force’ and ‘breathing life’ 
into the implementation process being used. With their local knowledge, for example, 
regional leads could be in a position to explain why some localities might be faring better 
or worse on the stocktake exercises; in doing so they would be also be better placed to 
offer tailored support. Such was the popularity of the regional support mechanism in our 
northern fieldwork sites that we also heard calls for its continuation into the post-
implementation stage, even for consideration to be given to a permanent forum for 
implementation, improvement and innovation.  Much depends here upon the skills and 
experience of those working at this level. Working in the interstices between central 
government and local implementation agencies, acting as the eyes and ears of both levels, 
is a complex task. We heard recurring reference to some of the required personal qualities 
such as trust, knowledge, experience and professional credibility. We know that such skills 
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are not in plentiful supply. There are some important issues to be unpicked here around 
creating the right environment and developing the right skills for such roles to be 
undertaken.  
 
5. Sustaining political support: degree to which the policy has the support (or at least the 
acquiescence) of legislators in order to come to fruition. Our fieldwork was limited by the 
absence of contact with national level politicians, though we did include the major 
national figures at a non-political level. It is understandable that politicians will want 
evidence that policies in which they have invested are producing ‘results’. In the case of 
the Care Act, the most obvious means of such confirmation was the results of the 
stocktake exercises and, as indicated above, this conflation of the support and 
performance management roles of the support programme was a source of consternation 
for localities. However, more nuanced messages could - and were - sent to ministers from 
the Programme Board, and responses were received. To this extent the very existence of 
the implementation support programme could be said to have helped sustain political 
support by keeping open channels of communication between political and non-political 
actors. At a local level we undertook fieldwork with local authority cabinet leads but were 
unable to discern any clear local strategies for political support of the legislation.  
 
6. Contributing to attainment of policy objectives: extent to, and the ways in, which the 
implementation support programme assisted in contributing to the attainment of policy 
objectives. This is difficult to ascertain in this case, given that the programme was not 
designed to ensure the policy made progress in achieving its ends; rather it was 
timetabled to cease once the legal deadlines for implementation had been reached. This 
means the implementation support programme can only reasonably be assessed on the 
narrower indicator of ensuring ‘implementation readiness’ on the part of the responsible 
agencies.  
 
Notwithstanding some of the difficulties identified in our fieldwork, it would be fair to 
conclude that the programme did significantly help to ensure implementation readiness. 
The most commonly expressed concerns were about the mismatch between the 
ambitions of the legislation and the impact of severe funding restrictions on local 
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authority spending. We encountered strong feelings that the austerity programme was 
rendering unattainable the key operating principles of the Care Act such as independence, 
wellbeing and prevention; rather localities felt they were being effectively confined to 
responding to crisis situations. This highlights the difficulties that arise when a policy that 
is collaboratively designed, popular with the receiving audience and supported by an 
implementation programme, is not properly funded to achieve its objectives. An 
implementation support programme, no matter how good, may be best regarded as a 
necessary but not a sufficient factor in securing policy objectives.  
 
Conclusion/Key Messages: Given the relative novelty of comprehensive policy support 
programmes there is correspondingly little empirical evidence to draw upon at this stage. 
However the issues, literature and evidence presented  in this report offer an opportunity to 
tease out some provisional messages for policy-makers and practitioners on how best to 
approach the task:  
 
Policy Design Preparation 
 Exploration of policy options and their feasibility with key implementation agencies 
 Creation of forums for collaborative policy design: the more consensual the design 
process the less the likelihood of disagreements at the implementation stages 
 Development of policy design assurance frameworks: identification of significant 
implementation risks and challenges along with risk management strategies 
 Production of robust implementation statements: clear expectations of what should 
reasonably be expected to be delivered and under what circumstances 
 Use of the best available evidence base to inform policy design 
 Agreement on what would constitute an adequate funding stream for anchoring the 
policy and achieving the programme objectives 
 Ensure the agencies tasked with implementation can reasonably be expected to 
succeed in the task 
Policy Tracking 
 Two-way communication processes: progress reports from implementation agencies 




 Use or creation of intermediary bodies between the policy-making and policy 
implementing levels 
 Development of proportionate primary and secondary targets along with agreed 
timelines 
 Separation of monitoring, regulating and inspecting roles from support mechanisms: 
use of policy support programmes to better understand the stories behind the 
statistics 
 Realistic expectations of what constitutes ‘success’: policy objectives might never be 
fully delivered in the case of ‘wicked issues’ 
Policy Implementation Support 
 Ensure the common ground developed with key stakeholders at the preparation stage 
is also applied to those putting policies into effect in managerial and professional 
roles: understanding bottom-up discretion and dilemmas 
 Recruitment and development of a cadre of experienced and trusted ‘implementation 
brokers’ to offer support tailored to local contexts 
 Offer implementation support where it is needed or requested: ongoing assistance 
with problem-solving and capacity-building to develop sustainable implementation 
skills and knowledge 
Policy Implementation Review 
 Short, medium and longer-term review landmarks: clarity on what should have been 
achieved by when 
 Routine use of action research for formative and summative evaluations 
 Political acknowledgement that complex policies need to be given time to 
demonstrate achievements: costs and benefits will be unevenly distributed over time 
 
Overall, it can be concluded that the Care Act implementation support programme 
significantly helped ensure the implementation readiness of the local agencies. The main 
successes were: securing policy legitimacy, navigating complex issues through stakeholder 
engagement and support, and ensuring of the readiness of local implementation agencies.   
The relationships developed between the key national stakeholders were unusual and 
creative – indeed we were unable to identify comparable achievements in other related policy 
domains. The model demonstrated engagement, drew on existing relationships, brought in 
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external expertise, facilitated the sharing of ideas and balanced bureaucratic with network 
elements of governance.  However, the Care Act was in large part a popular piece of 
legislation that generated a great deal of stakeholder consensus, and this limits what can be 







1. Introduction and Background to the Research 
 
1.1. Background 
The Government set out its plan to reform care and support in the 2012 White Paper, Caring 
for our future: reforming care and support (Secretary of State for Health 2012). Following the 
White Paper, the Government published a draft Bill that led to the passing of the Care Act 
2014 the first phase of which came into force on 1st April 2015. The Care Act 2014 was seen 
as a significant part of a new approach to supporting adults with social care needs and the 
delivery of adult social care services. The overarching objectives were to reduce reliance on 
formal care, to promote people’s independence and well-being, and give people more control 
of their own care and support.   
 
Despite its complexity and some measure of political disagreement over the proposed cap on 
care costs, the Bill was generally uncontentious and passed into law with little wider political 
or public debate. This consensus, both in and beyond Westminster, was sustained by the 
willingness of ministers to accept changes to proposed legislation during almost two years of 
scrutiny following publication of the White Paper. This consensus was also a product of the 
collaborative approach taken to develop the proposals outlined in the White Paper – an 
approach that is central to the focus of this report. Further public consultation on the Bill 
attracted around a thousand responses and involved a special joint committee of MPs and 
peers being established to scrutinise the draft Bill. Most of the committee’s recommendations 
for amendment were adopted with further changes being agreed as the Bill worked its way 
through Parliament.  
 
This high degree of legislative consensus and collaborative approach to drawing up the White 
Paper were important factors in influencing the decision to support the implementation of 
the Care Act through an innovative implementation support programme. Whilst it could be 
argued that all complex policy change requires some form of implementation support, this 
should be easier to achieve where most parties are in agreement over the direction and 
objectives of the policy. This ‘collaborative policy design’ (Ansell et al 2017) is the central 




Notwithstanding this high degree of consensus, it was recognised by the Department of 
Health and Social Care that implementation of the Care Act would be complex and a decision 
was taken to provide an implementation support programme. In effect, it was decided that 
the collaborative model that had characterised policy design should be extended into support 
for policy implementation.  The Department of Health and Social Care, Local Government 
Association (LGA) and Association of Directors of Adult Social Services (ADASS) were identified 
as the three key stakeholders and worked in partnership to support implementation of the 
Care Act in order to develop a consistent and coherent approach to local implementation. 
The programme was reviewed during its first year by the National Audit Office (NAO) which 
suggested there was some evidence that the approach was proving to be effective (NAO 
2015). It was noted that  
 
“The Department’s innovative joint governance with the sector has provided the 
support necessary to carry out this challenging piece of legislation. The Department is 
overseeing the programme, with stakeholders on the main programme board. A 
programme management office, set up jointly with the Local Government Association 
and the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, leads implementation. The 
main innovation is that stakeholders are partners, taking on responsibility and not just 
giving advice. This has been well received by local government and stakeholders” (p7). 
 
The NAO’s analysis of the implementation support programme was based on interviews with 
those involved in the support programme and research undertaken in nine case study site 
local authorities. The analysis of the support programme formed only one element of what 
was a wider assessment of the early stages of implementing Phase 1 of the Care Act 2014.  
 
We describe the structure and operation of the support programme more fully in Section 1.3 
below. The initiative was time-limited to align with the anticipated deadlines for 
implementation. The support programme continued until the first quarter of 2016 with the 
last meeting of the Partnership Board occurring in March 2016. The implementation support 
programme was seen as ground breaking and innovative by the key partners, with the 
potential to hold lessons for other policy domains and for models of implementation support 
more generally. It was against this background that a decision was taken by the Department 
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of Health and Social Care to commission further research on the effectiveness of the support 
programme as one of a number of projects examining the impact of the Care Act 2014.  
 
1.2. The research 
In 2016, the Department of Health and Social Care commissioned a suite of research projects 
examining various aspects of the Care Act’s implementation. This included a project 
specifically to understand more about the effectiveness of the Care Act support programme 
as an approach to implementation support. In particular, the Department was keen to learn 
lessons about the extent to which the Care Act support programme might provide a model 
for supporting the implementation of other national programmes.  The invitation to tender 
for this research requested proposals that understand how government may support the 
redesign of local services and systems, to improve the provision and quality of care and 
support and reduce risks to delivery. The Department was especially keen “… to identify 
effective practice in implementation, and ‘what works’ in terms of service redesign and 
provision” and to identify “potentially transferrable lessons that may be relevant to other local 
government reform programmes. These lessons could also help to focus the approach taken 
to implementing funding reforms from 2020” (Department of Health, Invitation to Tender). 
More specifically, the Department wanted to assess the impact of this partnership approach 
on local implementation.  
 
Key questions and issues identified were: 
 How this approach may support redesign of local services and systems, to improve the 
provision of care and support, to improve quality, and to reduce risks to delivery  
 How, and to what extent, centrally commissioned or developed implementation 
support (including regional Care Act implementation structures) is supporting local 
changes 
 To identify effective practice in implementation, and ‘what works’ in terms of service 
redesign and provision  
 To identify potentially transferrable lessons that may be relevant to other local 




A successful bid was submitted by a research team from Kent and Durham (latterly Newcastle) 
Universities to conduct a 2-year (2016-2018) research study. The proposal identified three 
levels of inter-dependent activity that shape outcomes – the macro (national support 
structures), meso (regional and senior/strategic local authority level) and micro (service 
management/service delivery level). Although it is important to identify the macro factors 
and be aware of their significance, our approach was to regard these as ‘givens’ and to focus 
upon the ways in which actors at the meso and micro levels responded. 
 
1.2.1 Aims and objectives of the research 
The aim of the research was to assess the impact of the national and regional partnership 
implementation support programme on local implementation of the Care Act. In attempting 
to understand this approach, we also undertook a wider review of other national policy 
support programmes along with a review of the theoretical and conceptual literature. Our 
key research objectives were to: 
 
1. Identify key lessons from other implementation support methods and improvement 
research. 
2. Evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the national and regional level support 
arrangements. 
3. Understand the implementation issues at local level, including cultural, organisational 
and operational issues. 
4. Develop a framework for understanding the requirements of a successful 
implementation programme and improvement service. 
5. Spread knowledge transfer between improvement support for the Care Act and other 
policy support programmes across the public sector. 
 
1.2.2 Design and methods 
 We used a mixed methods approach in order to fully address the various aspects of the 
support programme, situate this within a wider context of supporting policy implementation 
and, through researcher and data triangulation, develop lessons for national policy makers 
and those with implementation responsibilities. . To address these research objectives we 
undertook an analysis of relevant theoretical and conceptual literature, a review of the 
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support programmes for a number of previous and current national policy programmes, and 
an empirical study of the implementation support programme for the Care Act 2014. The 
research was pursued via a number of strands.  In order to understand more generally the 
issues related to implementing national policy programmes at a local level we undertook a 
review of relevant literature including evaluations of previous policy programmes where 
implementation support measures had been put in place. We drew on this data to develop 
an analytical framework and a set of criteria associated with successful policy 
implementation. Alongside this, we undertook empirical research on the process and impact 
of the Care Act 2014 implementation support programme at national, regional and local 
levels.  
 
1.2.3 Ethics and research governance 
As the research involved a number of local authority Adult Social Services Departments, we 
were required to apply for research clearance from the Association of Directors of Adult Social 
Services. Approval was granted on 21st July 2017 enabling fieldwork research to commence 
(see appendix A). In addition, as we planned to undertake focus groups with service users we 
were required to obtain HRA Social Services Research ethics. This took longer than expected 
with ethical approval finally obtained on 23rd February 2018 ((Ref: 17/IEC08/0050 - see 
appendix B). 
 
We established an external advisory group with representatives from the Department of 
Health and Social Care, Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, Local Government 
Association, Age UK, Carers UK, National Audit Office and the King’s Fund. The advisory group 
met in person and commented on identifying national and regional interviewees, case study 
selection, interim and final reports. 
 
1.2.4 Data collection and analysis 
We undertook a limited search for relevant published papers on implementation support 
programmes in other relevant policy domains.  The aim of the literature review was to help 




 identifying key lessons from evidence and practice 
 evaluating the impact and effectiveness of support arrangements 
 understanding implementation issues at local level 
 developing a framework for successful improvement 
 developing transferable knowledge 
 
Working with our advisory group members, we also identified a number of previous national 
programmes that had been implemented at a local level as well as some current programmes, 
such as the NHS Vanguard Programme, where we could identify evidence of implementation 
support structures and processes associated with them. We searched for any published 
evidence on these programmes and unpublished reports. We focused on identifying reviews 
of evidence on implementation and service improvement to identify “best practice” models 
of implementation and improvement where there was a national programme delivered local 
within a layered governance framework such as central government policy being delivered 
through a local or sub national government. We also searched for papers that we identified 
as examining support for policy implementation. Searches were undertaken of key databases 
including Embase, ASSIA, and Web of Science. We also examined approaches developed to 
support the implementation of national policies and service improvement programmes. The 
findings of this analysis are set out in our interim report (Hudson et al 2017) and summarised 
in Section 3 of this report. 
 
We undertook a detailed analysis of the work of the implementation support programme 
established to support local implementation of the Care Act 2014. Data collection was 
undertaken at three levels in order to understand the particular role and interpretation by all 
those involved and affected by the changes introduced by the Care Act and how the 
implementation support programme was enacted. Empirical data collection commenced in 
early 2017 and completed in August 2018. At the macro level, we undertook a review of the 
minutes and other documentation related to the implementation support process, and 
conducted interviews with senior staff involved at national level and from a sample of three 




At the macro national and regional levels, we examined the roles and functions of the key 
support mechanisms and structures – the programme board, programme management office 
and work-streams and regional leads. We used a mixed-methods approach involving 
interviews and document analysis to examine process and impacts. We conducted 11 
interviews with Programme Board members and representatives from key stakeholders. 
National interviews were conducted between March 2017 and September 2017. At a regional 
level, we undertook interviews with five regional leads between January 2018 and July 2018. 
We analysed all the Programme Board minutes and documents produced within the support 
programme. We also analysed all the stocktake survey results. Details of key decisions and 
actions taken at the Programme Board meetings are detailed in Appendix C. For these 
interviews, the data collection tools were developed by the research team and shared with 
our external advisory group. 
 
As set out in our application we then collected data at the meso and micro levels through 
interviews with key strategy and management staff in local authorities and with frontline 
team leaders/managers in a number of case study sites. Case study sites were selected to 
provide a sample of different local authority contexts in England (data source; Office for 
National Statistics). Key characteristics for selecting case studies were discussed with the 
external advisory group with type of authority, geographical location, percentage of people 
over 65 and size agreed as key criteria to ensure variation: 
 
Case study A: North East metropolitan district unitary authority  
Total population (2017) – population 200-300,000       percentage 65years+ - 17% 
Urban/rural split – 99%/1% 
Socio-demographic breakdown: Higher managerial, administrative and professional 
occupations – 8%; Lower managerial, administrative and professional occupations – 18%; 
Intermediate occupations – 12%: Small employers and own account workers – 9%; Lower 
supervisory and technical occupations – 17%; Semi-routine occupations – 17%; Routine 








Case study B:  Smaller northern unitary authority 
Total population (2017) – population 100-200,000        percentage 65years+ - 19.5% 
Urban/rural split – 68%/32% 
Socio-demographic breakdown: Higher managerial, administrative and professional 
occupations – 8%; Lower managerial, administrative and professional occupations – 20%; 
Intermediate occupations – 10%; Small employers and own account workers – 9%; Lower 
supervisory and technical occupations – 16%; Semi-routine occupations – 16%; Routine 
occupations – 17%; Never worked and long-term unemployed – 6%. 
 
Case study C:  Northern metropolitan district council 
Total population (2017) – population 300-400,000        percentage 65years+ - 17% 
Urban/rural split – 82%/18% 
Socio-demographic breakdown: Higher managerial, administrative and professional 
occupations – 9%; Lower managerial, administrative and professional occupations – 19%; 
Intermediate occupations – 10%; Small employers and own account workers – 10%; Lower 
supervisory and technical occupations – 15%; Semi-routine occupations – 15%; Routine 
occupations – 20%; Never worked and long-term unemployed – 4%. 
 
Case study D: Large southern county council 
Total population (2017) – population over 1 million       percentage 65years+ - 17.9% 
Urban/rural split – 72%/28% 
Socio-demographic breakdown: Higher managerial, administrative and professional 
occupations – 14%; Lower managerial, administrative and professional occupations – 24%; 
Intermediate occupations – 11%; Small employers and own account workers – 14%; Lower 
supervisory and technical occupations – 12%; Semi-routine occupations – 12%; Routine 
occupations – 11%; Never worked and long-term unemployed – 3%. 
 
Case study E: Rural eastern county council 
Total population (2017) – population 100-200,000        percentage 65years+ - 19.8% 
Urban/rural split – 61%/39% 
Socio-demographic breakdown: Higher managerial, administrative and professional 
occupations – 13%; Lower managerial, administrative and professional occupations – 23%; 
Intermediate occupations – 10%; Small employers and own account workers – 14%; Lower 
supervisory and technical occupations – 14%; Semi-routine occupations – 14%; Routine 







Case study F: London Borough Council  
Total population (2017) – population 200-300,000       percentage 65years+ - 10.3% 
Urban/rural split – 100%/0% 
Socio-demographic breakdown: Higher managerial, administrative and professional 
occupations – 13%; Lower managerial, administrative and professional occupations – 23%; 
Intermediate occupations – 11%; Small employers and own account workers – 12%; Lower 
supervisory and technical occupations – 14%; Semi-routine occupations – 14%; Routine 
occupations – 10%; Never worked and long-term unemployed – 7%. 
 
In selecting case studies, we included three sites that were also included in the NAO study. 
This provided an opportunity to undertake some limited longitudinal comparison in these 
sites. At the meso and micro levels, we planned to undertake interviews and focus groups in 
six selected case study sites with senior managers, operational staff, local providers and run 
focus groups with service users/carers. In addition, we also planned to observe operational 
meetings. Data collection tools for case study interviews were developed by the research 
team and piloted with staff in a local authority not included as a case study. We were also 
advised and supported by our public and patient advisors in terms of developing our data 
collection approach and, in particular, planning the focus groups with users and carers. We 
were also supported by the Public and Patient Engagement Officer employed at the Centre 
for Health Services Studies, University of Kent. Due to the timing of the research it was not 
possible, as we had hoped it would be, to observe operational meetings relating to the 
implementation support provided by the national programme board or programme office, 
both of which had ceased to function by the time the fieldwork commenced. 
  











A 1 5 0 6 0 
B 4 9 1 14 1 
C 1 8 1 10 1 
D 3 6 0 9 0 
E 6 7 0 13 0 
F 6 2 0 8 0 
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We planned to undertake 12 focus groups but, in the end, only carried out two.  The reasons 
were twofold. The first two focus groups provided no real evidence of any knowledge or sense 
of a national implementation programme and the data obtained from participants was of very 
limited value in addressing our research questions.  We discussed this with our PPI advisors 
and it was felt that it would provide little additional contribution to hold further focus groups 
which would require people giving up time to participate. A further issue was that recruitment 
was difficult with many of those approached not agreeing to participate. Local support and 
user groups felt that this was because of the limited engagement they and users and carers 
had with national implementation. Their interest was more on local implementation that 
affected them directly. The topic guides for the focus groups were developed together with 
user representatives from the CHSS patient experience and public involvement group – the 
Opening Doors to Research Group. This process was supported by the CHSS Patient 
Experience and Public Involvement lead.  We also interviewed local providers but initial 
indications suggested little or no contact with the support programme. 
 
All interviews and focus groups were recorded and transcribed. Data was entered into NVivo 
for coding. Coding was undertaken by two researchers and a sample of interviews were 
independently coded by the researchers and then shared with the wider research team to 
check and agree the coding frame. Data from the NAO study was also reviewed in relation to 
its analysis of the early stages of the support programme and, where relevant, local case study 
data. Thematic data from the documentation was also coded in a similar way. 
 
We analysed the data from the programme documentation and empirical data collection 
using the framework developed in our review of the literature and previous approaches to 
policy support based on McConnell’s analysis of policy success and failure and policy process 
domains (see Hudson et al 2019, and Table 3, Section 2 below). This enabled the drawing out 
of themes and identifying where aspects of implementation support might be more successful 
in some respects than others. Initially, all members of the research team read and analysed 
the same group of interview transcripts to ensure consistency of analysis. Once agreed, the 
remaining interviews were analysed by one researcher and then checked with a second 
member of the team. By synthesising the findings from across each strand of the research, 
we also provided an understanding of the multi-level coherence between the macro, meso 
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and micro levels for service improvement support which might be adopted in designing future 
support programmes. 
 
1.3. Care Act 2014 Implementation Support Programme 
This section outlines the main aspects of the Care Act itself and the Implementation Support 
(IS) programme. The Care Act 2014 introduced the most significant change in social care law 
in England for sixty years, fundamentally overhauling the entire care and support system for 
adults, older people and their carers. It consisted of two phases, the first phase being 
introduced in April 2015 with phase 2 to be introduced in 2016. However, in July 2015 it was 
announced that Phase 2 (introducing a cap on care costs) was to be deferred until April 2020. 
Even this has now been abandoned and new proposals are to be brought forward in a Green 
Paper expected in early 2019. This removed (for the immediate future) the most contentious 
part of the legislation that held serious concerns about the funding implications.  
 
However, the proposed changes in phase one alone were challenging and complex. They 
included:   
• providing services that prevent care needs from becoming more serious, or delay the 
impact of their needs;  
• meeting a national minimum level of eligibility for a person’s care and support needs;  
• assessing carers, regardless of how much care they provide, and meet carers’ needs on 
a similar basis to those they care for;  
• offering deferred payment or loan agreements to more people, avoiding property sales 
to pay for care and support;  
• providing information and advice (including financial advice) on care and support 
services to all, regardless of care needs;  
• providing an independent advocate where such support is needed;  
• working with care providers to get a diverse and high-quality range of local services;  
• complying with a new legal framework for protection of adults at risk of abuse or 
neglect;  
• giving continuity of care to those whose needs are being funded by the local authority 
who choose to move to another area;  
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• assessing the care and support needs of children and their carers, who may need 
support after they turn 18, as they move to adult social care; and  
• arranging and funding services to meet the care and support needs of adults who are 
detained in prison. 
 
Given the complexity of the changes to adult social care, the Department of Health and Social 
Care and its key partners – the LGA and ADASS – concluded that a traditional top-down, one-
size fits all approach to implementation support would be an inappropriate model for 
achieving successful implementation across all local areas. This view was clearly set out in 
2013 at a meeting of the Partnership Board that was attended by the key national 
stakeholders involved in the White Paper and Care Bill (Care and Support Reform Programme 
Board, November 28th 2013).  
 
The Partnership Board also set out the three interlinking principles that underpinned the 
support programme established by the Department of Health and Social Care: 
 Clarity of expectations and requirements: this was to cover the new legislative 
framework, financial issues and the outcomes to be achieved, all of which were to be 
effectively communicated to meet the needs of different audiences. 
 Flexible products: these were to be accessible and drawn upon in a way that met local 
needs. These included for example, information, toolkits to assess readiness, good 
practice guidance, guidance for service users and a model contract (See table 2 below). 
 Collaborative infrastructure: one that supports collaboration at local, regional and 
national levels through an ongoing two-way supportive dialogue. Underpinning this 
infrastructure was the relationship between the three key partners – the Department 
of Health and Social Care, the LGA and ADASS.  
 
In order to support the implementation programme it was agreed to establish three key 
organisational innovations: the Programme Board; a Delivery Board and Programme 
Management Office; and a regional infrastructure. The overall support programme is outlined 




























While some aspects of these features of support had been present in other policy 
programmes, the main innovation was that stakeholders were partners, taking on 
responsibility for achieving successful implementation and not just giving advice. Key 
priorities for implementation were identified and included: “(a) Care Act Implementation 
Grant of £125,000 allocated to each local authority; (b) Strengthening of regional capacity 
and the recently confirmed regional training and implementation support fund; (c) National 
support products as follows: Workforce learning and development resources and capacity 
planning tools; Implementation support toolkits and practice guidance; Support for providers” 
(Hughes, 2014 p1).   
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1.3.2 Programme Board  
The Programme Board (PB) was set up in the wake of the Care and Support White Paper of 
July 2012 (see: ‘Care and support reform programme board in figure 2). The membership was 
large (over thirty) with eleven representatives from the Department of Health and Social Care 
and the remainder from the LGA, ADASS and other agencies, including SOLACE (Society of 
Local Authority Chief Executives), NHS England, Skills for Care and NICE (National Institute of 
Health and Care Excellence). The PB was upwardly accountable to the Department of Health 
Major Programmes Board and had beneath it a Programme Management Office (PMO), a 
Support Delivery Board and nine core work streams (See table 2).  The PB was seen as having 
three functions: 
 Support: to provide national leadership and oversee the delivery of practical support 
to local authority providers and other delivery partners 
 Assurance: to oversee delivery of the Care Act legal framework; ensure that 
appropriate local delivery plans were in place; provide assurance on the state of 
readiness and delivery confidence; ensure expected benefits and associated outcomes 
were being realised. 
 Delivery: to oversee effective delivery of the national programme plan; bring together 
key representatives of delivery organisations; manage risks and make decisions about 
delivery. 
 
1.3.3 Delivery Board and Programme Management Office 
The Care and Support Reform Delivery Board’s function was more operational.  It was chaired 
by a representative of Department of Health and Social Care and tasked with driving timely 
and effective delivery; ensuring risks and other issues were identified and mitigated; and 
assessing data to monitor impact and drive the delivery of anticipated programme benefits. 
The Delivery Board met monthly before each Programme Board. The programme 
Management Office (PMO) was established in November 2013 to support the work of the 
Board in undertaking its three core functions – support, assurance and delivery. The PMO 
supported the ten work streams, provided a single point of contact for progress, enabled the 
Board to agree and prioritise progress, identified a single senior responsible officer to sign off 
on plans and related issues, and supported the identification of cross-cutting issues.  
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Table 2: Overview of work-streams for Care Act implementation support  
Work-stream Responsibility of stream Key implementation support 
Prevention and 
housing 
Prevention charging regulations (to be 
delivered alongside wider Charging for 
Care regulations); Statutory Guidance on 
prevention and housing 
Care and Support Specialised Housing 
Fund - up to £415m used to stimulate the 
market for specialised housing 
Quality and 
safety 
Publish, consult and implement regulations 
on fundamental standards; Implement 
new system of quality ratings against the 
new standards 
Evidence-based, outcome-based good 




Delivery of information and advice services 
to meet needs of population; Legal duty on 
local authorities to provide a universal 
information and advice service 
Improving online LA information; 
Improve access to independent advice 
and support for people with eligible 
needs 
Paying for care Support for those planning costs 
associated with care; Design of deferred 
payment scheme 
Identification and sharing of best 




Distributing costs of care between state 
and individual in equitable manner 
Development of a toolkit for local 
authorities to support readiness; Input 




Statutory guidance for care planning 
(including care planning process, reviews, 
and personal budgets/resource allocation 
Common principles of resource allocation 
systems; Easy read guidance for service 
users that details what they can expect 




Assessment regulations; Statutory 
guidance on assessment 
Tools to support assessment – Developed 
through ADASS; Tools and training 
module to support implementation of 
the new assessment and eligibility 
framework – Delivered by Skills for Care 
Care markets Regulations for the market oversight 
regime (definition of business failure, entry 
criteria, obtaining information from group 
companies including organisations that are 
not registered providers) and local 
authority duty when providers fail 
Principles for dealing with serious 
provider failure; Self-help networks of 
DASS’s to provide mutual support 
Law reform Oversight across the suite of regulations 
and guidance to ensure policy coherence, 
quality and a single voice. Includes 
coordination, challenge and review 
Possible model contract for delegation of 
functions; Integration Transformation 
Fund and Pioneers – financial and 
learning resources to make integrated 
health and care a reality; General 
information and support to local 




  1.3.4 Regional Infrastructure 
In recognition of the potentially wide gap between central government and a multiplicity of 
implementing local authorities, the decision was taken to develop a regional level of support 
to act as a conduit between localities and the PMO. It was suggested in PB minutes (November 
28th, 2013) that the regional level support would: facilitate rapid dissemination of the latest 
tools and advice; increase the pace of local implementation; and link into assurance 
mechanisms where the local pace is thought to be falling behind. Funding was to be found to 
establish this level of support. 
 
Organisationally this level of support was to build on arrangements for existing models 
connected with other programmes such as Health and Wellbeing Boards and Transforming 
Excellence in Adult Social Care. The key partners consisted of lead local authority CEOs, 
directors of adult social care and lead elected members, all supported by Department of 
Health and Social Care Regional Deputy Directors and LGA Principal Advisers. Regional 
branches of ADASS were expected to take the lead on implementation arrangements and a 
named contact was to act as an ‘engine room’ for cascading information, advice and support. 
 
This brief descriptive account of the IS programme for the Care Act 2014 is testimony to the 
seriousness with which the mission was undertaken at national level. It suggests a keen 
awareness of the potential danger of policy failure and a determination to avoid it in ways 
that could mark it out as different and distinctive. The need for implementation to be in the 
hands of a multiplicity of local agencies - statutory, voluntary and independent - is a key 
feature of the Care Act context. Although highly detailed statutory guidance (the epitome of 
a top-down approach) was indeed produced, there was also an appreciation of the influence 
of local contexts and dispersed power bases.  
 
The PB and PMO in effect functioned as an ‘intermediary body’ – an implementation support 
centre that attempted to bridge the gap between centrally determined legislative 
requirements and local implementation centres. The model consists of a clear but complex, 
multi-layered, time-limited intervention characterised by highly collaborative relationships 
and a desire for flexible local implementation facilitated by regional mechanisms. The 
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programme also exhibits all three of the purposes of implementation support interventions 
identified by Gold (2014) - managing and regulating; problem solving; and capacity building.  
  
1.3.5 Initial assessment of the organisation and structure of implementation support 
The structure and operation of the IS programme was examined by the NAO in 2014/15 (NAO 
2015). They concluded that the Department’s innovative joint governance with the sector had 
“… provided the support necessary to carry out this challenging piece of legislation.” (P7). 
They found that generally the approach was well received by local government and 
stakeholders. They identified that the programme had undertaken the kinds of activities 
outlined above.  Guidance materials and extra support were being offered local authorities 
and the programme management office had organised events and meetings, and 
commissioned tools and guidance. Importantly the NAO found that Adult Social Care 
departments and stakeholders had been involved in determining the content of the tools and 
guidance material and making sure they met the required standards.  
 
In line with the recommendations of the Programme Board, additional funding was provided 
by the Department of Health and Social Care to local authorities to support their preparations 
for the Care Act with further support available if needed. However, the NAO noted that too 
tight a timetable had been provided for local authorities to act on final guidance and obtain 
funding allocations that had inhibited local implementation planning in some areas. The 
Department published its final regulations and guidance 5 months and 10 days before the 
Care Act was due to be introduced. The ‘stocktake’ surveys found that pressures on councils, 
compounded with uncertainty over key guidance and information, had delayed or otherwise 
affected Care Act preparations. For example, stakeholders and councils could not produce 
support materials until the Department published final regulations and guidance (paragraphs 
2.12 to 2.13).  
 
Despite the challenging timetable, 99% of local authorities said they were confident that they 
would be able to carry out the Care Act reforms from April 2015. Most local authorities 
expressed confidence in being able to meet their statutory duties such as providing 
information and advice and giving carers extra support. The NAO noted, however, that it 
would take much longer to make the culture change envisaged in the Care Act. At the national 
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level, and from the macro perspective, there certainly seemed to be evidence to suggest that 
the IS programme had been carefully developed and was being well received.   
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2. Contextual and Conceptual Issues 
 
2.1 The Nature of the Problem 
Following on from the ground-breaking study by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) there is now 
a burgeoning literature on the ways in which aspirations and ideas often fail to translate into 
workable policy (Hill & Hupe, 2014). As Hupe and Hill (2015) note the normatively attractive 
top-down view is predicated on three questionable assumptions: a chronological order in 
which expressed intentions precede action; a linear causal logic whereby goals determine 
instruments and instruments determine results; and a hierarchy within which policy 
formation is more important than policy implementation. This notion of moving from one 
stable state to another as a result of planned change is now widely acknowledged to be at 
odds with work on complex adaptive systems, where change is seen as constant and 
stakeholders need to be adaptable and flexible (Byrne, 1998).  
 
Disillusionment with this top-down approach has slowly taken root as governments have 
recognised that more needs to be done at the post-legislative stage to try to ensure intentions 
are turned into results – as Harris and Rutter (2014) put it, ‘implementation has become the 
Achilles’ heel of the UK system’. At the same time, it is unclear how best to support 
implementation. This Part of the report aims to fill the gap in three ways: by unpicking the 
key factors behind policy failure; by highlighting different approaches to supporting policy 
implementation; and by developing a tentative framework for assessing the effectiveness of 
implementation support programmes.  
 
2.1.1 The persistence of policy failure 
Dunlop (2017) points out that although the likelihood of policy failure is at least as high as 
policy success the literature tends to focus on the latter – for example with injunctions to 
follow ‘best practice’ and centrally devised guidelines. Although there is now growing interest 
in the notion of ‘policy failure’ (Volker, 2014) the tendency is to treat failures somewhat 
tautologically – policy failure is equated with non-implementation, either in full or in part. In 
reality, as McConnell (2015) notes, ‘failure’ resides at the extreme end of a success-failure 
spectrum where it is characterised by absolute non-achievement. He observes that ‘in reality 
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failure is rarely unequivocal and absolute...even policies that have become known as classic 
policy failures also produced small and modest successes’ (p231). 
 
In the UK, the best-known study is that of ‘policy blunders’ by King and Crewe (2013) - a study 
of twelve government policies that failed in their objectives, spent and wasted large amounts 
of public money, ‘wrecked the lives of ordinary people’ and were foreseeable. The authors 
identify two ‘structural causes’ of this policy failure: 
 
 A Deficit of Deliberation: The British system, it is said, is designed ‘for decisiveness rather 
than deliberation’. In the cases studies selected for investigation the authors say the 
Government did not deliberate with the people most directly affected, with those 
whose job it is to apply a policy, with independent experts or with those opposed to the 
policy. In most cases, bills were rushed through Parliament with little time afforded for 
substantive debate or detailed scrutiny. 
 
 A Deficit of Accountability: Ministers tend not to be held accountable for the outcomes 
of their policy initiatives – by the time a blunder becomes apparent, they have moved 
on or out. One consequence of this is that ministers are attracted to short-term results 
and to pushing through policies as quickly as possible, rather than getting involved in 
the messy and frustrating details of implementation. 
 
If a more effective approach to implementation support is wanted, then the reasons for the 
persistence of policy failures such as this need to be more carefully unpicked. It is possible 
that certain policies are purposely vague or ambiguous precisely in order to delay or thwart 
implementation (Matland, 1995) and these largely lie outside our interest. Given the 
assumption of a desire to bring a policy to implementation fruition, four broad hindrances 
can be identified: overly optimistic expectations; implementation in dispersed governance; 






2.1.2 Overly Optimistic Expectations 
‘Over-optimism’ was the title given to an influential review of failure in major government 
projects in the UK by the National Audit Office (2013). It noted this to be: 
 
‘A long-standing problem widely recognised that too frequently results in the 
underestimation of the time, costs and risks to delivery and the overestimation of the 
benefits. It undermines value for money at best and, in the worst cases, leads to 
unviable projects.’ (p3) 
 
The problem is not confined to the UK - a comparative study from the OECD (2015) also notes 
successful delivery performance to be an ongoing challenge for centres of government. This 
is especially the case where policies require a long-term focus. A study by the Institute for 
Government (2016) of four such policy areas - UK climate change, UK international 
development, Irish anti-poverty strategies and rough sleepers in England – identified three 
common features that complicated delivery: costs and benefits are distributed unevenly over 
time – there is a long-time lag between implementation and positive outcomes; they are 
intellectually contested, politically contentious and hard to deliver; and the causes and effects 
span government siloes. 
 
In the case of the UK Major Projects Portfolio, the NAO study identified five interacting factors 
that contribute to over-optimism: 
 
 Complexity: Public bodies too often underestimate the delivery challenges of complex 
projects and fail to spend time to deepen their understanding; there is a commitment 
to a ‘solution’ with insufficient understanding of the context and options. 
 Evidence Base: Good decisions are based on having sufficient objective, accurate and 
timely information on costs, timescales, benefits and risks, but too often projects are 
planned and evaluated on poorly thought through data and modelling. 
 Stakeholders: Successful projects are driven by the effective interaction of organisations 
and people who may have widely varying aspirations and requirements. Government 




 Behaviour and Incentives: The NAO refers to the notion of ‘strategic misrepresentation’ 
– a desire on the part of individuals and groups to protect and boost their own prospects 
by securing investment in a project. 
 Challenge and Accountability: Decision-makers may be inclined to seek short-term 
recognition and rewards, and are often not in the same role when a project is under 
way and problems emerge. 
 
These explanations cover both the top-down and bottom-up implementation models. The 
top-down model focuses on how policies are communicated to lower level public 
administrators who are then responsible for implementation. The bottom-up explanation 
advanced notably by Lipsky (1980) claims that the top-down view overlooks the significance 
of the bottom-level of the implementation chain where front-line actors can have sufficient 
discretion in their work to significantly influence implementation.  
 
2.1.3 Implementation in Dispersed Governance 
Policies formulated at national level may face the challenge of ensuring some degree of 
consistency in delivery at sub-national level – a process that is especially fraught where the 
sub-national level has some separate degree of political authority. The application of 
knowledge is highly dependent on context and involves the ‘messy engagement of multiple 
players with diverse sources of knowledge’ (Davies et al, 2008). Existing evidence of policy 
implementation suggests that there is no single ‘right answer’ in the world of policy-making 
but only ‘more-or-less good reasons to arrive at more-or-less plausible conclusions’ (Russell et 
al, 2008) This highlights the importance of understanding the processes through which policy 
is implemented and how successful implementation and service improvements can best be 
supported. Sausman et al (2016) draw on the concept of ‘local universality’ to similarly 
describe the process whereby general rules, products or guidelines are shaped and tailored 
to fit into local contexts and enacted within practices.  
 
2.1.4 Inadequate Collaborative Policymaking 
What the above section implies is that whatever the requirements and expectations at central 
level, the local implementation process will always be in some ways unique. The implication 
35 
 
here is that policy design requires continuous collaboration with a range of local 
‘downstream’ implementation actors such as end users, frontline staff and a range of local 
service agencies. In this way design and implementation begins to resemble an integrated 
process rather than discrete and distinct stages.  
 
Ansell et al (2017) emphasise the need for policies to be designed in a way that ‘connects 
actors vertically and horizontally in a process of collaboration and joint deliberation’. This, the 
authors say, ‘should not be equated with a long and cumbersome search for unanimous 
consent’. Rather it constitutes ‘a shared effort to establish a common ground for public 
problem-solving through a constructive management of difference that leaves room for 
dissent and grievance’ (p475). This, it is argued, will lead to a joint commitment to, and 
responsibility for, the implementation of innovative policy design.  
 
2.1.5 Vagaries of the Political Cycle 
Policies of significance that involve change over a long period of time raise issues of political 
sustainability and support. In general, there is evidence to suggest that the political will 
necessary to drive long-term policy-making will tend to dissipate over time (Norris & McCrae, 
2013) with Ilott et al (2016) identifying three discrete phases: 
 
 Phase 1: Rising Salience: In this phase an issue becomes politicised, gaining the attention 
of ministers. It is the point at which the problem to be tackled is defined and articulated, 
and some indication of what success would look like is identified.  
 Phase 2: Building Blocks: Here politicians and officials put in place the policies, 
institutions and targets aimed at resolving the problem. These actions should serve as 
a rallying point for the coalitions of support needed to sustain long-term focus. 
 Phase 3: Embedding: This constitutes the period at risk of diminishing political interest 
during which the ‘building blocks’ nevertheless need to deliver some evidence of 
success.  
 
The danger here is that policy-makers are more likely to get credit for legislation that is passed 
than for implementation problems that have been avoided. Indeed the latter will probably 
tend to be seen as ‘someone else’s problem’ (Weaver, 2010). Ansell et al (op cit) identify five 
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reasons why politicians might shun engagement with implementation: policies have been 
adopted with high popular sentiment but little prospect of successful implementation; an 
unwillingness to share authority with others deemed less politically important; possession of 
an ideological fervour unsuited to collaborative governance; undue ties to partisan interest 
groups; and the perceived need to deliver unduly quick solutions to complex issues.  
 
2.2 Developing an implementation support programme 
Rather than just let policies drift into full or partial failure, governments are beginning to take 
an interest in ways in which the policy process – especially policy implementation – can be 
strengthened and supported. This interest is taking place at four sequential points in the 
implementation process: preparation, prioritisation and tracking, support, and, finally, 
review. However, given the relative novelty of these sorts of interventions, particularly where 
they constitute a coherent programme, there is still relatively little in the way of an 
established literature, let alone a framework for evaluating their effectiveness.  
 
One generic framework open to adaptation is that proposed by McConnell (op cit) in his 
discussion of degrees of policy failure, where he distinguishes between three inter-linked 
activities – process, programmes and politics. It is the first of these that is most applicable to 
the role of implementation support. He further distinguishes between three degrees of 
failure: tolerable (where opposition and criticism is small); conflicted (where failures are 
matched by achievements); and total (where opposition is great and support minimal). 
Applying these three levels to the process domain of policy-making gives us the following 
framework for assessing the contribution of an implementation support programme (see 
Table 3).  
 
Following some successful initial trialling of this framework with our early data collection, we 
concluded that it was able to provide a robust structure for our wider examination of the 
effectiveness of the Care Act IS Programme. The six dimensions adequately cover all of the 
aspirations of the Care Act programme and are also capable of being applied to comparable 
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The framework also recognises that there is no simple dividing line between success and 
failure – interventions can work well in some respects but not in others. A nuanced 
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understanding of why some aspects of implementation support intervention seem to work  
while others do not can help in drawing out more general lessons.  
 
2.2.1 Implementation Preparation 
The aim at this point would be to ensure government is more alert to the practicalities of 
implementation by scrutinising the feasibility of policy proposals more carefully at the outset 
– in effect, better ‘policy design’ (May, 2015).  Faulty policy design can stem from many causes 
– a poor understanding of the problem, insufficient knowledge of the implementation 
context, unclear and even contradictory goals, absence of political backing, amongst them. In 
such circumstances, any degree of successful implementation is unlikely (Hogwood & Peters, 
1985).  
 
A failure to draw upon, or be transparent about, the use of evidence has been highlighted in 
two recent UK reports by Sense About Science (2015, 2017). In these reports, the question is 
asked: ‘could someone outside government see what you’re proposing to do and why?’ A 
framework is developed covering diagnosis (the issue to be addressed), proposal (the chosen 
intervention), implementation (how the intervention will be introduced and run) and 
evaluation (how will we know if the policy has worked?). A scoring system with four levels 
was applied to 593 discrete policy proposals by thirteen domestic policy departments. 
Although some examples of good practice were identified, there were some general 
shortcomings evident: sharing work done; poor referencing; unclear chains of reasoning; and 
a failure to consider other policy options. 
 
Gold (2014) has noted that few countries have mechanisms in place to ensure more robust 
policy design. In the UK, the Civil Service Reform Plan (HM Government, 2012) requires 
permanent secretaries to warn before a political decision is taken if there are likely to be 
implementation concerns, but in practice the central machinery only tends to be activated 
once an established policy is off track. Again, a review of the Plan (HM Government, 2014) 
made a commitment to publish more of the evidence base that supports policymaking, but 




An interesting exception in this regard is Australia, where the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet has issued guidelines (Australian Government, 2014) for policy 
proposals with ‘significant implementation risks or challenges’. These policies are defined as 
fitting one or more of several criteria: addresses a top Government priority; has significant 
budget implications; makes major or complex changes to existing policies; involves significant 
cross-agency issues; is particularly sensitive; requires urgent implementation; involves new 
or complex delivery systems; and has been developed over a very short period.  
 
In such cases, a full implementation plan has to be developed during the drafting process 
covering seven domains: planning, governance, stakeholder engagement, risks, monitoring, 
review and evaluation, resource management and management strategy. Each of these is 
further broken down and made available in the form of implementation ‘toolkits’. There does 
not yet appear to be any evaluation of the effectiveness of these arrangements. In the UK, a 
more modest suggestion to create a watchdog (similar to the Office of Budget Responsibility) 
to scrutinise the assumptions underpinning government decisions about public spending 
(Institute for Government/Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, 2017) has 
yet to receive a positive response. 
 
2.2.2 Implementation Prioritisation and Tracking 
The emphasis here is to ensure a focus on implementation by establishing some form of 
central ‘delivery unit’ to track progress. Gold (op cit) sees the proliferation of such units as a 
global trend (they are now reckoned to exist in 25 countries) fulfilling several functions: 
 
 performance monitoring: tracking progress against key policy priorities through 
analysing a constant stream of departmental performance data 
 problem-solving: undertaking field visits to identify obstacles to delivery and flagging 
up where additional resources are needed to fix problems 
 progress assessing: supplying heads of government with routine progress reports 
 
Whilst most such units have been located at the centre of government, this does not have to 
be the case; others can be established in key ministries or for specific priority programmes. 
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In the UK, the first overt strategy unit was probably the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) 
created in 1971 to relate the policies of individual departments to the government’s strategy 
as a whole (Challis et al, 1988; Blackstone et al, 1988). The Conservative Government of 
Margaret Thatcher abolished the unit but the idea was revived under Tony Blair’s first Labour 
Government with the creation of a Performance and Innovation Unit based in the Cabinet 
Office in 1998, followed by the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit in 2002 and a Delivery Unit run 
by Michael Barber who has subsequently written about the experience (Barber, 2015). The 
latter - intended to ensure progress on selected priority public service targets – was in turn 
abolished by the 2010 Conservative Government which then set up the Major Projects 
Authority (MPA) to manage its portfolio of around 200 discrete high-risk projects. In 2016 the 
MPA merged with Infrastructure UK to form a new organisation, the Infrastructure and 
Projects Authority.  
 
It is far from clear how effective these different bodies have been. In a global review of the 
effectiveness of delivery units in education services (Todd et al, 2014) a range of key lessons 
was identified. These include: focusing on a limited number of key priorities; being able to 
assume that budgets for each priority are adequate; developing good quality data and metrics 
to measure what matters; producing mutually agreed targets that are realistic and achievable; 
ensuring a clear understanding of delivery systems and active stakeholder engagement; and 
constructing an effective communications strategy. 
 
The theory of knowledge here is the positivist tradition with its assumption that social 
phenomena can be divorced from their context and that objective knowledge about them can 
be achieved through empirical observation and quantitative expression. This constitutes a 
linear-rational model of decision-making in which unambiguous objectives are established, 
action upon them flows in predictable ways through established implementation structures 
and outcomes are monitored against them. It is the realisation that implementation is 
complex, contextual and as much a bottom-up as a top-down imperative that has led to 




2.2.3 Implementation Support 
Tracking performance delivery alone is unlikely to be sufficient to ensure effective 
implementation, especially where the policy is complex and long-term in nature. The question 
then arises as to whether some form of implementation support might be needed and, if so, 
what approach is appropriate. All such approaches require close liaison with, and 
understanding of, the position of the implementing agencies.  
 
In a review of the components of service improvement for the Health Foundation, Allcock et 
al (2015) point out that those who work on the front line know more about the challenges of 
delivery than national policy makers; a crucial task for implementation support is therefore 
to tap into the perceptions and experiences of those whose behaviour will shape the 
implementation process. This support is not so much about understanding legal obligations 
or the requirements of statutory guidance than about promoting the art and craft of policy 
implementation. It involves assessing existing capacity to deliver, knowing what is being done 
well, what needs improving and how best to build new capacity.  
 
The danger here is that such bodies try to straddle several strands of activity, some of which 
are at best in tension with each other, and at worst are contradictory. Three purposes can be 
identified: managing and regulating; problem-solving; and capacity building. 
 
Managing and Regulating:  
Here the focus is on the identification of procedures for the measurement and scrutiny of 
performance and ensuring required standards are met. Gold (op cit) notes that there is a risk 
that performance rating systems will be vulnerable to ‘grade inflation’. It is an approach 
better suited to prioritisation and tracking than to implementation support. 
 
Problem-Solving:  
The assumption here is that a problem has been sufficiently well defined to permit a close 
focus on how to ‘solve’ it. This could be pursued in a range of ways such as through technical 
support, trouble-shooting, the brokering of areas of dispute, and encouraging the utilisation 




Capacity Building:  
Whereas problem-solving focuses on ‘what’ questions, capacity building concentrates on the 
‘how’. It involves investing in skills and competencies that will be sustainable in meeting 
future implementation challenges. Training, peer learning, information, guidance, project 
management skills and other such interventions could all have a part to play.  
 
The literature on policy evaluation is well established. When done well it can help to modify 
implementation trajectories and support decisions on whether or not to renew, expand or 
terminate an initiative.  
 
2.3. Conclusion 
Section 2 has highlighted the relative neglect of ‘policy failure’ as a topic of official or academic 
concern. ‘Failure’ is rarely total -  typically it is a matter of degree. This in itself is part of the 
case for the potential value of a policy support programme – while such programmes can 
never hope to compensate for wholesale failure in policy design, they can make it more likely 
that reasonably well-designed policies come to fruition, if necessary by modifying them as 
experience is gained from their implementation. By identifying the most common 
explanations for policy failure, this section provides an important context within which to 
place the potential role and value of support programmes. Our framework for assessment 
has been designed to take account of: the reasons for policy failure; the sequential stages of 
implementation; and the fact that failure tends to be partial not total. This makes it possible 
for emerging lessons to be more nuanced, with the greatest efforts aimed at those parts of 
the policy process most in need of support. 
 
We recognise that the implementation of social care has a particular context given the  
governance arrangements of social care in England.  It provides a different context to other 
public policy areas such as health care where there are Arm’s Length Bodies such as NHS 
England, which have central co-ordination and support functions and work with devolved 
delivery structures. However, our evolving framework provides a useful way of 
conceptualising delivery support in these different contexts. In this report we utilise the 
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framework outlined in Table 3 to structure our data analysis and presentation of our research 







3. Mapping Implementation Support in Other Policy Domains 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of conducting a mapping of national policy implementation support initiatives 
introduced in other social policy areas was to establish if there are general lessons regarding 
how support processes may best be developed to aid the local implementation of national 
policy.  Overall, the mapping exercise sought to: 
 Identify a range of examples of policy implementation support and determine the role 
of government in the implementation 
 Develop understanding of the mechanisms that appear to have contributed to 
successful policy implementation support and how they play out in different contexts. 
In the absence of any established review of this issue, the research team sought to identify 
policy domains bearing some similarity to the Care Act, particularly those that required 
implementation by a multiplicity of local agencies. This included initiatives in the field of adult 
social care itself and wider programmes both past and ongoing.  
 
3.2 Mapping implementation support 
Fifteen policies were initially identified and reviewed as part of the mapping exercise.  The 
search was guided by the knowledge and experience of the research team and external 
advisory group.  While not all of the policies reviewed were closely related to the Care Act 
reforms, there are key-shared characteristics that are relevant to implementation support 
activities irrespective of the specific policy focus. Five key criteria governed the selection of 
policies:   
1. Scale: was this a national policy applicable to all relevant localities across the country? 
2. Purpose: was the focus on implementation support rather than monitoring, 
inspection or performance management? 
3. Reach: was support extended to every locality nationwide? 
4. Learning: is there an evaluation or other evidence base? 




The fifteen policies were assessed against these criteria – fourteen previous policy initiatives 
and one concurrent following NHS England’s launch of the Vanguard Programme to support 
the development of new models of care arising from the Five Year Forward View (NHS England 
et al 2014). While initially little information was available, by the end of 2018 this programme 
was being evaluated by the National New Models of Care Evaluation team.  In addition, 
although it had less to say about implementation support, the five North East region 
Vanguards had been evaluated in an earlier study by a team based at Durham and Newcastle 
Universities involving two members of the Care Act research team (Maniatopoulos et al 
2016). We were able, therefore, to include this programme in our analysis. The 
policies/programmes set against the five criteria are shown in Table 4 below.     
 
Table 4: Policies mapped against inclusion criteria for secondary synthesis of evidence 
Policy Scale Purpose Reach Learning Significance 
Total Place x X ✔ ✔ X 
City Challenge x X ✔ ✔ X 
Community Care Support Force 
(CCSF) 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Cities and Local Government 
Devolution Act 2016 
X X X X ✔ 
Community Care Development 
Programme 
X X ✔ ✔ X 
Troubled Families ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ X 
Ensuring the effective discharge of 
older patients from NHS acute 
hospitals 
X X ✔ X X 
Academies programme ✔ X X ✔ ✔ 
New Deal for Communities X X X ✔ X 
Health Action Zones (HAZ) ✔ X X ✔ X 
Sure Start ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Health and Social Care Act ✔ X ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Better Care Fund (BCF) ✔ X ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Health and Wellbeing Boards (HWB) ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Vanguards ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
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Grey highlight indicates policy identified for further investigation  
Data was collected in regard to each selected policy to understand how the approach was 
implemented, the role of the government with respect to implementation, the nature of the 
support provided for implementation, key contextual factors influencing implementation, 
and whether or not the implementation approach had been evaluated.  
 
Of these fifteen policy areas, five fulfilled all, or in one case most, of the criteria: - Community 
Care Support Force, Sure Start, Health and Wellbeing Boards, and Vanguards.  Troubled 
Families, although only sharing four of the characteristics, was also included in the analysis 
due to its scale and reach that are in line with the Care Act 2014. The five policies selected for 
closer inspection were considered in relation to their commonalities, and comparisons made 
between each of the implementation approaches and subsequent perceived success. The 
implementation support approaches adopted by each policy are explored below in terms of 
the extent to which they reflect one or more of three identified models based on the work of 
Gold (2014):  
 
 Performance management 
Including: articulation of required standards; identification of acceptable levels of 
performance; procedures for measurement and scrutiny of performance 
 Problem-solving  
Including: focus on the ‘what’ rather than the ‘how’: working through a well-defined 
problem to reach a solution; implementing solutions and reviewing results (e.g. technical 
support; trouble-shooting; brokering disputes; utilising research) 
 Capacity building 
Including: focus on the ‘how’ rather than the ‘what’; investing in competencies and skills 
for future sustainability (e.g. training; information and guidance; peer learning). 
 
Table 5 summarises the implementation support approaches identified within each of the five 
chosen policies (alongside that of the Care Act) and ranks their properties against the three 
models identified above.  An important caveat needs to be entered relating to the paucity of 
detail – or indeed any data in some cases – on the nature of implementation support for these 
other policy domains.   
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Table 5: Implementation approach methods within case studies 
Implementation 
Approach  
Brief description of approach 













































Information dissemination, learning and awareness 
Phased implementation  Phased implementation approach  ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ In part Yes In part 
Written support Provision of practice guidance ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Yes In part In part 
Product development and 
information dissemination 
Publication of support activities and 
distribution of funds, as well as the 
production of new products for 
implementation support to be 
disseminated to local areas 
✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ In part Yes No 
Increase public awareness  Commissioned research on regional 
and local variations  
     ✔ No Yes No 
Regional support Appointment of regional teams to 
promote implementation 
 ✔    ✔ In part Yes In part 
Provider implementation 
support 
Provider engagement work to gain 
understanding of implementation 
support needs 
 ✔  ✔  ✔ In part Yes In part 
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Stakeholder support Providing information and resource 
support to key organisations and 
groups involved in implementation 
process 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ In part Yes No 
Stock-take support Providing regional and LA support for 
conducting stock-takes of resources 
     ✔ In part In part In part 
Training courses and 
workshop support 
Aiding the dissemination of information 
✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ In part Yes In part 
Dedicated support Individual area Officer/Advisor made 
available 
 ✔   ✔  In part Yes In part 
Targeted support ‘Support Force’ targeting specific 
authorities 
✔      Yes Yes Yes 
Risk management, mitigation and risk registers 
Risk management Identifying risks in the implementation 
process and producing guidance on 
mitigation strategies 
     ✔ Yes Yes In part 
National programme coordination and delivery 
Translating products from 
national to local 
Production of local guidance 
 ✔    ✔ Yes In part In part 
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Individual lead areas Local areas taking the lead to develop 
new aspects of care models 
    ✔  In part Yes Yes 
National coordination National coordination of funding and 
resources for regional and local 
implementation 
✔ ✔  ✔  ✔ Yes No No 
Payment by results Detailed financial framework 
illustrating payment by results 
   ✔   Yes No No 
Adaptation of delivery 
models 
Local level delivery models able to be 
adapted to meet local need 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
In part Yes Yes 
Coproduction and collaboration 
Joint production of 
operating models 
Authorities working together with 
National Government to refine and 
implement operating models 
 ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ In part Yes No 
Relationship management Continual evaluation of relationships 
between partnerships of 
implementation partners, and, the 
public and private providers of care 
     ✔ No Yes No 
Collaboration, using and 
developing strategic 
partnerships 
Linking relevant organisations in order 
to streamline implementation   ✔   ✔ No Yes Yes 
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Although many of the policies have been subject to an evaluation, few of the studies detail 
the approaches of implementation support provided.  This in itself is an important finding 
although a somewhat frustrating one from the point of view of our study. The main exception 
is the Vanguard Programme where the national evaluation team mentioned earlier were 
explicitly requested to examine the support programme. Given this was the only evaluation 
to include a component to examine the programme support structures, and that it 
overlapped with  this study, it suggests that implementation support has tended to be 
regarded  as somewhat marginal to successful policy implementation.  It also underscores the 
importance of our study of implementation support in regard to the Care Act. 
 
Notwithstanding these drawbacks, common themes emerged from the exercise, suggesting 
that performance management and problem solving were the dominant characteristics of 
implementation support approaches. Performance management as a dominant characteristic 
is perhaps not so surprising given that in order to be included within the sample policies 
needed to be of a national nature and have statutory underpinning guidance. Likewise, 
problem solving as a dominant characteristic could be argued to be an expected element of 
an implementation support approach as it is a means of assisting recipients in implementing 
the policy/guidance in question.   
 
A key feature of all the policies reviewed was the level of locally developed delivery models 
to meet the identified need presented by national requirements.  Locally developed 
implementation guided by national performance management allowed local areas the 
flexibility to implement their own solutions to national requirements. Capacity building was 
evident in around two thirds of the identified implementation approaches and was accorded 
greater prominence within those which focused on support (i.e. through provision of 
Advisors/Support Force) and where local areas were granted  greater autonomy to deliver 
models of service that met local needs. The Vanguard programme aimed to provide a more 
comprehensive support as detailed in table 6.  The support package was informed directly by 
issues highlighted by local Vanguards and their stakeholders (including clinicians and patients) 
over time and aimed to build on local experience sharing practice and developing common 
opportunities for radical care redesign and remove barriers to change.   
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Table 6: Vanguard support programme features 
Areas of support Description  
Designing new care models  working with the Vanguards to develop their local model of care, 
maximising the greatest impact and value for patients  
Evaluation and metrics  supporting the Vanguards to understand – on an ongoing basis – 
the impact their changes are having on patients, staff and the 
wider population  
Integrated commissioning 
and provision  
assisting the Vanguards to break down the barriers which prevent 
their local health system from developing integrated 
commissioning  
Governance, accountability 
and provider regulation  
helping the Vanguards develop the right organisational form and 
governance model, as well as understand the impact on how they 
are regulated 
Empowering patients and 
communities  
working with the Vanguards to enhance the way in which they 
work with patients, local people and communities to develop 
services  
Harnessing technology  supporting the Vanguards to rethink how care is delivered, given 
the potential of digital technology to deliver care in radically 
different ways. It will also help organisations to more easily share 
patient information  
Workforce redesign  supporting the Vanguards to develop a modern, flexible workforce 
which is organised around patients and their local populations  
Local leadership and delivery  working with the Vanguards to develop leadership capability and 
learn from international experts  
Communications and 
engagement  
supporting the Vanguards to demonstrate best practice in the way 
they engage with staff, patients and local people  
 
 
While priorities for support were driven from the bottom up, i.e. by what Vanguards specified 
they wanted in terms of help and support, the national evaluation identified two key 
concerns: 
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 In some cases the infrastructure required was not fully established to provide the 
support required 
 Different types of support were needed at different times (technical aspects initially 
for example e.g. design) in the process and evolved over time.  
 
The programme also tried to provide a balance between national and more local support 
respectively with local “account managers”, regional level management and a national new 
care models team at NHS England.  
 
NHSE has facilitated bringing Vanguards together via communities of practice, network 
learning calls, webinars,  connecting sites to arm’s length bodies, providing access to data, 
learning materials and tools and provided bespoke local support, e.g. quarterly progress 
reviews, solution-focussed coaching and dedicated account management support (NHS 
Providers et al., 2018). Recognising that different people learn in different ways, a wide 
variety of mechanisms to support learning were employed during the programme.  However, 
as with other programme there were concerns about the timing and usefulness of support 
and the balance between support and performance management (Checkland 2018 personal 
communication). 
 
A key feature of all the policies was the requirement to equip local users of support within 
local agencies with the information required to implement the policy. A wide range of 
approaches was evident across the policies although features such as ‘increasing public 
awareness’, ‘regional support’, and ‘stock-take support’ were accorded greater prominence 
within the Care Act and did not feature so heavily in other policies.  
 
In terms of national coordination, all policies reviewed placed significant emphasis on the 
adaptation of delivery models to ensure that local needs could be met.  However, only the 
Sure Start initiative followed the Care Act example by supplementing this approach with local 
guidance. ‘National coordination’ was an integral element in the majority of policies whereby 
direction was given at a national level in taking policy implementation forward – very much a 
traditional top-down model. Finally, several policies placed an emphasis on co-production and 
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collaboration with ‘joint production of operating models’ present in the Sure Start, Troubled 
Families and Vanguards initiatives, albeit to a lesser degree than the Care Act.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
Although the other policies we examined shared some of the same approaches to 
implementation support, the Care Act employed a wider variety of support mechanisms in 
order to address every aspect of implementation (e.g. nationally produced guidance, regional 
level working groups, stocktake reporting mechanisms and so on). To that extent, in 
comparison with the other policies, it has proved distinctive and has also demonstrated a 
determination and commitment to providing implementation support that was welcomed 
and perhaps lacking from other policy areas. 
  
From our mapping of other policies and the implementation support provided around the 
same time as, or soon after, the Care Act (notably in the case of HWBs and Vanguards which 
also fall within the remit of the Department of Health and Social Care), there appears to have 
been little learning from the approach adopted by the Care Act.  The implementation of each 
policy seems to have proceeded in silos, oblivious to, and unaffected by, what has happened 
(or not) in other policy areas.  However, given the clear intent in developing support 
programmes for both the Care Act 2014 and the Vanguard programme, and interest in 
learning from these processes, there appears to be an increasing interest in the role of policy 
implementation support. Whether these support processes have been successful and what 
aspects of policy implementation support may be more successful than others is, therefore, 
important in relation to providing policy makers with valuable insights to improving policy 
implementation in the future.  
  
Page 55 of 157 
 
4. Study findings 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This section is in two parts. In part one, at a macro level, data obtained from the document 
analysis along with interviews with Programme Board members and representatives from key 
stakeholders are presented to provide a background to the topics identified for inclusion in 
the subsequent interviews at the meso and micro levels.  In part two,  data from interviews 
at the macro, meso and micro levels undertaken is  presented alongside document analysis 
from the NAO, set within McConnell’s framework (see table 3, p25 ). 
 
4.2 Why was implementation support needed? 
The following three key data sources were utilised to better understand the reasoning behind 
the establishment of an implementation support programme for the Care Act:  documentary 
analysis of Care Act Programme Board minutes; information on Care Act Programme Board 
actions; and an analysis of ten semi-structured interviews. For the interviews, we approached 
members of the Care Act Programme Board and explored the following questions with them: 
(1) Why was it considered necessary for an implementation support programme to be 
devised? (2) What were the aims and objectives of the programme?  (3) How was the 
programme structured, and who was involved? (4) What were the main perceived 
achievements of the programme and what were the ongoing dilemmas? Three key issues 
were identified: 
 
1. Inviting greater collaboration – involving a range of organisations in the planning and 
execution of the Act, as well as providing infrastructure to support implementation 
2. Reducing the impact of risk – thorough planning for any risks that might occur during 
the process of policy implementation in order to aid smooth delivery of the Care Act 
3. Providing clear information and guidance – using the knowledge and skills base of 
organisations outside of government to produce information relating to all aspects of 
the Care Act 
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A series of documents were produced setting out ‘visions and priorities’ for implementation 
support. Hughes’ (2013) paper – presented to the PB – provides a succinct explanation of the 
need for an IS programme: 
 
A traditional approach to providing implementation support is unlikely to be able to 
meet the needs of all organisations given their breadth, role in providing social care 
and support and particular local circumstances. Similarly, those charged with 
implementation also have challenging financial constraints, other related policy issues 
such as the Integration Transformation Fund, corporate requirements and/or 
partnership arrangements to address (p1). 
  
The paper cites a number of advantages to a distinctive implementation support programme 
including collaboration amongst stakeholders; clarity in dialogue; and flexibility in the 
programme management tools.  Additionally, capacity – in terms of resources and finance – 
is put forward as an issue that several organisations in the public-sector face. There is also a 
recognition that: “… no one single approach will be universally applicable to all involved and 
that a heavily directed approach would neither be well received nor taken-up” (Hughes 2013, 
p.2). 
 
4.2.1 The aims and objectives of implementation support 
For the implementation of the Care Act, a number of documents were produced by the PMO, 
and members of the PB, in order to streamline and coordinate an approach to policy 
implementation.  The initial documentation indicated that the programme should follow a 
cooperative and collaborative approach. On this matter, the paper by Hughes (2013) notes 
specifically that the implementation support vision is: “… [a] wide range of activities, products, 
communications and infrastructure that facilitate a local approach to implementation. It 
envisages a national and local approach to developing products that are supported through 
regional and local networks that encourage sharing, collaboration and mutual support” (Ibid, 
p.1). 
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Of these themes, the presence of a co-production approach has been central. Several 
meetings of the PB indicate that an insistence on collaboration was at the centre of the 
approach. The meeting on 28th November 2013 recorded that: 
 
[A] collaborative approach was welcomed by the Board, and there was general 
agreement that using existing resources and engagement groups would be key. 
Linking to the earlier discussion on financial risks, the Board asked we be mindful of 
the demands of implementation on a local level in terms of already stretched 
resources, so any work that can be done nationally for everyone’s benefit is to be 
welcomed. On the point of using the capacity of regional networks, the Board agreed 
this would be useful as part of a general ‘smarter’ approach to ways of working. 
Programme Board meeting, 28/11/2013 
 
The evidence from the national level interviews broadly supports the findings from the PB 
minutes. Participants were in agreement that the inclusion of multiple stakeholders in the 
planning process had been critical to developing specific guidance for the Care Act. 
 
There’s a group that you’ll consistently find were involved throughout: Skills for Care, 
ADASS… There’s a number of umbrella organisations like Care England, UK HCA, 
National Care Forum, which is charitable care providers. There would have been Carers 
UK or Carers Trust because of the carers’ angle being crucial. TLAP for the voice of the 
sector and service users. I’m pretty certain [they] were involved all the way through to 
develop the national policy. What I do regularly hear from the sector and from various 
places is that it was perhaps the best example they had come across of genuinely co-
producing legislation, genuinely not top down and done to. And that I’ve heard from 
various people right across the sector 
(N10: Social Care Institute for Excellence) 
 
A second key aspect was risk mitigation. The minutes from one PB meeting give an indication 
of one type of risk management used in the process of delivery: 
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CS informed the Board that a new risk register template (08/01/06) has been 
developed by the PMO following a risk identification workshop with SRO’s. Once 
finalised, this will be shared with Board members for their approval. The register will 
include newly identified risks relating to finance, lack of provider readiness and 
changes in current political consensus 
Programme Board meeting, 15/07/2014 
 
Flexibility in delivery support with support at a sub-central level emerged as another key 
consideration. The programme aimed to produce flexible support arrangements that helped 
provide clarity and certainty at the earliest opportunity, without constraining local 
approaches or innovation would be of most value. The PB identified a need to provide 
infrastructure and capacity at a regional level, consistent with other regional mechanisms, to 
support local implementation activity by sharing practice, through communications, 
organising mutual support and identifying and seeking to remove barriers.  
 
Analysis of the PB minutes and actions indicates that a number of implementation support 
methods were used, as well as details of how such methods were developed. The types of 
development and implementation support have been broadly categorised in table 7 below. 
Primarily, the PB minutes indicate that:  
 
1. Public awareness was a key feature of the implementation process – it was seen as 
paramount that information was accurately disseminated to the regional and local 
level;  
2. Stock-takes at the local level were a concern, and the tools to understand 
preparedness were developed quickly;  
3. Elements of risk at all levels of implementation were considered thoroughly.  
 
Our national level interviews included representatives from the Department of Health and 
Social Care, NHS England, Skills for Care, ADASS, Social Care Institute for Excellence, and, the 
LGA. Drawing upon these interviews we have further identified a range of support practices 
to better understand and categorise the data shown in table 8 below. 
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Table 7: Description of Care Act development and implementation support methods 
Phased implementation 
using scenario analysis 
Scenario planning workshops – i.e. coordinating implementation at the 
national and regional level, using comparison of scenarios 
Translating products 
from national to local 
Production of new guidance from the PMO 
Identifying risks using a 
risk register template 
Risk identification workshops with regional and local coordination 
Public awareness 
strand 
Commissioned research on regional and local variations of social care 
Product development Publication of support activities and distribution of funds, as well as the 
production of new products for implementation support 





Provider engagement work to gain understanding of implementation 
support needs 
Distribution and 
allocation of funding 
Government allocations methodology – consultation with regional 
implementation offices and local authorities 
 
Table 8: Implementation support typology from national interview data 
Categories of support Brief description 
Stakeholder support Providing information and resource support to key organisations and groups 
involved in implementation process 
Risk management Identifying risks in the implementation process and producing guidance on 
mitigation strategies 
Funding management Central and regional management of funding for implementation support 
Relationship 
management 
Continual evaluation of relationships between partnerships of 
implementation partners, and, the public and private providers of care 




Using PMO and PB to coordinate information dissemination in local 
authorities 
Stock-take support Providing regional and LA support for conducting stock-takes of resources 
Strategic partnerships Linking primary care organisations, care groups, third sector organisations and 
private sector groups in order to streamline implementation 
Training courses Courses run for the benefit of local authorities in updating own knowledge 
base on details of Care Act and its implications 
Work-stream approach Organising different work-streams for components of implementation – i.e. 
finance stream, workforce stream 
Workshop support Organising workshops at a regional and local level to aid dissemination of 
information 
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4.2.2 Perceived problems and achievements 
As with the wider issue of policy implementation per se, there is always the possibility that 
implementation support arrangements themselves might fail to change behaviours and 
outcomes. From the perspective of the national level interviewees, speaking with the 
advantage of hindsight, the process was felt to have been largely well received and successful 
along several key dimensions. 
 
4.2.3 Clarity of information and guidance 
One of the primary goals of the programme was to provide a suite of information for 
dissemination at the regional and local level – explaining the legal aspects of the Care Act, 
and setting out plainly new terminologies associated with the Act such as the ‘wellbeing’ 
principle. The primary goal here was to provide a standardised set of information for local 
authorities to aid training and learning for staff and professionals. Broadly, our national level 
interviewees felt that the programme had succeeded in producing clear guidance on the Act. 
According to one respondent:  
 
We produced a whole load of learning materials around each aspect of the Care Act 
[and] we worked very closely with the sector and the civil servants to ensure that the 
all the right material was fitted with the practice guidance that they were giving for 
each part of the Care Act… We also then alongside that developed a hosting 
mechanism for e-learning units around the Care Act. The other piece of work we did 
alongside that is we produced a workforce capacity-planning model [and] fitted that 
within our workforce planning model so it wasn’t something that local authorities 
found was suddenly new. But it fitted in with what they were doing but we tweaked it 
specifically to fit with the Care Act 
(N7: National Level Partner Organisation) 
 
The materials produced at the national level were generally felt to have provided the 
necessary frame for regional leads and local authorities to inform and advise their own 
workforce. This element was seen as crucial in the delivery of a national level programme. 
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4.2.4 Collaboration and infrastructure 
A further major perceived achievement was the programme management approach to 
delivery of the Care Act. It was frequently mentioned that the inclusive approach to design 
and execution helped to aid policy delivery – in other words that collaborative policy design 
is an essential precursor to collaborative policy implementation. Indeed, this was seen as 
holding the potential for future institutional learning and other major policy programmes: 
 
The thing I really like about it was the strong programme management approach, and I 
think if you use that and then as part of that think how widely you involve stakeholders 
and, you know, are there restraints then you can measure that then, then I think that's a 
really good way of doing policy. And we are using that kind of technique more and more, 
actually, this whole programme management approach to policy. 
(N4: Local Authority Chief Executive) 
 
The success, in this case, is identified as national coordination and delivery, which sought to 
provide ‘on-the-ground’ support in local authorities through workshops, meetings and 
presentations – situated either locally within the authority, or centrally at the Department of 
Health. Those that reflected on this approach also commented that the involvement of 
organisations at all levels aided policy delivery and implementation. One respondent went as 
far as to describe the experience as ‘the most involving process I’ve come across, and I’ve been 
involved in policy research and government work for a long time’  
(N10: Social Care Institute for Excellence) 
 
4.2.5 Products and programme management tools 
The programme was not understood by our national respondents to have been without 
delivery flaws. One was around the knowledge base. 
 
The department had some civil servants who had a social care background and they 
had seconded in one or two people specifically for their social care knowledge. With 
the last set of changes, that's changed entirely. There are very few civil servants with 
any great understanding of social care policy and they don't have any secondees into 
the department to fill those gaps 
(N1: Local Government National Officer) 
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In effect the intention was to deliver the Act under a set of implementation support 
arrangements that it was felt had previously not been employed for major policy shifts. 
 
4.3 Helping to secure policy legitimacy 
 
4.3.1 National perspective (Macro level) 
There was a strong sense of the importance of co-production with key national stakeholders, 
which was viewed to give the policy legitimacy. Comments regarding the securing of 
legitimacy were overall positive with a number of illustrations of how this had been achieved 
put forward.  
 
Policy legitimacy was most visibly secured through the formal establishment and signing of a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Department of Health and Social Care, 
the LGA and ADASS. The strength behind the formation of this partnership is also explored 
through the second component of the framework, ‘developing stakeholder support’. 
However, one of its key features was the promotion of the legitimacy of the policy through 
key organisations coming together to ensure the successful implementation of the Care Act. 
The MOU was suggested to '… document this vision for co-ownership of the programme.' (N5: 
Senior Civil Servant). In addition, it ‘…set out that involvement and influence would be at both 
of those levels [Senior management and PB], seats at the programme board, yes, but also, you 
know regular reviews with the SRO and joint sign off of recommendations that the SRO would 
make to ministers who would ultimately would have made decisions on the Care Act 2014’ 
(N5: Senior Civil Servant). 
 
The MOU also provided a degree of transparency to the joint working arrangements between 
stakeholders and provided legitimacy through the ‘…formalisation of joint working…’ (N8: 
Senior Civil Servant).  
 
Another key aspect in helping to secure policy legitimacy was the establishment of the PB. 
The PB formalised the joint working arrangements between stakeholders and had 
representation from a number of areas including professionals. This link to professional 
occupations directly connected to the Care Act, notably social workers, gave the opportunity 
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for experienced minds to comment on the developing guidance being overseen by the board. 
The co-production endorsed by the formation of the PB was intended to help to identify the 
big issues and risks, and to aid communication between stakeholders, whilst providing a 
legitimate framework within which stakeholders operated.  
 
The involvement of the Major Project Authority (MPA) was also commented to provide 
credibility and policy legitimacy through the provision of independent views. The MPA works 
with HM Treasury and other government departments in order to provide independent 
assurance on major projects and assures support and reporting on the Government Major 
Projects Portfolio. Finally, project legitimacy was also evident through the decision to set up 
regional activity (see later sections for discussion on local activity).  
 
The main concerns with regards to securing policy legitimacy were queries around the 
completion of stocktake reports where some at a national level felt that a number of 
authorities may have been '…projecting a rosier picture than was actually the case.' (N9: Local 
Government National Officer).  
 
4.3.2 Regional perspective (Meso level) 
In terms of securing policy legitimacy, the importance of the Regional Coordinator role was 
highlighted. The role was viewed as an essential ‘go-between’ from the centre to the local, 
providing the, ‘…conduit from the centre through into the regions and out into councils' (R3) 
and facilitating rapid information exchange. The Regional Coordinator was described as 
having 'privileged access' to information coming from the centre, and through contacts built 
in the region was able to disseminate this information to relevant staff. This approach was 
reported to alleviate the potential for information/emails to get 'stuck' in inboxes (of 
Directors for example) or not be passed on to the right people. At the same time the regional 
coordinator was in a position to feed into the centre the views of those in local implementing 
centres – a two-way conduit of information exchange. 
 
Policy legitimacy was also seen to be secured through a process of intensive collaboration and 
coproduction of knowledge, secured through: ‘a mixture of training, support, facilitating peer 
support, making sure we [the regional contacts] were engaged in consultation’. It was also 
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made clear that the funding made available at the regional level (although far from 
substantial) was crucial to the implementation process: 
 
‘The approach the civil servants took to coproduction of policy guidance was I think 
innovative and should be repeated. The implementation funding [funding made 
available from national to assist with implementation at the local level] was critical. It 
was critical then. It would be even more critical today when we all have a lot less day-
to-day resource than we had in 2013. Another five years of austerity and, you know, we 
just don’t have the same numbers of people to divert to stuff. So, I think that made a lot 
of difference.’ (R5: Regional co-ordinator)  
 
The stocktake process was highlighted in relation to conflicted attainment of securing policy 
legitimacy. It was thought as a process to lack supporting evidence and instead of being used 
as originally expected, the exercise developed into a performance management tool with the 
risk of becoming counterproductive as people distrusted the process. 
 
Mixed views on the availability of Care Act guidance were also given, both during and leading 
up to implementation giving rise to a feeling of conflicted attainment. The national level 
information on the Act, as provided by Department of Health and Social Care, had been 
delayed a number of times in 2013, leading up to the full implementation of the Act. 
 
4.3.3 Local perspectives (Micro level) 
 
Relative success 
Information flow was highlighted as a key concept in securing policy legitimacy with specific 
emphasis placed on the importance of information coming from the centre, through regional 
leads and appointed internal leads, into the local authority. This hierarchical information 
dissemination flow was viewed as providing credibility to the changes being incorporated at 
the local level given that the messages had been developed with the wider policy field and 
not just within the Department of Health and Social Care. The LGA, ADASS, Department of 
Health and Social Care and Public Health England were all named as being visible both through 
active engagement at national and regional events and through email communications in 
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connection with the Care Act. This wider presence helped to secure policy legitimacy at the 
local level as the organisations were viewed to have ‘clout’.  
 
Overall information flow was praised and viewed to be very much a two-way process with 
information being able to be fed back to the centre on local needs and interpretations. The 
significance of the Regional Leads was highlighted as a key driver for enabling the information 
flow between national and local level, acting as a ‘go-between’ providing an accessible vehicle 
to promote information exchange (see  section 4.4 ‘Developing stakeholder support’ for 
further discussion on the role of Regional Leads).  
 
National communication tools were, overall, well-received. However, some discussions 
regarding the lack of local input into such materials were raised. In particular, one area 
queried how household distribution lists and radio advertising slots had been formulated, as 
local knowledge input could have ensured that more relevant distribution channels were 
used. However, those that used the national tools often reported that they were a cost-
effective solution to disseminating information, for example: 
 
‘We used the leaflets and information. Because things were slow to come out in terms of 
the care and support statutory guidance and the detail of things, it’s very difficult to 
produce that locally, and very costly, especially if the messages are changing slightly some 
of the time. So it makes sense to use the national publications. So we used quite a lot of 
the national messaging and websites and linked to national information so it was very 
useful.’ (D3, Operational staff) 
 
Following the effect of having clear national leads for implementation, many local authorities 
identified internal leads to secure legitimacy of implementation at a more local level. These 
leads typically developed local delivery plans and identified relevant in-house resources to 
aid implementation. Comments were also made by some operational staff and management 
in relation to the stocktake process as aiding implementation through providing useful 
information regarding what was currently happening within the authority and what still 
needed to be done.  
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For users and carers the availability of information on the Care Act was a fundamental issue 
and one where local authorities and national government have been – in the opinion of the 
focus groups – unsatisfactory. Further to this, the treatment of carers, in terms of funding 
arrangements, was deemed to be poor under the Care Act: 
 
[You] can’t get your pension and you can’t get the carers’ allowance at the same time 
and I know some areas, we’re lucky in [area] we’ve got Carers Together, but I’ve got a 
sister in [neighbouring area] and since the new Care Act, they get nothing and I mean 
nothing… 
 
Respondents in our group discussions with users and carers, in the main, were negative about 
the availability – and delivery – of information. 
 
It was mentioned [the Care Act] at my wife’s annual assessment, but it wasn’t 
mentioned the first year as something that sounded important, if you know what I 
mean. The fact that I already knew about it because Carers Together had told us about 
it, I was ready for it coming and I said, oh yeah, I want an assessment, and she said, I’ll 
do it now, and I said, no you won’t, I’ve already made arrangements for Carers 
Together to do it for me. 
 
The above respondent is typical of the responses received during the focus groups. Most 
commonly, participants would speak about their experiences of receiving information 
through the use of external or third-party organisations – not via the local authority or 
national government. This view was reflected by several participants in the focus groups: 
 
We’re lucky, because, as I said, we can go to people, we can go to Carers Together and 
the people that we go to give us the information. Now, if we didn’t have the arm of 
Carers Together around us, can I put it, if we were doing it through the social worker, 
whether we would get the same information and feedback I think is highly unlikely, but 
that’s only a personal point of view, but it’s these people that are around us and help 
us and support us that really know the score. 
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Furthermore, on this point, participants tended towards speaking about general awareness 
regarding the Care Act, or, a lack of awareness, which stemmed from a perceived  scarcity of 
information as well as a distrust of the source -the reasons given were, more often than not, 
due to preconceptions about the national government, and the treatment of carers as being 
‘unfair’.  
 
There are an awful lot of people out there that know nothing about anything and in a 
way it’s not fair. We’re saving the government that much money a year and I think 
we’re treated pretty shoddily. 
 
Conflicted attainment 
As alluded to in the above ‘relative success’ section, information flow at the local level came 
under criticism whereby the implementation support programmes effects did not always 
reach all connected staff groups. With different authorities adopting different internal 
structures and information flow paths, there was an inequity in terms of the effectiveness of 
localised information flow. Each appeared to be very local context specific and reflected the 
needs and capacities of the authority.   
 
It appeared that there was a perception by many that information within local authorities 
would cascade throughout staff teams in a similar fashion to the flow from the national, 
through regional, to local information flows. However, issues were raised in relation to ‘who’ 
was in receipt of the information coming down from national sources. It was a matter very 
much linked to internal organisational structures and communication channels within the 
local authority. Identified Care Act Project Managers and Senior Managers in general had no 
issues with the information coming into the authority. The perception was rather different in 
the cases of middle managers and operational staff who sometimes queried the information 
flow. In some instances this perceived lack of information from national sources was felt to 
have hindered implementation support: 
 
‘…I think there’s always a bit of an issue there about either it goes to a lead or it goes to 
someone and then while they share it in that little pocket…’ (E9, Operational staff) 
 
Page 68 of 157 
 
Due to this perceived lack of national level information providing the steer for 
implementation, operational level staff often found themselves in situations where they had 
to make their own interpretations of policy implementation. This could result in operational 
confusion: 
 
 ‘…it just didn’t filter down to me, but something about some kind of steer or guidance 
around for implementation about what we need to be checking and what we need, 
because nobody said make sure your recording systems are up to date, look at your 
paperwork, look at what leaflets you’ve got, look at your communications, look at your 
policies. Nobody actually gave us the steer to do all that. We were going oh that’s going 
to say the wrong thing now, quick, we better update that.’ (E9, Operational staff) 
 
In addition to the overall comments on information flow, the timeliness of implementation 
support guidance was frequently cited in terms of conflicted attainment of securing policy 
legitimacy. Guidance documentation was viewed as being issued late in the day, with feeling 
rushed being a frequent observation. Concerns about timeliness of guidance were identified 
in the NAO Phase I review:  
 
‘[Local authority] feels that some guidance missing from DH on key issues – e.g. 
assessments for those in residential care; DH made misjudgement over money for deferred 
payments; major risk going forward is workforce capacity’ (Note from NAO Interview) 
 
Following up on this point, using data from our own study, there is clear evidence to show 
that little had changed in terms of confidence in the Department of Health and Social Care. 
Data from the same case study site (as that presented above) shows that one participant 
expressed the view that the outstanding issues on models of financial support, and of 
guidance on the Act itself, had been detrimental to the implementation process. 
 
If they’d [the DH] been upfront about well we’re actually not sure how to do this so let’s 
bring people together from different councils and talk that through, then that’s fine. You 
know, develop something amongst ourselves. But the fact there was these different 
models going around and so you weren’t quite sure well which one should we do, and is 
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this going to be replaced two weeks down the line by something else, you know, well it 
was a bit frustrating and probably duplicated effort in some ways. So being upfront about 
it would have been much better. (E12) 
 
In this case, the evidence presented on both counts indicates that there were real issues with 
the level of support from the Department of Health and Social Care and the associated 
implementation support process. In respect of this particular case study site, much of the 
internal work had already been produced, and could have been used to ease implementation. 
However, uncertainties about guidance on the Act had created more work for council staff 
than was necessary and it was not felt that sufficient time was provided to implement all 
elements of the Care Act properly.  
 
 ‘I think when you’re implementing such a large piece of legislation such as the Care Act, 
I mean that was huge, massive. It may be better to implement it in blocks over a period 
of time. So elements of the Care Act over a period of time so that, you’re leading up to a 
go live date when all staff have been trained up to an acceptable level.’ (E12, Senior 
Manager) 
 
As already noted, reactions to the stocktake process were mixed. Some found the process 
useful in helping to identify work still required. However, some were very negative, 
highlighting a tension between having support and performance management functions 
sitting within one implementation support model. It was stated by some that results were 
used as a performance management controlling mechanism rather than a supportive 
approach to assist with identified areas of need.  Accordingly, subsequent stocktakes were 
filled out with information which it was thought the Department of Health and Social Care 
wanted to hear rather than the reality of the local situation.  This is an important 
consideration in assessing the likely effectiveness of implementation support measures. 
 
Relative failure 
The only real failure acknowledged in terms of securing policy legitimacy was in respect to 
uncertainty over phase 2, which in turn was felt to have impacted on most aspects of 
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implementation for phase 1. This might best be regarded as a failure of policy design rather 
than of the support arrangements. 
 
4.3.5 Helping to secure policy legitimacy: A summary 
For this component we wished to understand how far, and in what ways, the creation of the 
implementation support programme had itself helped to shape the legitimacy of the policy, 
namely, the Care Act 2014. This is about more than simply bringing legislative requirements 
to the attention of those responsible for putting them into effect; rather it is about helping to 
demonstrate that the policy design is robust and that key implementation implications have 
been properly taken into account.  
 
In some important respects the quest for policy legitimacy around the Care Act was facilitated 
by the general view that parts of the legislation consisted of legal ‘tidying’, bringing together 
separate requirements that had accreted since the 1948 National Assistance Act. Other parts 
of the Act were more challenging requiring, for example, a new focus on wellbeing, 
prevention, self-care and market-shaping.  However, these concepts already had widespread 
support within many local authorities and to that extent, the Care Act could be regarded as 
going with, rather than against, the grain of organisational and professional thinking. To some 
extent this limits what can be learned from this particular case study about the value of 
implementation support programmes; different challenges would be faced in more 
controversial policy domains in which policy legitimacy is questioned.  
 
However, the existence of a policy consensus should not be equated with a ‘simple’ 
implementation path. The Care Act represented a formidable challenge to established ways 
of working and this complexity constituted the justification for creating the implementation 
support programme. In terms of securing policy legitimacy, two key sources needed to be 
accessed by the programme - expertise and governance.  In the case of expertise there was 
an explicit recognition at the national level that the experience and understanding needed to 
make the Care Act work was held not by the centre but by the multiple local implementation 
bodies.  Some means therefore had to be found to access this experience and expertise in 
order to lend credibility to a support programme.  In the case of governance, local authorities 
– although largely funded by central government – retained their own democratic legitimacy 
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and would be free to decide how best to make use of their resources in relation to their Care 
Act responsibilities.  Co-opting key representative bodies of the implementing agencies – the 
LGA and the ADSS – into the support programme offered a means of linking national and local 
levels of governance. 
 
Our fieldwork suggests that these arrangements were successful in helping to secure 
legitimacy for both the Care Act and for the support programme. Although there were some 
concerns about detail and practicality, there was little or no suggestion that the support 
programme was unnecessary, unwanted or in any way lacking in legitimacy. On the contrary, 
where reservations were expressed at local level about the programme these tended to be 
about the need for greater support rather than its removal. Our conclusion on this dimension 
of the framework is that the Care Act implementation support programme was successful 
both in securing its own legitimacy and in reinforcing the legitimacy of the legislation. 
 
4.4 Developing stakeholder support 
 
4.4.1 National perspectives (Macro level) 
Stakeholder support is viewed as the greatest strength of the programme and therefore runs 
across all the domains comprising our framework. It was highlighted that the collaborative 
approach associated with the Care Act was a continuation from the white paper, Caring for 
our future: Reforming care and support, and the Responsibility Deal. The white paper in 
particular was complimented for the way in which it engaged the wider stakeholder 
community. This collaborative approach then followed through to the way in which the Care 
Act was to be implemented. The importance of the collaborative approach was identified in 
the NAO’s Phase I review. The NAO report concluded that, as a result of ‘joint working’, 
objectives were achieved sooner than might have been the case in a different setting. 
 
It was also acknowledged that all local authorities had to implement Care Act changes in order 
to deliver expected outcomes and therefore '...you could not do that without a partnership 
with the organisations that represent those local authorities, which is the LGA and ADASS'. It 
was also commented that '...the department [of Health] got a lot more in terms of an 
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understanding of the system, how the system works and what it needed to do to achieve its 
policy objectives than if it had done it solely on its own.' (N3: Senior Civil Servant) 
 
At a national level the PB gave formality and structure to the partnership arrangements. The 
PB was described as very much a joint policy team and there was an acknowledgement that 
the individual strengths of the partners needed to be identified and determine how such 
strengths could be employed to best effect change.  
 
Through the interviews there emerged a strong sense among all parties of wanting to make 
the policy implementation work and, from this belief, strong commitments to ensuring its 
success were made across the board. This may have been because the Care Act, although 
complex, was aligned with the pre-existing aspirations of the stakeholders. It was this belief 
in the partnership that allowed for productive conversations between organisations that may 
have more commonly been adversarial.  The partnership approach was believed to make 
people feel that they were '…genuinely co-producing legislation...' and that it was ‘…genuinely 
collective effort' (N6: Director Adult Social Services). This was viewed as a new approach for 
social care. 
 
Comments were also made on the processes being perceived as very open with a lot of 
stakeholder support influencing decisions. This openness was commented on as bringing a 
sense of ownership and buy-in to those involved and was therefore thought to reduce the 
likelihood of subsequent failure. It was highlighted that '...anything that does away with this 
and them mentality, particular at the moment in the current context of pressures, is hugely 
helpful' (N9: Local Government National Officer). 
 
These arrangements even had the effect of introducing some co-location of stakeholders that 
would not have otherwise occurred. It was reported, for example, that ADASS and LGA staff 
shared work spaces in some instances through a ‘joint office programme’. This approach was 
thought to facilitate joint working and develop '…more rounded thinking.' (N9: Local 
Government National Officer). 
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Stakeholder support was not only commented upon as being strong at a national level, but 
also at the local level by national representatives. Local government was reported to have a 
level of trust in what was being done and '...a huge amount of influence over it' (N5: Senior 
Civil Servant). There was said to be a clear plan of co-ownership between central government, 
local government and adult social care leadership. The introduction of regional resources and 
capacity to shape regional activity was also felt to be a popular development by national level 
stakeholders as it allowed for people to take responsibility for their own future.  
 
Although, overall, comments towards developing stakeholder support were positive a few 
concerns were highlighted through the interviews alluding to tensions between organisations 
involved. Conflicts appeared to centre on being part of the partnership and the role of the 
organisation – for example the LGA’s role as a membership and support organisation and it 
being part of a central government policy implementation partnership. Sometimes the two 
did not fit, with examples such as communications coming out from only one partner where 
another partner did not agree with the messages being distributed, ‘…you know, if it was 
ultimately being driven by DH and we weren’t happy with the message, yet we’re in a joint 
project team, how does that work? So there were occasions when some of the 
communications came just from DH, I think, and just from us particularly around the delay for 
instance...’ (N9: Local Government National Officer). It was also reported that although work 
was undertaken as a partnership, ultimately it was the Department of Health and Social Care 
that was accountable for the actual delivery of the Care Act and that the partnership was 
'…collaborative up to a point and then DH ownership sometimes did kick in.' (N9: Local 
Government National Officer).  
 
It was also suggested that perhaps insufficient time had been allowed for the setting up of 
the partnership as the range of stakeholders meant that not everyone understood each 
other’s contribution to the group. This lack of understanding was perceived to be a   cause of 
tensions: 'So I was being commissioned by colleagues at DH who understood workforce 
development. But then working alongside the programme office who did not understand 
workforce development at all in any way whatsoever could cause significant tensions.' (N7: 
National Level Partner Organisation). 
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4.4.2 Meso Level: Findings from the Regional interviews 
One of the key benefits of the regional role was the promotion and development of 
stakeholder support through the region. The coordinators role seemed to be very much 
connected to fostering and facilitating stakeholder support at the regional level between 
stakeholders across the local authorities within their area. This facilitation was primarily 
undertaken through the establishment of regional groups, some of which already existed for 
other purposes. These groups were commented on as promoting peer learning and mutual 
support between the stakeholders. At the heart of this approach was the building of trust 
between stakeholders which was said to have facilitated a '…huge amount of sharing 
informally' with a '...lot of personal investment in supporting and sharing good practice.' (R2, 
Regional Coordinator.  The groups were believed to have developed and facilitated 
collaborative cultures through the promotion of inclusion. It was also noted that the groups 
provided a focal point for local authorities in terms of asking questions and gaining 
information: 
 
...a lot of people were very nervous about the new legislation and very concerned about 
what they had to have in place and really were looking for an opportunity to find out 
what other councils were doing and what they should be doing and to get some kind of 
peer support around that, so a lot of relief really that there was somebody in place that 
was a sort of focal point for their questions, their queries and to circulate good effective 
knowledge. (R4, Regional Coordinator).  
 
The use of regional groups was not new. For many, the implementation groups built on 
existing infrastructure: 
 
[We] did have, or we do have a structure of networks and groups. I mentioned workforce 
but we also have a performance group, a carers group, and informatics and 
safeguarding. A lot of the discussion and consultation was with those groups as well. So, 
it was individual Care Act leads but it was also the existing structure of networks and 
groups within the [Region] within an overall framework of governance which was the 
Care Act programme board reporting to [Region] ADASS… (R4, Regional Coordinator). 
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Examples were provided of groups containing a mixture of local representatives from 
Assistant Directors down to Team Managers. However, it was stated that there was no 
hierarchy in the room, just people interested in the implementation of the Care Act.  
 
It was not only within the region that stakeholder support was evidenced. At national level 
also, Regional Coordinators met with their peers and national colleagues to share ideas, 
promoting the ethos of collaborative working throughout the structure.  
 
Most Coordinators highlighted that they were given ‘free rein’ in terms of approaching 
support activity in the regions. This appeared to be an important aspect to the role as it 
allowed the Coordinators to address the individualised nature of each region and respond to 
emerging themes without being constrained by a nationally imposed framework. 
 
4.4.3 Local perspectives (Micro Level) 
 
Relative Success 
Overall there was a very positive response to the development of stakeholder support. The 
findings demonstrated that participants found the ‘collective’ nature of the implementation 
process integral to successful policy delivery. Using data from our case studies, and mapping 
it against the NAO information, we found a clear continuity of views in terms of stakeholder 
and partnership working:  
 
We're all learning different languages, different agendas, different roles, how can we 
pull all this together and do something collectively, rather than each of us having to 
go through the same learning process, can we speed it up because we haven't got very 
long to do it in… (C5, Operational staff) 
 
In particular, in terms of developing stakeholder support, we were able to identify from the 
case studies included in both the NAO and our study that the workforce benefited from a 
partnership approach. Stakeholders also mentioned in relation to success, that collaborative 
working included approaches internal to the local authority, consisting of staff from across a 
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number of departments and those external to the authority but working in similar positions 
where regional groups were used to bring people together.  
 
Internal implementation support procedures were also evident and too many were seen as a 
better option than bringing in a range of external consultants. Within the authority such 
approaches were fostered through the utilisation of staff from different teams to provide 
specialist knowledge, as well as through the formation of project teams. This use of existing 
networks was often preferred to setting up a specific implementation support function within 
the authority. For example, some authorities reported using existing project management 
staff to lead implementation, while others reported using existing meeting structures to assist 
with information flow throughout the authority. In addition, local authorities established their 
own local support networks and accessed/commissioned their external support. This included 
establishing internal teams, working with other authorities, and commissioning specialist 
expertise and training.  
 
Overall, there was strong support for the regional implementation support approach 
provided for the Care Act. This approach was thought to create a 'team ethos... across the 
region' (B3, Senior manager) and a sense of shared purpose, '…we all felt very much in the 
same boat' (C7, Operational staff) thereby reducing feelings of isolation. However, regional 
networks and the importance placed on them was found to vary across the case study sites, 
with some finding the function vital whilst others were not even aware of their existence. This 
variation highlights the importance of the influence of different local contexts in the 
development of implementation support mechanisms. 
 
In many instances, regional networks were not new. Existing meeting structures were re-
shaped to reflect the needs of the Care Act. Interestingly, there seemed to be a North/South 
divide with the Northern case study sites placing a greater emphasis on the collaborative 
approach fostered through the use of regional leads and attendance at regional groups than 
the Southern sites. Also within organisations, some members perceived the regional 
approach to be more significant than others did. Project manager and senior management 
were often much more positive in their responses to the input of the regional lead approach 
than less senior members of staff. This could be due to more senior staff members and project 
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leads being the key links to the regional Leads and groups and thus viewing them more 
favourably and also being in receipt of first-hand national communications rather than having 
information fed back to them through local internal communication channels.  
 
The regional meeting approach was praised in terms of its ability to share information across 
the region which allowed for a place to discuss ideas and to identify and then share best 
practice. Information was also received directly from national sources through regional 
meetings, providing opportunities to ‘…share, hear from centre, hear from DH, share practice 
what are other boroughs doing, and just a useful check.’ (F7, Senior manager). 
 
The opportunities for peer support and networking at regional events was noted by many to 
be more beneficial than the formal information-giving. The perceived benefit of having a 
range of authorities within regional forums was to enable discussions with a good 'cross-
section' of ideas: '...superb ideas came through from lots of different authorities who were 
just approaching things in a slightly different way but going away from that and looking to 
see what would best fit.' (B6, Operational staff).  
 
As well as stakeholder support during implementation, comments were also made regarding 
the relative success of the involvement of implementing agencies in the policy design and not 
just presenting them with a policy fait accompli.  
 
It was a lot of the pre-consultations that we did about these are the proposed outcomes, 




Only a small number of interviewees discussed conflicted attainment (patchy and uneven 
support and/or with some key groups missing) of developing stakeholder support. When they 
did discussions often related to external providers (such as IT), where there was a general 
feeling that bringing in external consultants was not successful as they did not always 
understand the local impact and context.  
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There were some comments that particular elements of the regional support were too 
forthcoming with information and that there was uncertainty over what needed to be done 
due to the amount of information received. In contrast, there was a perceived lack of 
support/guidance by some in terms of more specific areas such as prisons, safeguarding and 
housing compared to the more general principles of the act. 
 
As highlighted previously, queries arose over who was in receipt of the information coming 
from both regional and national sources which led to questions regarding the accessibility of 
the programme for those who needed to make it work ‘on the ground’. Internal local 
structures may have a part to play in clearer information dissemination. However, comments 
were also made on the potential benefit having of a closer face-to-face relationship with 
external stakeholders in terms of implementation support, as well as  a feeling that although 
national level events are held  they are often too far away to travel to and so attendance 
cannot always be guaranteed.  
 
Relative failure 
There was no deemed relative failure in relation to developing stakeholder support where it 
was utilised.  However, the fact that some localities made little or no use of the regional 
facility has to be better understood.  
 
4.4.5 Developing stakeholder support: A Summary 
For this second component we were interested in the nature and extent of stakeholder 
engagement in the implementation support programme; whether all key partners had been 
involved and also the terms of their engagement. Our fieldwork suggests that the relationship 
between the three key national stakeholders – the responsible government department 
(Department of Health and Social Care), the representative body for the implementing 
authorities (the LGA), and the representative body for the implementing profession (the 
ADASS) – was a key feature of the support arrangements.  
 
This is not an achievement that should be taken lightly - the national, local and professional 
voices in social care have often been in disagreement over the general direction of social and 
economic policies. A key aspect of this relationship was the decision to engage the key 
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stakeholders in the policy design process as well as the policy implementation arrangements. 
Often these will be treated as distinct domains, one the preserve of policy makers and the 
other of those tasked with putting policy into practice. The literature on the ‘policy-
implementation gap’ has long since shown this distinction to be false and unhelpful but it is 
nevertheless unusual to see a structured attempt at national policy level to address this issue.  
 
The ways in which these arrangements are structured are also vital. Any attempt to engage 
key stakeholders in a superficial and cosmetic manner would have led to charges of co-option 
without cooperation. And even if there is a genuine wish to fully involve all partners there are 
critical decisions to be made about the extent to which this should be formalised. In the case 
of the Care Act support programme a balance was drawn between a formalised agreement 
(a Memorandum of Understanding), complex organisational arrangements with a wide 
membership (the creation of a Programme Board, Programme Office and a multiplicity of 
work streams) and network governance based in long-standing high trust relationships.   
 
Securing a workable balance between the legislative authority and the implementing agencies 
is an achievement not to be underestimated. It was clear to all involved that ultimate 
authority lay with the Department of Health and Social Care and that compliance with law, 
regulation and guidance was the bottom line yet this ‘primus inter pares’1 status was rarely 
raised as a problem by other stakeholders. Stakeholder engagement at national level was 
regarded as perhaps the key feature of the implementation support programme. It was a 
model of engagement that drew upon existing relationships, sought out external expertise, 
encompassed the sharing of ideas on policy design as well as on implementation, and 
balanced both bureaucratic and network elements of governance. There was little or no 
reservation expressed about how this model had worked out in practice and we were not 
able to identify any comparable achievement in other policy domains. The incorporation of a 
regional support mechanism generally served to strengthen these achievements, especially 
by drawing upon networks of local stakeholders. When assessed against the “developing 
stakeholder engagement” element of our framework, the Care Act implementation support 
                                            
1 first among equals (Collins dictionary) 
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programme scores highly given the way in which arrangements were developed and 
understood at national level. 
 
4.5 Clarity of Programme Contribution 
 
4.5.1 National perspectives (Macro Level) 
It was suggested that the relative size and scale of the Care Act warranted a different 
implementation approach to previous social care policies. Building upon the partnership 
approach adopted, there was a desire for rapid cross-sector learning and development.  This 
cross-sector learning was focused through a communications strategy that included a range 
of materials coordinated through local authorities in order that they had the tools required 
at their disposal to organise their own delivery in respect of the Act and communicate with 
the public as they saw fit. National guidance was reported to be well received with the 
Programme Management Office viewed as distributing good quality information. Helpful 
information was also noted to be coming out from the local government sector itself such as 
the National Association of Financial Assessment Officers where expertise was being drawn 
on in order to produce relevant information guidance.  In addition, Skills for Care was formally 
engaged to provide guidance documentation for distribution in relation to workforce training.  
 
In addition to the production of communication materials, the approach taken was also a 
mechanism providing clarity to the programme. As stated throughout, the approach taken to 
the implementation of the Care Act was viewed to be different to previous projects. It was 
stated that normally there is a clear separation between government and project; however, 
this structure saw involvement of stakeholders and decision makers all the way up to 
government.  As previously highlighted, the 'co-ownership' structure was reported to assist 
with the clarity of programme contribution through the incorporation of specialists within 
established task and finish groups identified to look at specific elements of the Care Act 
implementation.  
 
There was an acknowledgement that without this specific professional input, guidance 
documentation would have been too generic. In addition, the MOU which gave the policy 
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legitimacy, also served as a formal guide establishing management approaches and a level of 
transparency to developed work streams.  
 
4.5.2 Regional perspectives (Meso Level) 
Regional coordinators were generally positive about their own contributions and the work of 
colleagues in regional lead roles during implementation: 
 
I would say there was a great willingness to share intelligence and for people to want to 
do that and that made the job much easier really. I would say that the support was good. 
It was well organised, it was responsive. And I suppose the indication of its value is that 
after the Care Act was implemented my role continued from funding within, there was 
no more specific funding available from DH to support the Care Act but they felt that 
there was a reason for the role of the regional lead… (R4, Regional Coordinator) 
 
As previously highlighted in regard to developing stakeholder support, the approach of 
regional groups was not deemed to be ‘new’ and so the clarity and structure of the 
programme contribution was well received by many. It was commented that there was a 
sense that the implementation approach was more of a '[national] would like you to do… not 
a, you will do' (R1, Regional Coordinator). This more relaxed, less top-down, directive 
approach encouraged ‘buy-in’ from both regional and local level stakeholders and allowed for 
a more operational role in assisting implementation at the regional level. Each region was set 
up slightly differently, however, with most having a number of regional level work streams 
around specific elements of the Care Act requirements. These were often those identified as 
challenging or completely new. This approach allowed for more focused discussions to take 
place in relation to these elements of the Care Act.  
 
The experience and profile of the regional lead was regarded as important in terms of the 
clarity of the programme contribution. It was felt to be important that they had experience 
of local government in order to be able to effectively lead the region and disseminate 
important, relevant information.  
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One of the few negative points relating to conflicted containment of the clarity of the 
programme contribution was linked to the resource available at the regional and local level. 
This was thought to impact on capacity issues.  
 
4.5.3 Local perspectives (Micro Level) 
 
Relative Success 
Overall, the Care Act was a welcomed piece of legislation and as such was not really 
contested. It was described as a ‘consensual synthesis of a policy direction’ rather than a 
‘policy shift’ with the accompanying support programme on the whole valued: 
 
 Part 1 was a codification, synthesis of legislation policy into something which wasn’t 
particularly either contested or particularly if you like ideological, although it clearly is 
ideological it wasn’t ideologically contested. So the model of support actually worked 
pretty well for that. The bit that was more anxiety creating was a fork in the road, which 
was Care Act Part 2... The Care Act broadly we’ve been there before. Part two we hadn’t. 
(F4, Senior manager) 
 
In terms of ensuring the aims of the programme were agreed and understood, comments 
again related to the establishment of feedback loops between local, regional and national 
bodies in disseminating information. 
 
As highlighted earlier in relation to stakeholder support, the regional implementation support 
approach was again praised. The approach was deemed to help shape local resources through 
the provision of information and ensured consistent approaches across the region whilst also 
allowing for verification of information: 
 
So initially it was are we doing it right, what’s happening? So it was good to get other 
councils’ opinions, and when you were hearing the same things, the same issues, it was 
sort of just backing that up to say well everybody’s in the same boat with this. It’s sort of 
suck it and see how it goes. (A1, Senior manager). 
 
Page 83 of 157 
 
The Regional Lead role within this support approach was held in very high regard and was 
identified as the 'driving force' behind the implementation. '…the fact we had someone like 
[Regional Lead] who was living and breathing it, it was ideal' (B2, Senior manager). The 
Regional Lead was viewed to bring everything together and provide focus for the region. 
There was a concern that without the role there may have been a lack of focus due to 
competing priorities and the national voice would probably not have been heard at the local 
level. However, as already noted, this viewpoint was much more evident in the North than 
the South of the country. Linked to this, one of the Northern regions made a number of 
references to having a strong local identity and that this facilitated the regional approach. 
 
National guidance produced alongside the implementation of the Care Act was regularly cited 
as a means by which to gain information and understanding of the Care Act implementation. 
Factsheets in particular were considered to provide easy to understand bite size information.  
Positive comments were also made in relation to the guidance provided through attendance 
at seminars. 
 
National level information was usually taken by authorities and customised in order to inform 
local implementation. This process was stated to create a shared sense of understanding 
which was easier to engage with than centrally produced guidance. At a local level, pre-
existing structures were used to facilitate information sharing with regards to implementation 
of the Care Act.  
 
Between the national ‘products’ and regional level support there emerged an additional layer 
of information dissemination linked to clarifying the programme contribution. This related to 
the role of national level advisors being brought in to offer advice on specialist areas of 
support such as new legal requirements arising from the Act.   Opinions of external training 
brought in were mixed with some commenting that availability of such training was ‘patchy’. 
All case study sites had a training plan in place to ensure all staff were fully up to date on the 
implementation of the Care Act. For some this was organised completely in-house using 
nationally available resources, whilst other areas brought in external specialist subject matter 
experts to facilitate the training.  
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Across the case study sites, a mix of approaches to implementation was evidenced. Some 
areas relied heavily on regional level support in order to confirm and clarify process that 
should be adopted whilst some did not appear to engage with the region, but instead opted 
to use the national products to provide clarification on implementation. Individual staff 




Conflicted attainment on the clarity of programme contribution largely related to 
information/guidance produced and disseminated. Three key concerns were raised in relation 
to this: the changing of information and guidance, the need for local interpretation of the 
guidance and the late distribution of the information and guidance.  
 
As understanding regarding the requirements of the Care Act was being explored, it was 
reported that guidance information was changing. This created a pressing need to keep up to 
date with guidance being published. For some this was described as causing ‘information 
overload’ with numerous documents produced and information distributed with a level of 
uncertainty over what needed to be adhered to. This links to the complexity component of 
the framework where questions were raised in relation to whether or not communications 
were as clear and succinct as they could have been. In addition, it was felt that some parts of 
the published guidance were contradictory and confusing, again contributing to the 
uncertainty over what information to take away from such guidance materials. 
 
It was acknowledged by many that there was a need to locally interpret the national guidance 
produced. This approach was not always welcomed with some feeling that guidance needed 
to be more explicit to avoid having to constantly adapt locally produced guidance as a result 
of learning. This need for adaptation of the guidance was perceived to lead to variation 
between authorities which could lead to questions being raised by residents '...well that's not 
done in [County]' (A1, Senior manager). In addition, differences with Scotland were 
highlighted when referrals are made into adult social care, i.e. 'it’s free in Scotland' (A1, Senior 
manager). Overall there was a general feeling of inconsistency due to the amount of local 
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adaptability of the Care Act. This inconsistency resulted in a perceived lack of detail which 
was also stated to hinder communications strategies being put into place. 
 
Following on from comments relating to helping secure policy legitimacy, timing was once 
again brought up as an issue. Late issue of information regarding practical aspects of the Care 
Act resulted in concern over the logistics of implementation. Due to the short timescales 
imposed by some aspects of the Care Act, some staff training had to be completed after 1st 
April. Overall it was perceived that there was a disconnect between when resources for 
workforce development were produced and when they were needed, with an example given 
that it was a year after implementation before specific Occupational Therapist guidance was 
issued. As well as being late, one respondent also commented on training being put in place 
too early: 
 
…so badly delivered because it was too early on, there were still too many unknowns, or 
the guidance was just published and the training courses were the next stage, that all she 
was doing was reading from the guidance... So there was something about timing for us 
thinking we were getting some guidance that could have been interpreted and then put 
into something a little bit more interesting for a training course rather than it being so 
fresh just reading off what was published. (D6, Operational staff) 
 
The outsourcing of training was commented upon by a number of people, and was viewed at 
best as a mixed experience. However, there was a sense that external organisations delivering 
Care Act training were generally a waste of money due potentially to the fact the Care Act 
was so new combined with a lack of, or late, dissemination of guidance to inform training. 
 
For some respondents the support arrangements were not only valued in the short-term but 
were felt to be a useful longer-term intervention:  
 
What we might need now is ongoing support coming back and saying OK we’ve had a 
couple of years now, what’s worked, what hasn’t and what support can we do to try and 
shift upstream because you’re all too focused downstream still. (F3, Senior manager) 
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…I think what’s interesting is that the resources just went up to the inception. I don’t think 
any thought has been given to are there any resources you now need to ensure it’s 
embedded? (C4, Operational staff) 
 
Although a number of respondents commented on the Care Act becoming ‘business as usual’ 
questions may need to be asked over when the national programme should cease, if at all, 
and whether some alternative ‘step down’ arrangement could be offered once legislation 
takes effect as there is evidence of a desire for continued support.  
 
Relative failure 
There was only one direct mention of relative failure in relation to clarity of programme 
contribution and that was an acknowledgement that there was a skill shortage relating to 
providing staff training for the changes that were coming into effect. An external provider 
therefore had to be commissioned to fill this gap.  
 
4.5.4 Clarity of Programme Contribution: A summary 
 
On this dimension of the framework our interest shifts away from understandings and 
aspirations at the national level and focuses on the implementing agencies that the support 
programme was designed to assist. In particular, we wished to understand more about two 
things: whether effective use was made of the implementation ‘products’ commissioned by 
the programme; and whether there was clarity over the aims of the support programme. 
 
Use of Programme Products 
On the first aspect, a battery of products – guidance, events, factsheets and more – was 
rapidly commissioned by the programme and offered, or distributed to, the implementing 
agencies. It is doubtful if this could have been achieved by the Department of Health and 
Social Care alone without the stakeholder engagement described in the previous section. 
These flows of information were widely seen as helpful in averting the need for implementing 
localities to create their own products for local consumption.  However, there are bound to 
be limits over the extent to which centrally commissioned support products and other 
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arrangements can meet all of the eventualities encountered at local level. Several recurring 
difficulties were identified during our fieldwork: 
 
 Timeliness: The flow of information needed to match the implementation timetable 
imposed upon local authorities by the Care Act legislation; concerns were frequently 
expressed that the two were not well synchronised and this led some localities to seek 
external support, especially in relation to uncertainty around their legal obligations. 
 
 Customisation: Standardised products commissioned and developed centrally were 
sometimes seen as insufficiently sensitive to local contexts and hence in need of local 
‘customisation’.  Again this could involve external consultants (the experience of 
which was – at best – mixed) or in-house project management teams whose 
availability was limited in the wake of funding cuts to local councils.  
 
 Penetration: While information flows between the centre, regions and senior 
managers in localities seemed good, there were frequently expressed concerns that 
messages had failed to penetrate through to middle management, front-line staff and 
users and carers. The situation with front line staff is significant since as ‘street-level 
bureaucrats’ they can be in a position to determine their own implementation 
priorities. The position of users and carers is critical. Given that the central premise of 
the Care Act is around user/carer wellbeing it is concerning that our focus group 
fieldwork revealed them knowing little about the Act other than what had been 
supplied by third sector agencies; more significantly they generally felt little difference 
had taken place in their lives.  
 
Clarity over the aims of the support programme 
The earlier discussions on policy legitimacy and stakeholder support describe a high degree 
of clarity at national level on what the support programme was aiming to achieve.  This was 
not always matched at local level. The key tension here was between a perception of the 
programme as helping localities to solve problems and build implementation capacity on the 
one hand, and managing performance on the other. These two elements – carrot and stick - 
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do not sit easily together. They conflicted most prominently in relation to the ‘stocktaking’ 
exercises where local authorities were required to self-assess their preparedness for Care Act 
implementation on a wide range of dimensions.  
 
Arguably a national implementation support programme requires a high level of trust with 
the implementing bodies; a relationship within which those needing to put policy into effect 
can be frank and honest about what has and has not been achieved, and on realistic prospects 
for progress. From the perspective of the centre – and perhaps especially at political level – 
the stocktake findings could be viewed as necessary indicators of progress that can justify 
investment in the implementation support programme. On the other hand, localities can – 
and often did – view them as a means of unwanted attention that could result in some form 
of ‘naming and shaming’ exercise. This led to some element of ‘gaming’ whereby local 
authorities assessed themselves as neither doing well nor badly in order to avoid attracting 
attention. Implementation support programmes will arguably struggle to achieve their aims 
if the agencies they are designed to support feel uncertain about the purpose of their 
intentions. 
 
4.6 Comprehension of Complexity  
 
4.6.1 National perspectives (Macro Level) 
Comprehension of complexity at the national level mainly focused on measures put in place 
to understand the complex nature of the local authority operational environment within 
which the Care Act would be implemented. At the time of implementation there were 
considerable changes (for example staff structures) within local authorities due to depleting 
budgets, resulting in pressures on the system that could impact on implementation; this was 
thought to create a need for a national support structure in order to promote successful 
implementation. 
 
Part of this complexity relates to the different levels of governance and accountability. It was 
stated that there was a need to understand the ‘…clash between national accountability and 
democratic local authority.’ (N8: Senior Civil Servant). In addition there were issues about lack 
of operational expertise - the central team had little experience in working with local 
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authorities, therefore professionals were brought in to comment on guidance who 
understood the complexities of specific sectors with a requirement for guidance produced to 
‘…actually work…’ (N2: Senior Civil Servant) in practice. Complexity was also addressed in 
relation to the multiple roles of the key partners, the LGA and ADASS. These organisations 
had to be part of the programme whilst retaining their core function, ‘…there was this 
wonderful situation where we were working as a partnership within a programme context, 
but outside the programme you would have lobbying…so sometimes it was difficult…for 
example where they are being torn in two different directions.’  (N3: Senior Civil Servant). 
None of these issues were simple to address.  
 
One national respondent interviewed for the NAO review also highlighted that as a result of 
developing pilot local authority Care Act Frameworks and a separate national model there 
was a degree of duplication and confusion: 
 
One of the things we could have done is actually been up front and said [local authority 
work E] is our Care Act framework... People are getting confused between why are we 
having a new practice model, signs and safety, when we’ve got [local authority work 
E]. And so, I think it would have been helpful if we’d said [local authority work E] is our 
Care Act framework (E13, Senior Manager) 
 
4.6.3 Regional perspectives (Meso Level) 
 
Overall it was felt that having the regional post allowed for complexities of the Care Act 
implementation to be addressed. There was an acknowledgement that without the post a lot 
of time would have been spent from the centre chasing up local authorities to understand 
what they were doing over implementation. With the post, more time was able to be spent 
on programme implementation at the centre.  
 
In terms of comprehension of complexity, the regional leads offered a positive account of 
dealing with the practicalities of implementation. By way of recognising that implementation 
of the Care Act would be inherently multifaceted, the regional leads were keen to 
demonstrate that several levels of support had been considered and applied.  
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[A] lot of people were very nervous about the new legislation and very concerned about 
what they had to have in place and really were looking for an opportunity to find out 
what other councils were doing and what they should be doing and to get some kind of 
peer support around that, so a lot of relief really that there was somebody in place that 
was a sort of focal point for their questions, their queries and to circulate good effective 
knowledge (R4, Regional Coordinator) 
 
In the main, the assessment given by the regional leads was one of confidence in the 
implementation plan. One participant added that the success of implementation of the Act 
was continuing to demonstrate the efficacy of regional collaboration, and indicated that such 
an approach would be replicated in future.  
 
I think we’re still reaping the benefits from that because how can I say, it showed or I 
think it showed what the benefits of collaborating regionally on a bespoke piece of work 
and what can be achieved… (R6, Regional Coordinator) 
 
It was noted by most of our interviewees that it was better that a regional rather than a 
national approach to implementation was taken as the differences between local authority 
areas are 'vast'. Therefore, priorities will be different and with limited resources some 
authorities would possibly not engage. However, if the programme was locally developed 
then local authorities would be '...are more willing to put the time in because they've chosen 
those priorities' (R1, Regional Coordinator).  
 
It was thought that it was important for the coordinator post to be both strategic and 
operational. There was a need for the post to understand what was going on at the centre in 
terms of political influence, and how it related to integration at the local level. Regional 
Coordinators with a background of working in local authorities and already knowing a number 
of local directors gave the position credibility and meant they could understand the 
complexity of the issues faced and local challenges encountered. 
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You needed to understand the pressures that directors and adult social services were 
under in terms of, not only in terms of budgets, but in terms of demand and staff churn 
and manager churn. All of those things you had to understand because that would help 
inform you as to why council A was really slow and struggling with implementation; 
whereas council B were a little bit quicker off the mark. (R3, Regional Coordinator) 
 
It was felt that Regional Coordinators needed to have a strong understanding of the local 
landscape and the pre-existing meeting structures and groups in order to facilitate discussions 
with these groups as and when required. In addition, the post had to be able to '...translate 
the national policy stuff into what it might mean on the ground...' (R2). In doing this there was 
also a requirement to identify and understand that all councils are different and that they 
therefore require different approaches. Examples were given of some councils being very 
forthcoming when it came to submitting implementation plans while others were not seen at 
Regional meetings due to capacity issues based on their small size.  
 
4.6.4 Local perspectives (Micro Level) 
 
Relative Success 
Overall there was a feeling that the implementation support provided demonstrated 
awareness of the complexities of the implementation task. There was a general 
acknowledgement that training materials, including written information and guidance, 
recognised complexities within the authorities. There was a feeling of preparedness put down 
in part to the provision of relevant training materials and there was positive feedback on 
handouts provided from national sources and the website content.  
 
It was pointed out that the voluntary sector organisations produced Care Act guidance which 
was thought to highlight the main themes of the Care Act and was subsequently easier to 
interpret: ‘…not having to wade through 140-odd pages to find that one section that you 
need.’ (D6, Operational staff). 
 
At a local level, authorities responded to the complexities of implementation by setting up 
implementation or steering groups to enable local judgements to be made and subsequently 
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addressed regarding the complexity of implementation. It was noted that a number of 
different work streams from this group were required.  These were often evolving in response 
to a need to meet all the demands of Care Act implementation that often meant staff being 
involved from across the authority.  
 
It was viewed as a positive where there was an acknowledgement that there is always a need 
to be flexible in approach to implementation as populations across authorities look very 
different. It was perceived to be useful to have a national template, while retaining the ability 
to be flexible in order to: 
  
…make it suit you…Because that makes, it's more resonant to you isn't it because you 
know the locality, you know the nuances of that area, but still doesn't mean to say we 
couldn't learn from a [other area] Council. (C4, Operational staff). 
 
Many areas brought in external consultants and specialists in order to assist with some of the 
complexities the Care Act implementation. . As highlighted in the Clarity of Contribution 
section, views concerning this experience were mixed. However, legal assistance training was 
highlighted by a number of people as a complex area that required specialist support to be 
provided.  Some of this training was facilitated through the regional groups, whilst other 
training was purchased independently by authorities in order to meet their needs. Overall, 
legal training was well received. 
 
Generally, with regard to addressing complexity national level support was viewed positively 
and was felt to be responsive when issues were raised by local authorities.  One example 
given was in relation to foreign nationals, for which a prompt response was provided. 
 
Conflicted attainment 
Many of the comments regarding conflicted attainment of the comprehension of complexity 
related to the context within which the Care Act was being introduced.  There were concerns 
that the importance of the context of austerity needed to be highlighted, and a recognition 
of the need to make the Care Act work with reducing finances and resources. Austerity had 
already resulted in local authorities stripping out the more ‘luxury’ services such as 
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implementation support/project management and this had led to an increased dependence 
on other sources both national and external: 
 
There was a very strong I think message from our chief exec in relation not to the Care 
Act but to the austerity that we protect the frontline. So other places hadn’t gone quite 
so root branch protecting the frontline, and you could still see that they had got policy 
and development teams, and those were the people doing the work, that might have 
been an easier ask. (F7, Senior manager). 
 
Tension also became apparent between a national aspiration  for a ‘bells and whistles’ 
implementation and councils wanting a more minimalist approach ensuring ‘compliance’: 
 
So were they [national IS] helpful? I guess no. Because what happened was you would, 
central, DH and LGA were talking best practice, and really encouraging everybody to go 
full out. And it took quite some soul searching things to say it’s OK to just be compliant 
in some areas. (F7, Senior manager). 
 
Although there was praise for the guidance produced to go alongside the Care Act, there were 
also some more negative comments where it was not felt that it was able to fully grasp the 
complexities of the implementation. There was felt by some to be a misalignment between 
what was being asked of authorities and reality: 
  
I don’t think that they probably understood what it actually meant on the ground so to 
speak... some of the policies that were written, and the practice and what they wanted 
us to implement, were not necessarily going to be able to be implemented in a way that 
they expected, and achieve what they expected. Because I think they’d got all these 
ideas that it was going to achieve certain things... And what we couldn’t see as 
practitioners on the ground, and managers on the ground in doing that, that that 
wouldn’t necessarily come to fruition. But that would then be an impact for us as a 
council, and a burden to us further down the line. (C1, Operational staff). 
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There was a feeling that parts of the published guidance demonstrated a lack of 
understanding about the marketplace, particularly in relation to carers. It was further stated 
that some aspects of the guidance contradicted each other and that case law would be 
required to clarify these aspects.  
 
IT systems posed a number of issues, mainly relating to the fact that they were slow to be set 
up due to the late distribution of guidance and so they were not always up and running in 
time for the ‘go live’ date. Some described how time-consuming manual procedures had to 
be employed to supplement the IT system until it was ready.   
 
A couple of interviewees questioned the legitimacy of national presenters at a particular 
regional event as not understanding social care within a local authority and ultimately not 
understanding the complexities faced: 
 
... it was quite obvious that the people who were dealing with the focus groups and were 
presenting were civil servants who haven't practiced in the real world... they weren't 
necessarily able to answer the more technical questions... there was a feeling that... it 
was all written by graduates who don't really understand the ins and outs of social care. 
(B1, Senior manager). 
 
There were a few criticisms that the complexities of local landscapes were not entirely 
comprehended by the centre. It was suggested that people ‘on the ground’ would have been 
best placed to feed into decisions on implementation as they are more aware of local 
contexts: 
 
But at the same time there are some of us on the ground who do that every day for a 
living and who could say well actually you might want to think about this or this might 
actually help you to think about how you’re going to do it or to help you with the advice 
you’re going to give. But I don’t think they talk to the people who deliver it on the ground 
early enough in that development. (D3, Operational staff) 
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For our user and carer respondents there was more interest in understanding the complexity 
of the legislation and legal aspects of the Care Act. When the question of whether the specific 
legal aspects of the Act had an impact on the situation of carers or service users, respondents 
were either ambivalent or negative: 
 
I guess the Act just formalised and made certain things legal and in some areas people 
were already having carer’s assessments and organisations before it, but maybe in 
some areas they weren’t, so therefore there’d be more of a noticeable change. 
 
Participants discussed the fact that any formal or legal aspects of the Act – which were 
intended to benefit them – were not fully realised, and in some cases had been diluted in the 
process of policy implementation. This was either due to specific problems with the local 
authority, or a more general distrust of the political system. 
 
Relative failure 
The main aspect of comprehension of complexity that could be termed as relative failure 
related to Phase 2 on the care cost cap, which was perceived to be unworkable and based on 
fundamental misunderstandings about the way the social care market is constructed: 
 
What I did struggle with was what impacted most on my role, which was basically phase 
2, and whilst there was quite a lot of discussion and involvement in what phase 2 might 
look like, it didn’t really give a lot of information centrally about how that would work. So 
I think generally in terms of the implementation for [area] we did quite a robust project 
planning in being able to implement it, probably a little too robust in some cases, but 
maybe that’s just me and the level I was at hearing all of these changes a lot and then 
doing a training (D6, Operational staff). 
 
However, where complexity is concerned, the experience of one local authority – in terms of 
preparations for the Act – was shaped in part by an existing piece of internal work on adult 
social care. The work, discussed earlier, was duplicated in efforts to prepare the case study 
site for Care Act implementation. The data from the NAO is clear: the additional labour 
pressures placed on the workforce were costly in terms of the time spent. 
Page 96 of 157 
 
 
CA reforms being implemented as part of wider transformation [within local authority] 
but have cost 100s of hours of officer time (Note from NAO interviews) 
 
To follow up on this point it is very clear that – using our own project data – this was an 
unresolved issue. During our investigations, one participant in the study gave an account of 
the complex preparations prior to, and during, implementation, with reference to internal 
preparatory work developing a framework for implementation of the Care Act completed by 
the local authority. The essential point in this comparison is that in undertaking internal 
preparatory studies a lot of Care Act implementation work had indeed been duplicated which 
cost the organisation considerable amounts of time.  The duplication of work, and surplus 
efforts of the workforce, had impacted on the local implementation of the Act. This is partly 
about the issuing of guidance, but it also reflects on the levels of communication from the 
centre – i.e. government and the Department of Health and Social Care. 
 
As highlighted earlier, good timing in terms of policy implementation for the Act was clearly 
an issue that cut across several of the case study areas in our research. Looking back to the 
data collected for the NAO study we can draw parallels with our own interview data. The 
experiences of the workforce in one study site show that the timing of implementation was 
clearly a hindrance in terms of achieving locally set targets: 
 
Tight timescales for understanding and implementing reforms has been a challenge; 
the earlier introduction of a transformation programme has meant that the timescale 
is achievable. Without prior work the implementation timetable would be very 
difficult. (Note from NAO interviews) 
 
The results for our own investigation confirm that, following implementation, interview 
participants reaffirmed their concern about aspects of delivering the Act on time: 
 
On reflection it felt at the time probably quite hectic for staff. There was a lot of 
learning that they needed to undertake, a lot of workshops that they needed to attend 
which were compulsory in order for them to practice in a different way. So, at the time 
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I think it was quite hectic, quite stressful for staff. They were quite anxious, they were 
quite worried… (E11, Senior Manager) 
 
The key point here is that, in terms of timeliness, the implementation programme created 
many issues for local authorities. Reflecting on the evidence from our study, and comparing 
it with the NAO data, the conclusion is that the successful delivery of policy depends on well-
timed support from the centre. 
 
4.6.5 Comprehension of Complexity: A summary 
Our interest in this dimension of the framework is with the extent to which the support 
programme was felt able to get to grips with the realities of implementing a complex policy. 
It is well known that successful change is at least as much (if not more) about bottom-up 
behaviour than top-down prescription; that local contexts (history, tradition, culture, 
personalities) can filter out standardised expectations and requirements; and that most 
policies – and certainly this one – are characterised by complexity rather than simplicity. In 
short, there is an issue around the ways in which an implementation support programme 
understands and responds to the complexity of the implementation environment. 
 
Reference has already been made to the issue of penetration – the difficulty of reaching 
beyond senior management level to the front-line and then to users and carers themselves. 
Other concerns arose about specialist areas about which there seemed to be relatively little 
information and support, such as housing and the prison service, as well as some concern and 
confusion around legal obligations. These all required local action over and above national 
support, often involving the use of expensive and sometimes poorly received management 
consultancies.  
 
It is unrealistic to expect a national government department to be in touch with, and have a 
detailed understanding of, around 150 local implementation agencies each with their own 
history, culture and democratic governance. Indeed, when national representatives were 
despatched to localities there were some concerns expressed about a lack of credibility. It 
was for this reason that a decision was taken at national level to insert a regional dimension 
into the national support programme. As noted earlier in the report, this tier was meant to 
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serve as a conduit between regions and the Programme Management Office. It was 
anticipated that this would: facilitate rapid dissemination of the latest tools and advice; 
increase the pace of local implementation; and link into assurance mechanisms where the 
local pace was thought to be falling behind.  
 
Some modest funding was found to establish this level of support and by and large the 
regional leads were left free to determine their own ways of working. Our fieldwork suggests 
that in some localities the regional tier ended up having a significance that far exceeded 
expectations. The benefits of a regional tier included: reducing implementation isolation – 
localities were able to learn from each other; peer support and networking – forums were 
created that encouraged the sharing of achievements and problems; two-way 
communication – messages were received from the centre to localities but implementation 
concerns were relayed back through the same channels.; and organisational effectiveness – 
regions set up their own work streams to grapple with common problems.  
 
Where they worked well, the regional leads were very highly regarded with expressions such 
as ‘the driving force’ and ‘breathing life’ into the implementation process being used. With 
their local knowledge, for example, regional leads could be in a position to explain why some 
localities might be faring better or worse on the stocktake exercises; in doing so they would 
be also be better placed to offer tailored support. Localities saw this as a much better 
approach than a negative, and possibly punitive, response from the centre to a below average 
stocktake ranking. The overall experience was felt to be one of collaboration rather than 
command and control.  
 
Such was the popularity of the regional support mechanism in our northern fieldwork sites 
that we heard calls for its continuation into the post-implementation stage, even for 
consideration to be given to a permanent forum for implementation, improvement and 
innovation.  Given that the forthcoming Green Paper on adult social care is likely to usher in 
challenges as demanding as those contained in the Care Act, there may be some important 
lessons to be learned here. 
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Much depends here upon the skills and experience of those working at this level. Working in 
the interstices between central government and local implementation agencies, acting as the 
eyes and ears of both levels, is a complex task. We heard recurring reference to some of the 
required personal qualities such as trust, knowledge, experience and professional credibility. 
We know from the literature what a crucial role can be played by these ‘reticulists’;2 we also 
know that such skills are not in plentiful supply. There are some important issues to be 
unpicked here around creating the right environment and developing the right skills for such 
roles to be undertaken.  
 
4.7 Sustaining political support 
 
4.7.1 National perspectives (Macro Level) 
Political support was retained throughout the implementation period via close links with 
central government. This took the form of ministerial involvement which is not normal 
practice. In addition, the Cabinet Office and Major Project Authority were also involved, again 
providing links to senior level political support. This strong political leadership from the centre 
was commented on as being different to previous projects, whereby there was visible 
involvement of stakeholders and decision makers all the way up to government arising from 
identified roles within the implementation support process.  
 
As highlighted in the stakeholder development framework component, there was a strong 
commitment to the collaborative approach adopted by the Care Act. It is uncertain if this was 
due to the personalities involved or stemmed from the shared values of the organisations or 
was a combination of both, however the approach did demonstrate a shared understanding 




                                            
2 Reticulist: Someone who possesses skills in creating, servicing and manipulating 
communication networks, and is astute at identifying where in an organisation a decision in 
which she/he is interested would be made (Power, 1973) 
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4.7.2 Regional perspectives) (Meso Level) 
 
In terms of sustaining political support, very little comment was forthcoming. One aspect that 
did come up concerned the links to the centre. Regular meetings were reported to be held 
with senior representatives from Department of Health and Social Care, LGA, ADASS and the 
Regional Coordinators. These were primarily used as planning and information giving groups. 
 
4.7.3 Local perspectives (Micro Level) 
 
Relative Success 
Although the Care Act was a piece of national legislation, very little was discussed regarding 
sustaining political support at the local level, with the exception of some references made to 
information papers being prepared for elected members to take to local cabinet meetings. 
This may be because the Act had already gained high level support and as such it was taken 
as a given that it would be implemented at the local level. Considerable references were made 
to strong internal senior management support, often with senior managers making up part 
of the project/implementation team. Clear information channels, including the feeding of 
reports up to senior management, was also mentioned as a mechanism by which to sustain 
support. 
 




There was very little conflicted attainment for the sustaining of political support. Some 
mention of little knowledge relating to national level support was stated by operational level 




There was no deemed relative failure in relation to sustaining political support. 
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4.7.4 Sustaining political support: A summary 
All policies will have political origins and all will require the support (or at least the 
acquiescence) of legislators in order to come to fruition. Our interest in this dimension of the 
framework relates back to our earlier discussion of the vagaries of the political cycle and the 
ways in which the political will necessary to drive long-term policy-making can dissipate over 
time. The issue is whether an implementation support process can help to sustain the political 
commitment needed for seeing a policy through to implementation. 
  
Our fieldwork has been limited by the absence of contact with national level politicians, 
though we did include the major national figures at a non-political level. It is understandable 
that politicians will want evidence that policies in which they have invested are producing 
‘results’. In the case of the Care Act the most obvious means of such confirmation was the 
results of the stocktake exercises and, as indicated above, this conflation of the support and 
performance management roles of the support programme was a source of consternation for 
localities. However, more nuanced messages could - and were - sent to ministers from the 
Programme Board, and responses were received. To this extent the very existence of the 
implementation support programme could be said to have helped sustain political support by 
keeping open channels of communication between political and non-political actors. At local 
level we undertook fieldwork with local authority cabinet leads but were unable to discern 
any clear local strategies for political support of the legislation.  
 
An important consideration in this context is the extent to which the policy being supported 
is politically contentious. As already indicated, Phase 1 of the Care Act was largely seen as 
uncontentious, either because it consisted of legislative tidying or because it was consistent 
with the flow of professional opinion. This was not true of Phase 2. Phase 2 proposals, in 
relation to resolving the respective financial contributions of individuals, families and the 
state to the costs of long-term care were highlighted as being contentious by a number of 
respondents with comments relating to the perceived unfeasibility of the phase. Key partners 
to the implementation support programme – LGA and ADASS – repeatedly warned the lead 
agency (the Department of Health and Social Care) of the dangers of proceeding with Phase 
2 in the absence of improved funding and a more realistic timetable. In the event, Phase 2 
was initially postponed and then abandoned. On the one hand this can be interpreted as a 
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case of faulty policy design; on the other as an indicator of a successful implementation 
support programme within which effective communication resulted in appropriate political 
adjustments.  
 
4.8 Contributing to attainment of policy objectives 
 
4.8.1 National perspectives (Macro Level) 
There was a mixture of responses in relation to the contribution to attainment of policy 
objectives. The PB was thought to contribute through the provision of clear policy objectives 
setting out what was required. The provision of local level funding to assist implementation 
at the local level was highlighted to be an important aid to local implementation. Again, the 
strength of the collaborative approach in ensuring successful implementation came through, 
with comments made regarding the passion, determination and willingness to engage with 
the policy across organisations. Commitment from the centre was also thought to inspire local 
level implementation. However, there could only be robust evidence of the contribution of 
the process (the implementation support programme) to the policy objective 
(implementation of the Care Act) once implementation was underway. Our fieldwork in six 
localities and their regions was intended to explore this relationship between process and 
outcome. 
 
4.8.2 Regional perspectives (Meso Level) 
Where policy objectives are concerned, the initial findings clearly show that, at the regional 
level, there was a lot of preparation involved in ensuring implementation of the Act was 
smooth. Participants broadly gave positive assessments about their own role as well as the 
role of existing networks and organisations in delivering the implementation programme. 
Specifically, participants were very direct in pointing to the benefits of a regional lead – 
particularly where the regional leads had specific knowledge:  
 
Well they saved time and money ultimately. So, they didn’t for example have to buy their 
own training on the law because we provided that for them. They didn’t have to, we 
helped them a lot with policies and procedures, so then they could customise. (R6, 
Regional Coordinator)  
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In relation to contributing to the attainment of policy objectives it was stated by one that 
although the role of the Regional Coordinator was to support the region in order to 
implement the Care Act, '…the bottom line was always compliance' (R1).  
 
The role of acting as a mediator between the centre and the local was about managing  the 
'tension' between information coming out from the centre and local interpretations, i.e. they 
were aware of local operational issues and how the information would affect these. This 
therefore meant that the information being distributed within the region would be relevant.  
 
The Regional Coordinator was also able to provide a focus for the implementation of the Care 
Act: 
 
I also raised the profile of the Care Act ... I think the Care Act would have passed most 
councils by, and it probably has in some ways ... the Care Act hasn’t passed managers 
and senior managers by. But it may have passed some of the staff by because of some 
work that hasn’t gone on that should have gone on. But I think had we [Regional 
coordinators] not been in place the whole Care Act would have just came, come and 
gone. (R3, Regional Coordinator) 
 
4.8.3 Local perspectives (Micro Level): Findings from the Local interviews and focus groups 
 
Relative Success 
There was a strong sense overall, that implementation of the Care Act was a success. It was 
perceived as being aligned with the direction of travel local authorities were going in and was 
stated to provide the mechanism for driving through changes: 
 
I would say the Care Act oiled the wheels really in terms of giving us greater momentum 
behind those changes in terms of we were already moving towards that emphasis on 
prevention, early intervention, giving people the skills so that they could function far 
more independently of statutory services. So yeah, this was the means to do it, if you 
like, or the confirmation of the means to do it. (B8, Operational staff). 
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The fact that the Care Act (part 1) had few critics may limit the lessons learnt from the Care 
Act support programme as implementation may be expected to be more straightforward 
when there is a consensus of support for the policy. 
 
For many, implementation of the Care Act built upon existing systems and resources, which 
were re-worked and transferred where appropriate rather than starting again: 
 
 ...it was about taking our existing systems and changing them and developing and 
adapting them, it wasn't completely new, it wasn't just a blank slate, but it felt in some 
ways almost like you had to develop stuff from scratch (C5, Operational staff). 
 
Comments regarding the additional funding to assist implementation at the local level made 
available highlighted the importance of this resource in providing the ability to bring project 
resources together and funding training. In addition, it was thought to be useful as it allowed 
authorities to be creative and use it as they needed it rather than it being ring-fenced to 
prescribed uses. 
 
Many now regard the Care Act as ‘business as usual’ with it becoming '…part of everyday' and 
'…embedded in practice.' 
 
Conflicted attainment 
As highlighted in relation to the comprehension of complexity, the local context was also seen 
to impact on the attainment of policy objectives with the external environment (austerity) 
being seen as impeding implementation. Indeed, arguments were even made that external 
factors (austerity) had rendered the support programme ‘useless’: 
 
There’s no area of care that isn’t increasing as far as I can see. There is a demand. And 
everybody’s getting more - they’re not getting less siloed in the way that they work, 
they’re getting more siloed, more gatekeeping, more thresh-holding, which kind of, 
that’s not really what the Care Act has said (F8, Operational staff). 
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The current trick, of course, which is a very neat trick of central government, is to sort of 
talk about localism and say well what we think is  local authorities are better placed to 
do this. And they’ll give you the power and the responsibility and maybe a quarter of the 
money or a half of the money. And quite rightly people are going like well I blame the 
local authority. I it’s sort of an underhand trick that’s been done on everybody (F8, 
Operational staff). 
 
A small number of mixed responses exhibited conflicted attainment to the attainment of 
policy objectives. Lack of available tools was highlighted due to delays in system changes 
coming into effect which impacted on staff as they didn’t have the tools required to 
implement required changes. Other aspects included a dislike of the new terminology to be 
used in line with the Care Act, a disjointed interpretation of responsibilities between the local 
authority and health colleagues, and the impact on brand reputation of the authority 
regarding sending out messages for phase 2 of the Care Act which never came into effect.  
 
Comments were also made in respect of some elements of the Care Act being better 
supported than others. For example, prevention and wellbeing are the central underpinning 
principles of the Care Act but were not always perceived to be centrally located within the 
support provided. No reasons were identified for these gaps. For users and carers there were 
two important themes related to policy objectives: care work and support. On care work 
specifically, some carers chose to direct their frustrations at national government, pointing 
out that their labour was very cheap: 
 
If you’re a carer, and you get £62 a week because you’re earning less than £101 a 
week, 35 hours and it’s taxable. That’s a job. I asked for minimum wage, they laughed 
at me. I’m retired, so I couldn’t get £62, I got £34, which I told them where to put 
politely. I said, I’m not desperate for £34 a week, you can, and we’re a cheap army, but 
carers want organising just like a union. 
 
The tendency to speak to the social and political and ramifications of caring was evident with 
the responses of both of the focus groups. Participants (carers) were clear that they were 
undervalued and underpaid for the work they were undertaking. 
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In terms of support, participants voiced concerns that their voices were not being heard, and, 
that the Care Act legislation has done little to ‘empower’ people. Where policy objectives are 
concerned, this is a crucial point: 
 
If the council aren’t going to take seriously when carers, who are the frontline people 
there, are actually ringing and saying, look, this isn’t working, then they’re not 
empowered at all, are they, as carers and the Care Act, where does it come into play? 
If you’re actually saying, well, you’re providing a service that isn’t working and nothing 
changes, then what difference has that Care Act made to empower people? 
 
Following from the point of ‘empowerment’, some participants made more explicit 
comments about the level of support and individual effects of the Care Act on their work for 
patients/partners/service users. 
 
Well, it [the Care Act] did give the carers a voice, but it had no effect on me and who I 
looked after, my husband, anything, because we get no support. The only support we 
get is from Carers Together. We get no support at all from the authorities, because 
when he became 65 they decided, when they changed him from on the Young Onset 
Dementia Team where we had the social worker and that, when he was changed over 
to the Adult Onset Dementia Team, they decided he hadn’t got dementia anymore and 
we were told that we weren’t entitled to a social worker or anything. 
 
The respondents from the focus groups were clear in this regard: support arrangements after 
the Care Act have had little perceived benefit. Combined with the funding arrangements and 
perceived lack of care by local authorities, the only possible conclusion is that of relative 
failure, in terms of attaining policy objectives. 
 
Relative failure 
There was no deemed relative failure in relation to contributing to attainment of policy 
objectives. 
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4.8.4 Contributing to attainment of policy objectives: A summary 
This final dimension of the framework concerns the extent to, and the ways in, which the 
implementation support programme assisted in contributing to the attainment of policy 
objectives. This is difficult to ascertain given that the programme was not designed to ensure 
the policy made progress in achieving its ends; rather it was timetabled to cease once the 
legal deadlines for implementation had been reached. This means the implementation 
support programme can only reasonably be assessed on the narrower indicator of ensuring 
‘implementation readiness’ on the part of the responsible agencies.  
 
Notwithstanding some of the difficulties identified in our fieldwork, it would be fair to 
conclude that the programme did significantly help to ensure implementation readiness. The 
most significant expressed concerns were about the mismatch between the ambitions of the 
legislation and the impact of severe funding restrictions on local authority spending. We 
encountered strong feelings that the austerity programme was rendering unattainable the 
key operating principles of the Care Act such as independence, wellbeing and prevention; 
rather localities felt they were being effectively confined to responding to crisis situations.  
 
It has been beyond the remit of this study to make any assessment of the impact of the 
implementation support programme on the subsequent attainment of the policy objectives 
of the Care Act; there are too many other variables that will have shaped the outcome. 
However, it does highlight the difficulties that arise when a policy that is collaboratively 
designed, popular with the receiving audience and supported by an implementation 
programme, is not properly funded to achieve its objectives. An implementation support 
programme, no matter how good, is best regarded as a necessary but not a sufficient factor 
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4.9 Key messages 
The key messages arising from this section are summarised in relation to seven McConnell’s 
criteria: 
Helping to secure policy legitimacy: 
 The implementation support programme was able to build upon an established 
policy consensus 
 It secured access to professional expertise 
 The support programme linked national and local governance 
 It did not challenge to legitimacy of the policy 
 There was no challenge to desirability of the support programme 
 Implementing phase 2 of the Act would have constituted a sterner test to the 
arrangements 
 
Developing stakeholder support: 
 This was a hallmark feature of the support programme 
 The support programme developed strong and effective relationships at national 
level 
 There was stakeholder involvement in both policy design and policy implementation 
 It involved a careful balance of governance styles, formal structures and high trust 
networks 
 
Clarity of programme contribution: 
 Successful dissemination of a wide range of valued products 
 There were concerns at locality level about timeliness and specificity; some use of 
external consultants to try to bridge the gap 
 There was difficulty in reaching below senior management level in implementing 
agencies 
 There was a generally positive view of the support role of the programme 
 However, users and carers were largely unaware of the policy, the legislation and the 
programme 
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 There was a tension between the support and performance management roles of the 
programme 
 
Comprehension of complexity: 
 The regional level support was seen as vital in some localities 
 Perception of regional actors as critical friends rather than national emissaries 
 Regional leads helped to promote effective learning networks 
 Regional leads were an effective conduits between the national and local levels: a 
two-way communication flow 
 The knowledge, experience and attitudes of regional ‘entrepreneurs’ were important 
factors 
 
Sustaining political support: 
 The Programme Board served as a conduit between stakeholders and ministers 
 Regular stocktake exercises provided some reassurance on progress to politicians 
 There was little apparent engagement of local political leaders with the support 
programme 
 The decision to remove Phase 2 of the Act could be regarded as a ‘negative success’ 
 
Contributing to attainment of policy objectives: 
 Support programme was designed to ensure ‘implementation readiness’ not to 
pursue implementation impact 
 Implementation readiness was generally thought to have been achieved 
 The programme was time-limited and there was some wish in localities for a 
continuation of the support role into later stages of implementation 
 There were strong concerns that factors in the external environment undermined the 
attainment of policy objectives 
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5 Discussion: Key Overarching themes 
 
In this final section of the report we pull out some of the recurring themes from our 
investigation that hold significance for the development and application of implementation 
support programmes more generally. We depict these as the ‘5Cs’ – context, closeness, 
complexity, collaboration and clarity.  
 
5.1  Context 
It is a mistake to think that policy drives innovation. Rather it sets the context within which 
those with a remit for policy delivery must make crucial decisions on the shape of 
implementation. In everyday talk it is often said that things should not be ‘taken out of 
context’. This similarly applies to policy implementation, since there is now a growing body 
of evidence that an intervention that is successful in one location does not deliver the same 
results elsewhere (Health Foundation, 2014; Horton et al, 2018).  As Dixon-Woods (2014) 
points out: 
 
‘History is littered with examples of showpiece programmes that do not consistently 
manage to export their success beyond the home soil of early iterations’ (p89). 
 
All of this ties in with the long-standing literature on ‘receptive’ and ‘non-receptive’ contexts 
for change pioneered by Pettigrew et al (1992). The quintessential task of implementation 
support could therefore be said to be to assist the organisational shift towards a ‘receptive’ 
implementation context. Weiner (2009) describes this as ‘organisational readiness’ for 
change - a state of being both psychologically and behaviourally able and willing to take action 
in a desired direction.  Of relevance here is the health system transformation initiative 
launched by WHO Europe which includes a self-assessment checklist to enable policy-makers 
to reflect upon, and assess, their readiness for change and whether or not the requisite 
capacities and capabilities are in place for successful implementation to occur (WHO, 2018).  
It is a focus on subtle, incremental changes and an awareness of what needs to be in place 
for change to happen without which more prominent achievements cannot be attained or 
sustained. This is precisely the approach that was taken in relation to the Care Act 2014 and 
its associated improvement support programme. 
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It is likely that the implementation support process will more easily flourish in some contexts 
than others – indeed a recurring caveat throughout this report has been the receptive political 
and professional context within which the Care Act support programme functioned. Not all 
policies can be expected to be characterised by a high degree of political and professional 
agreement; in fact, most will almost certainly be the outcome of divisive and contentious 
disagreements. Health and Wellbeing Boards (HWBs), for example, have been described as 
enjoying ‘overwhelming support’ from a political perspective (Humphries et al, 2012). 
However, professionally, potential tensions were found with the role of the board, relating to 
their functions spanning public health, local government, the local NHS and the third sector 
(Humphries et al, 2012). A more recently published evaluation of HWBs funded by the 
Department of Health Social Care Policy Research Programme led by one of us (Hunter) 
concluded that while they had the potential to become system leaders, since they were the 
one place where the system came together, they were under-powered to perform such a role 
satisfactorily (Hunter et al, 2018).  In particular, HWBs had no powers to hold partners to 
account and were in danger of being eclipsed by new national initiatives, notably 
Sustainability and Transformation Programmes and more recently Integrated Care System 
partnerships.  No amount of implementation support could compensate for HWBs being 
viewed generally as ‘talking shops’ which added little of value.  It was also felt that, as bodies 
established by local government, they were not well understood or valued by the NHS and 
therefore risked being marginalised.     
 
The importance of the external environment was also evident in the Vanguard Programme. 
The NHS England implementation programme, while generally welcomed, was to some 
extent handicapped by various contextual factors which were dominant. This was evident in 
an evaluation in the North East of England for which two of us (Hudson and Hunter) were co-
investigators (Maniatopoulos et al, 2017). It found that despite the support available and the 
attempt to avoid Vanguards being viewed as another top-down initiative, those responsible 
for designing and operating the new care models felt under intense scrutiny and pressure 
from NHS England to deliver positive results.  There was pressure to deliver within 
unrealistically tight timescales when complex changes involving transforming the culture and 
behaviour of the workforce took time to succeed and become embedded.  Under such 
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circumstances there was a tendency to overlook the initial welcome emphasis on encouraging 
and valuing local flexibility and context.  Resisting the tendency to interfere and micro-
manage from the centre became a preoccupation of, and distraction for, many Vanguards.  
Ensuring the requisite mix of skills and capabilities, as well as investment in these, was 
another major factor determining success and while limited transformation funds were made 
available to lubricate the change process, it is arguable whether they were sufficient to bring 
about the changes required and to ensure that these were sustainable in the longer term.  A 
final key message is that for changes of the type Vanguards were introduced to undertake to 
have a chance of becoming embedded over time requires both a continuing commitment to 
invest in support and development and the creation and protection of space to enable change 
to occur and prosper.  Achieving such an outcome proved to be a delicate balancing act in 
regard to Vanguards and one that was difficult to achieve or maintain.  These findings are 
echoed in a study of eight Vanguards conducted by a team from the Health Foundation 
(Starling, 2017).        
 
In order to develop a wider understanding of the potential role and shape of implementation 
support strategies it is therefore also necessary to consider other sorts of contexts.  
 
A useful framework for understanding the role of context is Matland’s (1995) classic work on 
the impact of conflict and ambiguity on implementation. Matland’s premise is that the 
different characteristics of policies have varying implications for the way these policies are 
implemented – and, by extension, for the ways in which implementation support 
programmes might best be constructed. He uses a distinction between issues about the 
extent of policy ambiguity on the one hand, and issues about policy conflict on the other, to 
develop the matrix shown in Table 10 below. 
 
There are important implications arising from this analysis for ensuring the right model of 
policy implementation support is associated with each domain of the matrix. Broadly we can 
hypothesise that: 
 
 Administrative Implementation is amenable to a model associated with guidance, 
regulation and top-down performance management 
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 Political Implementation is amenable to a model associated with guidance, regulation 
and performance management but will also require flexibility and collaborative 
working 
 Experimental Implementation is amenable to a model associated with a bottom-up 
approach, sensitivity to the implementation context and support for problem-solving 
 Symbolic Implementation is amenable to a model associated with the same features 
as experimental implementation but may also require support for capacity building. 
Table 10: Matland’s Model of Conflict, Ambiguity and Implementation  





 low ambiguity and low conflict 
 the pre-requisite conditions for a 
rational decision process are in place 
 an activity associated with a generally 
shared and straightforward objective 
 suitable for the application of a top-
down approach 
 key organising concept: resources 
POLITICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
 low ambiguity but high conflict 
 a straightforward but strongly contested 
activity 
 amenable to interaction and feedback 
 implementation outcomes determined 
by the location of authority 






 high ambiguity but low conflict 
 a complex policy domain where 
cause-effect mechanisms are 
uncertain 
 environmental influences likely to be 
important; different organisations 
implement different policies 
 bottom-up approaches likely to be 
important 
 key organising concept: context 
SYMBOLIC IMPLEMENTATION 
 high conflict and high ambiguity 
 an absence of clarity about what can be 
achieved conflict and ambiguity 
 no strong coalition to create progress 
 significant professional values and 
allegiances 
 neither top nor bottom stakeholders 
committed 
 key organising concept: collaborative 
strength 
 
These categories are not mutually exclusive - policies could contain several elements – but 
the task of policy-makers and policy practitioners is nevertheless to determine which policies 
require what mix of support to give them the best chance of effective implementation.   
 
Page 115 of 157 
 
The Troubled Families initiative could be described as ‘Administrative Implementation’. There 
was relatively low ambiguity and conflict with clear guidance produced setting out the terms 
for payment by results for implementation success.  At the opposite side of the model, 
‘Symbolic Implementation’ can be used to describe the implementation approach of the 
Community Care Support Force. The approach taken consisted primarily of ‘leading edge’ 
practitioners being brought in to work alongside localities in enabling them to meet the 
requirements of the policy (Henwood & Wistow, 1993). The approach was very much bottom 
up with elements of capacity building within local teams.  
 
HWBs could best be described as a clear example of ‘Experimental Implementation’ combined 
with some elements of ‘Symbolic Implementation’.  The introduction of new forms of 
partnership working to promote health and wellbeing occurred in a context of low conflict 
but one in which there was considerable ambiguity over exactly what HWBs would and could 
do with their limited powers.   There was also variable commitment to HWBs among the 
partners, many of whom displayed a number of the components of ‘Symbolic 
Implementation’.      
 
In regard to the NHS Vanguards initiative, this was another example of ‘Experimental 
Implementation’ although with some features of ‘Political Implementation’ visible given the 
importance of the initiative and its high-risk political profile.  The national support programme 
accompanying the Vanguards displayed elements of ‘Administrative Implementation’ and 
‘Political Implementation’ given the tensions between a desire for top-down control and 
performance management of outcomes on the one hand and a recognition that complex 
cultural change of the kind envisaged demanded flexibility and finding local solutions to long-
standing problems.    
 
In the case of the Care Act, the policy is probably best understood as ‘experimental 
implementation’. Although the passage of the legislation was characterised by relatively low 
conflict it incorporated some new and largely untested ideas that were always likely to be 
open to interpretation – high ambiguity. In these circumstances a bottom-up approach 
showing sensitivity to local context alongside support for problem-solving was (in line with 
Matland’s hypothesis) the correct approach.  
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Our research was not able to properly explore the role of other types of implementation 
support in other policy domains, chiefly because of a paucity of information and research 
exploring this dimension, but the fact that we were unable to discern any clear and sustained 
interventions comparable to that associated with the Care Act 2014 is a matter of concern. 
Further work is needed to understand the relationship between policy implementation and 
policy support in other domains.  
 
5.2 Closeness 
One of the most striking – and perhaps unexpected – findings of this research has been the 
importance in some of our local sites of the role of the Regional Coordinator. Where the 
responsibility for implementation of a national policy largely lies with a multiplicity of local 
agencies in a system of ‘dispersed governance’, there needs to be some way of linking the 
national and local levels. One way is for the centre to simply pass down instructions to local 
implementing actors but there is now incontrovertible evidence of the limitations of this sort 
of remote ‘hands off’ approach.  
 
All of this implies the need to find some way of bridging the understanding of national and 
local narratives via some intermediary body. One approach is the formation of what has been 
termed ‘implementation support centres’ (Pew Charitable Trust, 2017) – entities of various 
types that work alongside and often at the direction of government to support effective 
implementation. Franks and Bory (2015) develop a similar concept in their exploration of 
‘intermediary organisations’ which, they conclude, ‘appear to play a critical role not only in 
implementing model programs, but also in developing the necessary capacity for systems 
change’ (p54).  
 
In the case of the Care Act, the Regional Coordinator undertook precisely this sort of role. As 
we have already noted, this very lightly funded regional tier ended up having a significance 
that far exceeded expectations. The benefits included: reducing implementation isolation – 
localities were able to learn from each other; peer support and networking – forums were 
created that encouraged the sharing of achievements and problems; two-way 
communication – messages were received from the centre to localities but implementation 
Page 117 of 157 
 
concerns were relayed back through the same channels.; and organisational effectiveness – 
regions set up their own work streams to grapple with common problems. 
 
This raises the more general issue of our second ‘C’ - ‘closeness’ – the existence or creation 
of some form of local presence to support implementation. Geographically remote support 
at national level in the form of guidance, toolkits and information-giving events can only be 
expected to deliver marginal results. One option is for each locality to develop its own 
implementation support unit (which some of our localities effectively decided to do) but this 
is likely to be expensive, duplicative and runs the risk of being unduly inward-facing. An 
alternative is to consider the case for a domain-specific policy implementation support unit 
that is available to the field. In effect, this is the model that was used in the 1990s with the 
Community Care Support Force and the Community Care Task Force, both outlined earlier in 
this report. The approach here is one of making available a cadre of experienced and trusted 
‘implementation entrepreneurs’ with the skills and capacity to tap into the perceptions and 
experiences of those whose behaviour will shape implementation. It is likely to require a 
flexible staffing model able to respond to different needs and demands along the lines of the 
Joint Improvement Team in Scotland (Petch, 2011; Hendry, 2016) and the Change Agent Team 
in England (2004).  
 
All of this presupposes the availability of a cadre of such individuals with the necessary 
experience, skills and attributes to engage with local implementing agencies. Whilst much 
attention is given to issues such as governance and budgets in policy implementation, much 
less is given to the role and behaviour of those who could undertake a dedicated responsibility 
to create and sustain a range of complex connections in pursuit of implementation support 
activities.  
 
As we have noted above, acceptance of the role and contribution of the Regional Coordinator 
hinged in good part upon their ability to establish a personal reputation. Getting behaviour 
right can make all the difference between successful support and a doomed intervention, 
indicating a more general issue concerning the importance of relationships over and above 
structures and levels of governance. The strongest card that can be played is personal skills 
and credibility; the weakest is to seek to impose authority. Roberts and King (1996) go so far 
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as to suggest that such ‘policy entrepreneurs’ appear to have a unique identity with certain 
innate personality characteristics. These include being highly intuitive, critical analytical 
thinkers, instigators of constructive social action, well-integrated personalities, highly 
developed egos, high level of leadership and above average creative potential. It also has 
implications for the style of leadership adopted with engaged and adaptive leadership being 
most appropriate in complex settings involving a diversity of stakeholders (Heifetz et al, 
2009).  There is also a need to avoid an obsession with competences.  As an alternative, the 
idea of capability has been advanced – the extent to which individuals and groups can adapt 
to change, generate new knowledge and continue to improve their performance in situations 
where there is little certainty or agreement (Edmonstone, 2013).  This points to the crucial 
importance of relationships both within and between organisations.  It is an understatement 
to say that finding the requisite combination of experience and skill will be challenging but 
one of the key tasks of a new approach to implementation support will be to identify, nurture 
and institutionalise such behaviours and leadership styles. 
 
5.3 Complexity 
Traditional analyses have concentrated on separating out individual parts of the system from 
their context and environment. These ‘closed systems’ are seen as characterised by 
‘equilibrium’ such that problems can be analysed without reference to the external 
environment. Best and Holmes (2010) use the term ‘linear models’ to describe this approach 
which they characterise as a one-way process in which knowledge, guidance, toolkits and so 
forth are disseminated to end users and are then in turn expected to be smoothly 
incorporated into local policy and practice.  
 
Our investigation into implementation support for the Care Act raises the issue of when it is 
more sensible to acknowledge and work with complexity. Rather than make assumptions 
about linearity. It is fair to say that the majority of health and social care system change 
initiatives mistakenly attempt to control or manipulate context rather than foster emergent 
solutions (Holmes et al 2017). It echoes the claim of Pawson (2013) that a support mission to 
provide an overlay of uniformity and stability on unstable and endlessly evolving social 
systems will – other than in the case of Matland’s ‘administrative implementation’ – be of 
limited effectiveness.  In the case of the Care Act support programme there was a paradox. 
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Although the programme was acknowledged to be reasonably sensitive to the complexity of 
local contexts, it was seen as insufficient to take account of wider environmental turbulence. 
This led some to suggest that although the support to attain implementation readiness had 
been successful, the impact of austerity and funding cuts to local councils had made it 
difficult, if not impossible, to implement the principles of the Act. 
 
5.4 Collaboration 
The growing enthusiasm within the UK for whole system working has arisen from a 
recognition that many of the problems that public services now deal with are too complex to 
be addressed by one agency acting in isolation – they are ‘wicked’ problems (Rittel and 
Webber, 1973). Cross-cutting problems like health inequalities and social exclusion are 
frequently cited examples, but issues like reducing unplanned hospital admissions and 
delayed hospital discharges would also be included.  The place of adult social care within a 
wider inter-agency system was also a central feature of the Care Act 2014, especially in the 
case of relationships with the NHS. All of this requires an administrative system capable of 
focusing on ‘place’ rather than on separate – and often competing – organisational priorities.  
 
Addressing fragmentation through a collaborative and coordinated approach to policy design 
and policy implementation was perhaps the defining feature of the Care Act support 
programme. This report has detailed the formal structural arrangements (the Programme 
Board and Programme Office), the legal Memorandum of Understanding, the multiplicity of 
work streams bringing in a wide range of expertise where it was needed and the high levels 
of trust and mutual respect at national level between the three key stakeholders – the 
Department of Health and Social Care, the Local Government Association and the Association 
of Directors of Adult Services. This constituted a remarkable degree of partnership working 
and one that resulted in the creation of a successful – and possibly unique – programme of 
implementation support. 
 
Effective horizontal collaboration has to be matched by successful vertical collaboration. This 
too could be regarded as successful, especially where use was made of the Regional 
Coordinator role – communications between the centre and the localities remained open and 
constructive. However, two weak links in the collaborative chain were identified in the 
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fieldwork. First, vertical collaboration at local level too often stopped at the level of senior 
management. Operational staff working at the front-line, and users and carers themselves 
were the groups most likely to feel untouched by the efforts of the support programme. And, 
secondly, there was relatively little coordination between the prime local implementing 
agency – local authority adult social care – and other partners with a role in the promotion of 
health and wellbeing. The prison service, housing agencies, public health and others often 
seemed to be left on the outside of the support arrangements. Conversely, where the NHS is 
taking the lead, as with the current ‘new models of care’ initiative, it can be social care that is 
left on the outside of shared arrangements. It is a reminder that despite over forty years of 
official exhortation for inter-dependent public agencies to work together in partnership, 
progress has been at best patchy (Exworthy and Hunter, 2011).  
 
5.5 Clarity 
While the most valued aspects of the Care Act implementation support programme tended 
to be the regional links (an intervention seen as supportive), perhaps the least helpful was 
the stocktaking exercises (an intervention seen as regulatory). Although there is certainly a 
case for both types of intervention to be part of any implementation process, it does raise the 
issue of the appropriateness of combining compliance and support within one agency or 
programme. There seems to have been relatively little attempt to explore these tensions in 
contemporary institutions and policies but there is still much to be learned from Henkel’s 
seminal study of the Audit Commission, Social Services Inspectorate and Health Advisory 
Service (Henkel, 1991). In all three cases attempts were made to straddle compliance and 
support to change, sometimes with a degree of success. In the case of the Audit Commission 
it was the perceived independence from government that was vital, allied to credibility within 
the relevant policy communities. Henkel notes that: 
 
‘The auditors had to combine rational-technical approaches to managerial problems 
with recognition of the complex structure of political, professional, managerial and 
industrial relations.’  (p64) 
 
The evolution of the Social Work Service (SWS) into the Social Services Inspectorate (SSI) was 
more fraught. The leitmotif of the SWS was to serve in a professional and advisory capacity 
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and attempts to recast it as an inspectorate were seen as unwelcome. In 1985, this resulted 
in the conversion of SWS into the SSI with a sharper interventionist focus on obtaining value 
for money. Henkel concluded that the tensions between compliance and support in this new 
incarnation were not successfully resolved. Much the same fate befell the Health Advisory 
Service (HAS) which was conceived as a multi-professional advisory service committed to 
achieving improvement by persuasion, but was soon reshaped by the era of managerial 
control. Henkel again concluded that HAS ended up ‘pleasing neither managers nor powerful 
professionals’ (p177).  
 
All of this suggests that the way in which offers of implementation support are couched and 
perceived is vital in understanding their likely effectiveness. It is appropriate that local 
implementation agencies should be required to demonstrate probity in the ways in which 
public money has been used and effectiveness in terms of delivering on policy objectives. 
However, if the implementation of a policy is also thought to require sensitive, localised 
support that works with the grain of complexity then it would be circumspect to separate out 
this role from that of regulation and performance management. 
 
5.6 Tactics for Supporting Implementation 
Alongside these broad messages for selecting a type of support programme, there is the 
further question of developing a repertoire of tactics – practical measures to aid policy 
practitioners in their activities and decision-making. The starting point for this analysis was 
the notion of ‘policy failure’ discussed in section 2:1 where it was suggested that through a 
better understanding of how policy can go wrong, it is possible to develop a better 
appreciation of the potential role of policy support programmes. Such an understanding could 
determine the point at which support might be most helpful (if at all) as well as the most 
appropriate mode of support and its potential duration.  
 
Four broad causes of policy failure were identified – overly optimistic expectations, dispersed 
governance, inadequate collaborative policymaking and the vagaries of the political cycle. 
Each of these can be roughly equated with the four chronological phases of preparation, 
prioritisation and tracking, support and review (discussed in section 2:2) as shown in Table 11 
below.       
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Table 11: Policy Failure and Policy Support Programmes  
      Type of Policy Failure          Mode of Policy Support 
Overly Optimistic Expectations Implementation Preparation: Better Policy 
Design 
Dispersed Governance Prioritisation and Tracking: Better Policy 
Monitoring 
Inadequate Collaborative Policy-Making Implementation Support: Better Policy 
Impact 
Vagaries of the Political Cycle Implementation Review: Better Policy 
Learning 
 
Although aspects of each of these elements can be routinely found, it is not usual for all of 
them to be combined in a comprehensive manner to address all four stages. The most 
common mode of intervention tends to be around performance tracking, with policy-making 
bodies keen to unearth some evidence that their efforts are bearing fruit. Much less attention 
is being given to the other three elements identified in Table 11.  
 
The rise of post-modernism and the era of ‘post-truth’ politics (Baron, 2018) arguably makes 
it more important than ever to establish a more robust evidence base for the design and 
delivery of policy. Although there is now a substantial literature on the policy-implementation 
gap and on discrete aspects of implementation support, such as policy design or performance 
monitoring, there is relatively little evidence on the use or effectiveness of coherent and 
comprehensive policy support programmes. Indeed, we know little about their very 
existence. A first useful step would be to commission wider research into the role of policy 
support programmes themselves, to better understand what works for whom and in what 
circumstances. It is not enough to be aware of the policy-implementation gap; we need better 
ideas on how to fix it.  
  




From the outset it was recognised that the Care Act was a complex piece of legislation, 
introducing the most significant change in social care law in England for sixty years. It was also 
recognised that implementation would not be easy and dependent on context and the 
involvement of multiple stakeholders presenting specific challenges well identified in the 
policy literature (Davies et al, 2008; Russell et al, 2008). This highlights the importance of 
understanding the processes through which policy is implemented and how successful 
implementation and service improvements can be supported. The approach taken in the 
implementation support approach to the Care Act 2014 built upon the collaborative nature 
of the development of the Care Act and involved key national stakeholders - the Department 
of Health and Social Care, LGA and the ADASS - working in partnership to develop and support 
the implementation process. This collaboration sought to embed partnership working as a 
coherent approach throughout local implementation of the Care Act.  The range of support 
mechanisms used within the implementation approach set the Care Act apart from previous 
policies reviewed in this study. 
 
This research has looked to “… identify effective practice in implementation, and ‘what works’ 
in terms of service redesign and provision” and to identify “potentially transferrable lessons 
that may be relevant to other local government reform programmes. These lessons could also 
help to focus the approach taken to implementing funding reforms from 2020” (Department 
of Health, Invitation to Tender). Four key concerns have guided the research: 
 
1. How this approach may support redesign of local services and systems, to improve the 
provision of care and support, to improve quality, and to reduce risks to delivery  
2. How, and to what extent, centrally commissioned or developed implementation 
support (including regional Care Act implementation structures) is supporting local 
changes 
3. To identify effective practice in implementation, and ‘what works’ in terms of service 
redesign and provision  
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4. To identify potentially transferrable lessons that may be relevant to other local 
government reform programmes. 
 
Overall, it can be concluded that the Care Act implementation support programme 
significantly helped ensure the implementation readiness of the local agencies. One of the 
main successes identified for the implementation support programme relates to its securing 
of policy legitimacy, the address and successful navigation of complex issues through 
stakeholder engagement and support, and its ensuring of the readiness of local 
implementation agencies.   Stakeholder engagement at a macro, national level was regarded 
as the key feature of the implementation support programme. The relationships presented 
between the three key national stakeholders (Department for Health and Social Care, LGA 
and ADASS) at a national level were somewhat unique with no comparable achievement able 
to be found in other policy domains. The model demonstrated engagement, drawing on 
existing relationships, brought in external expertise, facilitated the sharing of ideas and 
balanced bureaucratic and network elements of governance.  This was a feature absent from 
the other policies reviewed for this study and may be difficult to replicate in full as the 
approach was developed from the approach taken to policy development for the Care Act.  
 
As highlighted throughout this report, regional leads, although not a new support approach, 
were seen to have a significant impact on supporting local changes. These appointments were 
seen as a conduit between regions and the Programme Management Office. In some localities 
this regional tier had significance which far exceeded its expectations (particularly true in the 
northern case studies). Benefits of the regional tier included; reducing implementation 
isolation – localities were able to learn from each other; peer support and networking – 
forums were created that encouraged the sharing of achievements and problems; two-way 
communication – messages were received from the centre to localities but implementation 
concerns were relayed back through the same channels; and organisational effectiveness – 
regions set up their own work streams to grapple with common problems. This approach may 
be particularly significant in relation to the implementation of policy within situations of 
dispersed governance.  
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6.1 Key messages 
Three principles were identified to underpin the support programme established: 
 
 Clarity of expectations and requirements: this was to cover the new legislative 
framework, financial issues and the outcomes to be achieved, all of which were to be 
effectively communicated to meet the needs of different audiences. 
 Flexible products: these were to be accessible and drawn upon in a way that met local 
needs. 
 Collaborative infrastructure: one that supports collaboration at local, regional and 
national levels through an ongoing two-way supportive dialogue. Underpinning this 
infrastructure was the relationship between the three key partners.   
 
Given the relative novelty of such comprehensive policy support programmes there is 
correspondingly little empirical evidence to draw upon at this stage. However the issues, 
literature and evidence presented  in this report  offer an opportunity to tease out some 
provisional messages for policy-makers and practitioners on how best to approach the task. 
We outline these below. 
 
Policy Design Preparation 
 Exploration of policy options and their feasibility with key implementation agencies 
 Creation of forums for collaborative policy design: the more consensual the design 
process the less the likelihood of disagreements at the implementation stages 
 Development of policy design assurance frameworks: identification of significant 
implementation risks and challenges along with risk management strategies 
 Production of robust implementation statements: clear expectations of what should 
reasonably be expected to be delivered and under what circumstances 
 Use of the best available evidence base to inform policy design 
 Agreement on what would constitute an adequate funding stream for anchoring the 
policy and achieving the programme objectives 
 Ensure the agencies tasked with implementation can reasonably be expected to 
succeed in the task 
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Policy Tracking 
 Two-way communication processes: progress reports from implementation agencies 
to the policy-making centre; responses back from the centre to implementing 
agencies 
 Use or creation of intermediary bodies between the policy-making and policy 
implementing levels 
 Development of proportionate primary and secondary targets along with agreed 
timelines 
 Separation of monitoring, regulating and inspecting roles from support mechanisms: 
use of policy support programmes to better understand the stories behind the 
statistics 
 Realistic expectations of what constitutes ‘success’: policy objectives might never be 
fully delivered in the case of ‘wicked issues’ 
 
Policy Implementation Support 
 Ensure the common ground developed with key stakeholders at the preparation stage 
is also applied to those putting policies into effect in managerial and professional 
roles: understanding bottom-up discretion and dilemmas 
 Recruitment and development of a cadre of experienced and trusted ‘implementation 
brokers’ to offer support tailored to local contexts 
 Offer implementation support where it is needed or requested: ongoing assistance 
with problem-solving and capacity-building to develop sustainable implementation 
skills and knowledge 
 
Policy Implementation Review 
 Short, medium and longer-term review landmarks: clarity on what should have been 
achieved by when 
 Routine use of action research as well as more traditional evaluative methods  
 Political acknowledgement that complex policies need to be given time to demonstrate 
achievements: costs and benefits will be unevenly distributed over time 
 




This study specifically aimed to examine the implementation support structures and 
processes established by central government to support local authorities’ implementation of 
the Care Act.  As such, the research focus did not address the local implementation of the Act 
itself and what impact this had on users and carers of social care. In undertaking interviews 
and focus groups at a local authority case site level it was often difficult to separate people’s 
views about local delivery from whether the support programme provided sufficient 
preparatory support. This was particularly an issue when interviewing frontline managers and 
staff and users and carers where locally there was limited awareness of the central support 
programme.  
 
In future research it may be useful to  explore whether those authorities that felt better  
prepared in terms of implementation were more or less successful in local implementation. 
Some of this data may be available from other research projects within the wider research 
programme commissioned on the Care Act by the Department of Health and Social Care of 
which this study was just one. 
 
This research also only related to phase one of the implementation of the Care Act given the 
postponement of phase two of the reforms. It is possible, as identified by some respondents 
in our study, that different findings may have resulted if phase two had been followed through 
in line with the original timeframe. Further research may be useful in examining the 
implementation of this aspect of reforms to the social care system. 
 
Our work suggests that the Care Act support programme was relatively successful – and 
probably unique – in preparing the implementation agencies for legislative readiness. The 
support programme was widely welcomed by respondents in our case study sites. However, 
to understand the value of support programmes of this nature it would be necessary to look 
at other policy domains more closely in order to take account of different contexts and 
challenges. The Care Act arrangements were able to build upon established collaborative 
structures that had shaped policy design and built a consensus about the content of the 
legislation and accompanying guidance. The challenges facing support programmes in more 
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contested policy domains would be different and greater. Our research carries some 
important messages for securing effective policy implementation but these messages do 
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Appendix A: Ethical approval 
 
 
Professor Stephen Peckham MA 
(Econ) 
George Allen Wing 
University of Kent 
Canterbury 
CT2 7NF  
 
Layden House  




 Date:  21 Jul 2017  
 Our Ref: RG16-18 (phase 2) 
Dear Stephen, 
 
Improving choices for care: a strategic research initiative on the 
implementation of the care act 2014 RG16-18 (Phase 2) 
 
I am writing on behalf of the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services 
Executive Council and am pleased to tell you that the Executive has decided 
recommend your project to its members; directors and assistant directors of adult 
social services. A circular advising directors of this decision will shortly be in their 
hands.  
 
In the interests of ensuring that adult social services departments receive the 
maximum benefit from co-operating in research projects such as your own, the 
Executive places great importance on disseminating findings and conclusions.   It 
encourages researchers to find ways, including (but not exclusively) formal 
publication of a report, of feeding back the results of their research to participating 
departments.  It would welcome a short summary of the findings of this project, once 
you have completed it, in a form suitable for distribution to adult social services 
departments. We would appreciate knowing your expected publishing date.   
 
The Executive Council has also requested that researchers involved in specific 
recent applications liaise with each other, to avoid duplication and to consider the 
timetabling of calls on local authority time. I emailed details of the other relevant 
projects to you previously, on 19th June 2017.  
 




Hilary Paxton, ADASS Assistant Director 
Sent on behalf of the ADASS Executive Council 
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Appendix B: Ethical approval 
  
  
Social Care REC  
Ground Floor  




SE1 6LH  
 Telephone: 
0207 972 
2568  Fax:  
  
  
23 February 2018  
  
Professor Stephen Peckham  
Centre for Health Services Studies  
University of Kent  
Canterbury, Kent  
CT2 7NF   
  
  
Dear Professor Peckham  
  
Study title:  Improving choices for care: a strategic 
research initiative on implementation of the 
care act 2014  
REC reference:  17/IEC08/0050  
IRAS project ID:  
  
237177  
Thank you for your letter of 19 December 2017, responding to the Committee’s 
request for further information on the above research and submitting revised 
documentation.  
  
The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the 
Chair.  
  
We plan to publish your research summary wording for the above study on the 
HRA website, together with your contact details. Publication will be no earlier 
than three months from the date of this opinion letter.  Should you wish to 
provide a substitute contact point, require further information, or wish to make a 
request to postpone publication, please contact hra.studyregistration@nhs.net 
outlining the reasons for your request.  
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Confirmation of ethical opinion  
  
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical 
opinion for the above research (apart from that already taken place, the staff 
research as detailed in our letter dated 08 January 2018) on the basis 
described in the application form, protocol and supporting documentation as 
revised, subject to the conditions specified below.  
  
The Committee would like to remind you, as stated in our letter dated 08 
January 2018 and our  
Standard Operating Procedures (added below), that if you are submitting an 
application in the  
future which involves staff and service users, the whole study needs to be 
submitted for an ethical review before any of the research is commenced, 
including the research with staff.   
  
The Health Research Authority’s (HRA) Standard Operating Procedures state 
that for dual staff and patient studies - Studies which include both NHS and 
social care provider staff who are recruited through their professional capacity 
and NHS patients/service users, should be reviewed by a REC and an opinion 
given on the study as a whole. There is no REC requirement to ensure that the 
staff element of the study has been reviewed by a non NHS REC prior to giving 
a decision.   
  
  
Conditions of the favourable opinion  
  
The REC favourable opinion is subject to the following conditions being met 
prior to the start of the study.  
  
1. Although you have submitted an amended participant information sheet, 
letter of invitation and consent form in response to point 7 our letter, 
there is mention of observations in them  which was not explained.  
Either delete the reference to observations or explain them – what is 
being observed and when.  Is it just during the focus group?  
  
You should notify the REC once all conditions have been met (except for 
site approvals from host organisations) and provide copies of any 
revised documentation with updated version numbers. Revised 
documents should be submitted to the REC electronically from IRAS. The 
REC will acknowledge receipt and provide a final list of the approved 
documentation for the study, which you can make available to host 
organisations to facilitate their permission for the study. Failure to 
provide the final versions to the REC may cause delay in obtaining 
permissions.  
  
Management permission must be obtained from each host organisation prior to 
the start of the study at the site concerned.  
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Management permission should be sought from all NHS organisations involved 
in the study in accordance with NHS research governance arrangements. Each 
NHS organisation must confirm through the signing of agreements and/or other 
documents that it has given permission for the research to proceed (except 
where explicitly specified otherwise).   
Guidance on applying for NHS permission for research is available in the 
Integrated Research Application System, www.hra.nhs.uk or at 
http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk.    
  
Where a NHS organisation’s role in the study is limited to identifying and 
referring potential participants to research sites ("participant identification 
centre"), guidance should be sought from the R&D office on the information it 
requires to give permission for this activity.  
  
For non-NHS sites, site management permission should be obtained in 
accordance with the procedures of the relevant host organisation.   
  
Sponsors are not required to notify the Committee of management permissions 
from host organisations  
  
Registration of Clinical Trials  
  
All clinical trials (defined as the first four categories on the IRAS filter page) 
must be registered on a publically accessible database within 6 weeks of 
recruitment of the first participant (for medical device studies, within the 
timeline determined by the current registration and publication trees).    
  
There is no requirement to separately notify the REC but you should do so at 
the earliest opportunity e.g. when submitting an amendment.  We will audit the 
registration details as part of the annual progress reporting process.  
  
To ensure transparency in research, we strongly recommend that all research 
is registered but for non-clinical trials this is not currently mandatory.  
  
If a sponsor wishes to request a deferral for study registration within the 
required timeframe, they should contact hra.studyregistration@nhs.net. The 
expectation is that all clinical trials will be registered, however, in exceptional 
circumstances non registration may be permissible with prior agreement from 
the HRA. Guidance on where to register is provided on the HRA website.    
  
It is the responsibility of the sponsor to ensure that all the conditions are 
complied with before the start of the study or its initiation at a particular 
site (as applicable).  
  
Approved documents  
  
The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as 
follows:  
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Document    Version    Date    
Evidence of Sponsor insurance or indemnity (non NHS Sponsors 
only) [Insurance]   
      
Interview schedules or topic guides for participants [Interview 
schedule]   
2   09 August 2017   
IRAS Application Form [IRAS_Form_18102017]      18 October 2017   
IRAS Application Form XML file [IRAS_Form_18102017]      18 October 2017   
IRAS Checklist XML [Checklist_12022018]      12 February 2018   
Other [ADASS support]   1   21 July 2017   
Other [Response to ethics committee]   1   05 October 2017   
Other [Access sheet (focus group)]   2   18 October 2017   
Other [Consent form (focus group)]   2   14 August 2017   
Other [Unfavourable Opinion Letter]      08 September 2017  
Other [Response letter 19-12-17.pdf]   1   19 December 2017   
Other [Focus group topic guide]   2   02 February 2018   
Other [Consent Form (focus group)]   3   02 February 2018   
Other [Focus group - Information for research participants]   3   02 February 2018   
Other [3rd response letter final SP.docx]   3   02 February 2018   
Other [Focus group - letter template]   3   12 February 2018   
Participant consent form [Consent Form]   2   14 August 2017   
Participant information sheet (PIS) [PIS]   2   14 August 2017   
Research protocol or project proposal [Proposal]         
Response to Request for Further Information      19 December 2017   
Summary CV for Chief Investigator (CI) [SP-CV]   1      
  
Statement of compliance  
  
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance 
Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees and complies fully with the 
Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the UK.  
  
After ethical review  
  
Reporting requirements  
  
The attached document “After ethical review – guidance for researchers” gives 
detailed guidance on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable 
opinion, including:  
  
• Notifying substantial amendments  
• Adding new sites and investigators  
• Notification of serious breaches of the protocol  
• Progress and safety reports  
• Notifying the end of the study  
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The HRA website also provides guidance on these topics, which is updated in 
the light of changes in reporting requirements or procedures.  
  
  
User Feedback  
  
The Health Research Authority is continually striving to provide a high quality 
service to all applicants and sponsors. You are invited to give your view of the 
service you have received and the application procedure. If you wish to make 
your views known please use the feedback form available on the HRA website: 
http://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-the-hra/governance/qualityassurance/     
  
HRA Training  
  
We are pleased to welcome researchers and R&D staff at our training days – 
see details at http://www.hra.nhs.uk/hra-training/    
  
  
17/IEC08/0050                          Please quote this number on all correspondence  
  
















Enclosures:    “After ethical review – guidance for  researchers”   
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Appendix C: Key decisions and actions from the Programme Board minutes 
Care Act Programme Board work streams: 
ID Workstream SRO/lead Policy area & lead Policy commitments Objectives (summary) 
1 Funding reform policy Tabitha Jay Cap & Extended Means 
Test (Sara Mason) 
 
Charging Framework Policy 
(Sara Mason)   
 
Funding Reform 
Legislation (Sara Mason) 
 
Financial Services 
Engagement & behaviour 
change (John Murphy) 
 
Funding Reform Finance & 
Impact Assessment (Tom 
Skrinar & James Umpleby) 
 
Funding allocations (Jo ?) 
Introduction of a cap on 
care costs that limits the 
amount a person has to 
contribute towards the 
cost of care to meet their 
eligible needs; 
 
Increase the threshold for 
when financial help 
becomes available with 
the cost of care; 
 
Introduction of a national, 
notional standard 
contribution to living 
costs. 
Delivery and 
implementation of a 
reformed system for 
determining how much 
people contribute towards 
their care and support that 
shares the costs of care 
between the state and the 
individual more equitably 




To implement appeals 
system for 2016: 
 
To consult on appeals 
policy proposals in early 
2015 to inform 
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Appeals Finance & Impact 
Assessment 
Be clear and easy to 
understand; 
 
Be locally accountable; 
 
Provide public redress; 
 
Resolve issues in a timely, 
effective and cost-effective 
way; 
 
Have an independent 
element; 
 
Promote local resolution 
development of 
regulations and guidance; 
 
To develop policy for the 
appeals system that 
delivers on ministerial 
aims for a system that 
provides some level of 
independence whilst being 
proportionate; 
 
To develop and scope tool 
kits to help local 
authorities implement 
system 




Market Oversight Regime 
(Richard Campbell) 
 
Market Impact (Stephen 
Airey) 
 
To develop a market 
oversight regime, to be 
operated by CQC, focusing 
on ensuring people 
continue to receive 
services when certain 
providers fail; 
 
To clarify the 
responsibilities of LAs 
To enhance the operation 
of adult social care 
markets: 
Clarification of the 
responsibilities of LAs 
when 
providers in their area fail 
 
Supporting LAs to develop 
their capacity to shape 
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Developing Good Practice 
in Commissioning, 
including 
Commissioning for Better 
Outcomes (Stephen Airey) 
 
Direct Payments in 
Residential Care (Amy 
Baldwin) 
when providers in their 
area fail; 
 
To provide a general duty 
for LAs to develop the 
diversity, quality and 
sustainability of the local 
care market; 
 
To support LAs to consider 
the whole population in 
their commissioning, 
market shaping and 
market oversight, not just 
those they directly fund 
diverse, sustainable and 
high quality markets 
 
Develop and improve LA 
commissioning practices, 
to ensure a focus on 
outcomes 
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Care Act Programme Board ‘enablers’ 
ID Workstream SRO/lead Policy area & lead Objectives (summary) 
4 Implementation Support Tabitha Jay Workforce L&D and Capacity 
Planning 2016/17 (John 
Woods / Sara Mason) 
 
Funding Reform Implementation 
Support (John 
Woods / Avril Mayhew) 
Understand local assumptions, 
risks and opportunities regarding 
Phase 2 delivery. 
 
Share good local practice in terms 
of planning for the new system 
and models of service delivery to 
support councils’ and other 
stakeholders’ implementation of 
Phase 2. 
 
Enable local authorities to 
effectively implement a 
framework to achieve the policy 
objectives of funding reform. 
 
Encourage local authorities to 
view their implementation of 
Phase 2 as part of a wider 
opportunity to become more 
effective and efficient as they 
reshape their local social care 
offer and operations, rather than 
in isolation as a response to a new 
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cohort of people interacting with 
the local system. 
5 Communications Steven Pollock Policy areas and project leads: 
Fraser Clubbe & Suzanne 
Lawrence 
 
Raising Awareness 2016/17 
Reforms 
 
Behaviour Change Campaign 
 
Strategic Communications 
To increase awareness among 
local system leaders of the 
rationale behind and vision for the 
changes; 
 
To increase awareness in target 
media of the difference the 




To increase confidence among 
national stakeholders in the steps 
being taken by DH to improve care 
and support; 
6 Informatics Charlotte Buckley Policy areas and project leads: 
Matt Birkenshaw (DH) & Mark 
Golledge (LGA) 
 





IT Systems and LA/ Supplier 
Readiness 
 
Suppliers and Local Authorities are 
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Nationally to support 
development of, and address 
national barriers to, online citizen 
self-service to support key 
functions: 
• Information and advice 
• Needs self-assessment 
• Financial self-assessment • PB / 
IPB calculations 
• Care Account Access 




Ensure data collections from local 
government reflect new 
requirements of Care Act to 
facilitate effective monitoring and 
evaluation. 
7 Programme Management Office 
(PMO) 
Martin Caunt & 
Andrew Hughes 
PMO activity leads: 
 
External Assurance & Benefits – 
Clare Brown (DH) 
Programme Management & Board 
Secretariat – 
Rachael Whitaker (DH) 
PMO enables the Care and 
Support Reform Programme 
Board and associated Boards to 
effectively and efficiently oversee 
delivery of the Care Act to the 
approved Programme Plan 
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– Lynne Morris 
 
Provider Implementation – Avril 
Mayhill / Ian Turner 
 
LA Readiness Stocktakes – Tom 
Shakespeare 
 
Monitoring Programme Budget – 
Clare Brown 
PMO supports Local Authorities, 
service providers and other 
partners implementation through 
timely communication of the 
Programme plan and the key 
decisions of the Boards 
 
 
DH , LGA and MPA assurance that 
programme well managed and 
planned and remains on track for 
delivery of expected benefits 
 
Local authorities understand their 
own readiness and support needs 
to implement the Act 
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Care Act Programme Board – Benefits Realisation 
ID Workstream SRO/lead Policy area & lead Objectives (summary) 
8 Benefits Delivery Simon Medcalf Policy areas or enablers in benefits 
phase: 
 
Paying For Care – Tabitha Jay 
 
Integration & Cooperation – Ed 
Scully  
 
Information, Advice & Advocacy – 
Paul Richardson  
 
Housing – Ed Scully 
 
Ordinary Residence – Paul 
Richardson 
 
ASC in Prisons – Anne McDonald 
 
Quality and Safety – Paul 
Richardson 
Care Planning & Personalisation – 
Paul Richardson  
 
To understand how the 
programme has made a difference 
to the lives of those with care and 
support needs and their families, 
both in terms of outcomes and 
experience of services 
 
Learn how the programme has 
changed local delivery approaches 
 
Measure success in terms of 
monetary savings 
 
Understand how the joint 
programme has added value 
and supported local 
implementation 
 
Use the knowledge gained to 
inform future work to 
maximise the realisation of 
anticipated benefits 
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Assessment & Eligibility – Simon 
Medcalf  
 
Prevention – Simon Medcalf 
 
Delayed Discharge – Charlotte 
Buckley 
 
 
 
